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ABSTRACT
This paper presents new homogeneous series on top wealth shares from 1916 to 2000 in the United
States using estate tax return data. Top wealth shares were very high at the beginning of the period
but have been hit sharply by the Great Depression, the New Deal, and World War II shocks. Those
shocks have had permanent effects. Following a decline in the 1970s, top wealth shares recovered
in the early 1980s, but they are still much lower in 2000 than in the early decades of the century.
Most of the changes we document are concentrated among the very top wealth holders with much
smaller movements for groups below the top 0.1%. Consistent with the Survey of Consumer
Finances results, top wealth shares estimated from Estate Tax Returns display no significant increase
since 1995. Evidence from the Forbes 400 richest Americans suggests that only the super-rich have
experienced significant gains relative to the average over the last decade. Our results are consistent
with the decreased importance of capital income at the top of the income distribution documented
by Piketty and Saez (2003) and suggest that the rentier class of the early century is not yet
reconstituted. The most plausible explanations for the facts are perhaps the development of
progressive income and estate taxation which has dramatically impaired the ability of large wealth
holders to maintain their fortunes, and the democratization of stock ownership which now spreads
stock market gains and losses much more widely than in the past.
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The pattern of wealth and income inequality during the process of development of modern
economies has attracted enormous attention since Kuznets (1955) formulated his famous in-
verted U-curve hypothesis. Wealth tends to be much more concentrated than income because
of life cycle savings and because it can be transmitted from generation to generation. Liberals
have blamed wealth concentration because of concerns for equity and in particular for tilting
the political process in the favor of the wealthy. They have proposed progressive taxation as
an appropriate counter-force against wealth concentration.1 For conservatives, concentration of
wealth is considered as a natural and necessary outcome of an environment that provides incen-
tives for entrepreneurship and wealth accumulation, key elements of macro-economic success.
Redistribution through progressive taxation might weaken those incentives and generate large
eﬃciency costs. Therefore, it is of great importance to understand the forces driving wealth
concentration over time and whether government interventions through taxation or other regu-
lations are eﬀective and/or harmful to curb wealth inequality. This task is greatly facilitated by
the availability of long and homogeneous series of income or wealth concentration. Such series
are in general diﬃcult to construct because of lack of good data. In this paper, we use the ex-
traordinary micro dataset of estate tax returns that has been recently compiled by the Statistics
of Income Division of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in order to construct homogeneous
series of wealth shares accruing to the upper groups of the wealth distribution since 1916, the
beginning of the modern federal estate tax in the United States.
The IRS dataset includes detailed micro-information for all federal estate tax returns ﬁled
during the 1916-1945 period.2 We supplement these data with both published tabulations and
other IRS micro-data of estate tax returns from selected years of the second half of the century.
We use the estate multiplier technique, which amounts to weighting each estate tax return by the
inverse probability of death, to estimate the wealth distribution of the living adult population
from estate data. First, we have constructed almost annual series of shares of total wealth
1In the early 1930s, President Roosevelt justiﬁed the implementation of drastic increases in the burden and
progressivity of federal income and estate taxation in large part on those grounds.
2The estate tax return data was compiled electronically and hence saved for research purposes thanks to Fritz
Scheuren, former director of the Statistics of Income division at the IRS.
1accruing to various sub-groups within the 2% of the wealth distribution.3 Although small in
size, these top groups hold a substantial fraction of total net worth in the economy. Second,
for each of these groups, we decompose wealth into various sources such as real estate, ﬁxed
claims assets (bonds, cash, mortgages, etc.), corporate stock, and debts. We also display the
composition by gender, age, and marital characteristics. This exercise follows in the tradition
of Lampman (1962), who produced top wealth share estimates for a few years between 1922
and 1956. Lampman, however, did not analyze groups smaller than the top .5% and this is
an important diﬀerence because our analysis shows that, even within the top percentile, there
is dramatic heterogeneity in the shares of wealth patterns. Most importantly, nobody has
attempted to estimate, as we do here, homogeneous series covering the entire century.4
Our series show that there has been a sharp reduction in wealth concentration over the 20th
century: the top 1% wealth share was close to 40% in the early decades of the century but has
ﬂuctuated between 20 and 25% over the last three decades. This dramatic decline took place at
a very speciﬁc time period, from the onset of Great Depression to the end of World War II, and
was concentrated in the very top groups within the top percentile, namely groups within the
top 0.1%. Changes in the top percentile below the top 0.1% have been much more modest. It is
fairly easy to understand why the shocks of the Great Depression, the New Deal policies which
increased dramatically the burden of estate and income taxation for the wealthy, and World
War II, could have had such a dramatic impact on wealth concentration. However, top wealth
shares did not recover in the following decades, a period of rapid growth and great economic
prosperity. In the early 1980s, top wealth shares have increased, and this increase has also been
very concentrated. However, this increase is small relative to the losses from the ﬁrst part of
the twentieth century and the top wealth shares increased only to the levels prevailing prior to
the recessions of the 1970s. Furthermore, this increase took place in the early 1980s and top
shares were stable during the 1990s. This evidence is consistent with the dramatic decline in top
3For the period 1916-1945, because of very high estate tax exemption levels, the largest group we can consider
is the top 1%.
4Smith (1984) provides estimates for some years between 1958 and 1976 but his series are not fully consistent
with Lampman (1962). Wolﬀ (1994) has patched series from those authors and non-estate data sources to produce
long-term series. We explain in detail in Section 5.3 why such a patching methodology can produce misleading
results.
2capital incomes documented in Piketty and Saez (2003) using income tax return data. As they
do, we tentatively suggest (but do not prove) that steep progressive income and estate taxation,
by reducing the rate of wealth accumulation of the rich, may have been the most important
factor preventing large fortunes to be reconstituted after the shocks of the 1929-1945 period.
Perhaps surprisingly, our top wealth shares series do not increase during the 1990s, a time of
the Internet revolution and the creation of dot-com fortunes, extra-ordinary stock price growth,
and of great increase in income concentration (Piketty and Saez, 2003). Our results are never-
theless consistent with ﬁndings from the Survey of Consumer Finances (Kennickell, 2003; Scholz,
2003) which also indicate hardly any growth in wealth concentration since 1995. This absence of
growth in top wealth shares in the 1990s is not necessarily inconsistent with the income shares
results from Piketty and Saez (2003) because the dramatic growth in top income shares since
the 1980s has been primarily due to a surge in top labor incomes, with little growth of top
capital incomes. This may suggest that the new high income earners have not had time yet to
accumulate substantial fortunes, either because the pay surge at the top is too recent a phe-
nomenon, or because their savings rates are very low. We show that, as a possible consequence
of democratization of stock ownership in America, the top 1% individuals do not hold today a
signiﬁcantly larger fraction of their wealth in the form of stocks than the average person in the
U.S. economy, explaining in part why the bull stock market of the late 1990s has not beneﬁted
disproportionately the rich.5
Although there is substantial circumstantial evidence that we ﬁnd persuasive, we cannot
prove that progressive taxation and stock market democratization had the decisive role we
attribute to them. In our view, the primary contribution of this paper is to provide new and
homogeneous series on wealth concentration using the very rich estate tax statistics. We are
aware that the assumptions needed to obtain unbiased estimates using the estate multiplier
method may not be met and, drawing on previous studies, we try to discuss as carefully as
possible how potential sources of bias, such as estate tax evasion and tax avoidance, can aﬀect
our estimates. Much work is still needed to compare systematically the estate tax estimates
5We also examine carefully the evidence from the Forbes 400 richest Americans survey. This evidence shows
sizeable gains but those gains are concentrated among the top individuals in the list and the few years of the
stock market “bubble” of the late 1990s, followed by a sharp decline from 2000 to 2002.
3with other sources such as capital income from income tax returns, the Survey of Consumer
Finances, and the Forbes 400 list.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data sources and outlines our
estimation methods. Section 3 presents our estimation results. We present and analyze the
trends in top wealth shares and the evolution of the composition of these top wealth holdings.
Section 4 proposes explanations to account for the facts and relates the evolution of top wealth
shares to the evolution of top income shares. Section 5 discusses potential sources of bias, and
compares our wealth share results with previous estimates and estimates from other sources such
as the Survey of Consumer Finances, and the Forbes richest 400 list. Finally, Section 6 oﬀers
a brief conclusion and compares the U.S. results with similar estimates recently constructed
for the United Kingdom and for France. All series and complete technical details about our
methodology are gathered in appendices of the paper.
2 Data, Methodology, and Macro-Series
In this section, we describe brieﬂy the data we use and the broad steps of our estimation
methodology. Readers interested in the complete details of our methods are referred to the
extensive appendices at the end of the paper. Our estimates are from estate tax return data
compiled by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) since the beginning of the modern estate tax in
the United States in 1916. In the 1980s, the Statistics of Income division of the IRS constructed
electronic micro-ﬁles of all federal estate tax returns ﬁled for individuals who died in the period
1916 to 1945. Stratiﬁed and large electronic micro-ﬁles are also available for 1965, 1969, 1972,
1976, and every year since 1982.6 For a number of years between 1945 and 1965 (when no micro-
ﬁles are available), the IRS published detailed tabulations of estate tax returns (U.S. Treasury
Department, Internal Revenue Service, various years).7 This paper uses both the micro-ﬁles and
the published tabulated data to construct top wealth shares and composition series for as many
years as possible.
In the United States, because of large exemption levels, only a small fraction of decedents
has been required to ﬁle estate tax returns. Therefore, by necessity, we must restrict our analysis
6Those data are stratiﬁed and hence always contain 100% of the very large estates.
7Those tabulations are also based on stratiﬁed samples with 100% coverage at the top.
4to the top 2% of the wealth distribution. Before 1946, we can analyze only the top 1%. As
the analysis will show, the top 1%, although a small fraction of the total population, holds
a substantial fraction of total wealth. Further, there is substantial heterogeneity between the
bottom of the top 1% and the very top groups within the top 1%. Therefore, we also analyze in
detail smaller groups within the top 1%: the top .5%, top .25%, the top .1%, the top .05%, and
the top .01%. We also analyze the intermediate groups: top 1-.5% denotes the bottom half of
the top 1%, top .5-.25% denoted the bottom half of the top .5%, etc. Estates represent wealth
at the individual level and not the family or household level. Therefore, it is very important to
note that our top wealth shares are based on individuals and not families. We come back to this
issue later. Each of our top groups is deﬁned relative to the total number of adult individuals
(aged 20 and above) in the U.S. population, estimated from census data. Column (1) of Table A
reports the number of adult individuals in the United States from 1916 to 2002. The adult
population has more than tripled from about 60 million in 1916 to over 200 million in 2000. In
2000, there were 201.9 million adults and thus the top 1% is deﬁned as the top 2.019 million
wealth holders, etc.
We adopt the well-known estate multiplier method to estimate the top wealth shares for the
living population from estate data. The method consists in inﬂating each estate observation by
a multiplier equal to the inverse probability of death.8 The probability of death is estimated
from mortality tables by age and gender for each year for the U.S. population multiplied by
a social diﬀerential mortality factor to reﬂect the fact that the wealthy (those who ﬁle estate
tax returns) have lower mortality rates than average. The social diﬀerential mortality rates
are based on the Brown et al. (2002) diﬀerentials between college educated whites relative to
the average population and are assumed constant over the whole period (see Appendix B for
a detailed discussion and analysis of the validity of this assumption). The estate multiplier
methodology will provide unbiased estimates of the wealth distribution if our multipliers are
correct on average and if probability of death is independent of wealth within each age and
gender group for estate tax return ﬁlers. This assumption might not be correct for three main
reasons. First, extraordinary expenses such as medical expenses and loss of labor income may
8This method was ﬁrst proposed in Great Britain almost a century ago by Mallet (1908). Atkinson and
Harrison (1978) describe the method in detail.
5occur and reduce wealth in the years preceding death. Second, even within the set of estate tax
ﬁlers, it might be the case that the most able and successful individuals have lower mortality
rates, or inversely that the stress associated with building a fortune, increases the mortality rate.
Last and most importantly, for estate tax avoidance and other reasons, individuals may start
to give away their wealth to relatives as they feel that their health deteriorates. We will later
address each of these very important issues, and try to analyze whether those potential sources
of bias might have changed overtime.
The wealth deﬁnition we use is equal to all assets (gross estate) less all liabilities (mortgages,
and other debts) as they appear on estate tax returns. Assets are deﬁned as the sum of tangible
assets (real estate and consumer durables), ﬁxed claim assets (cash, deposits, bonds, mortgages,
etc.), corporate equities, equity in unincorporated businesses (farms, small businesses), and var-
ious miscellaneous assets. It is important to note that wealth reported on estate tax returns only
includes the cash surrender value of pensions. Therefore, future pension wealth in the form of
deﬁned beneﬁts plans, and annuitized wealth with no cash surrender value is excluded. Vested
deﬁned contributions accounts (and in particular 401(k) plans) are included in the wealth deﬁ-
nition. Social Security wealth as well as all future labor income and human wealth is obviously
not included in gross estate. Estate tax returns include the full payout of life insurance but we
include only the cash value of life insurance (i.e., the value of life insurance when the person is
living) in our estimates.
Therefore, we focus on a relatively narrow deﬁnition wealth, which includes only the mar-
ketable or accumulated wealth that remains upon the owner’s death. This point is particularly
important for owners of closely held businesses: in many instances, a large part of the value of
their business reﬂects their personal human capital and future labor, which vanishes at their
death. Both the narrow deﬁnition of wealth (on which we focus by necessity because of our
estate data source), and broader wealth deﬁnitions including future human wealth are inter-
esting and important to study. The narrow deﬁnition is more suited to examine problems of
wealth accumulation and transmission, while the broader deﬁnition is more suited to study the
distribution of welfare.9
9The analysis of income distribution captures both labor and capital income and is thus closer to an analysis
of distribution of the broader wealth concept.
6For the years for which no micro data is available, we use the tabulations by gross estate,
age and gender and apply the estate multiplier method within each cell in order to obtain a
distribution of gross wealth for the living. We then use a simple Pareto interpolation technique
and the composition tables to estimate the thresholds and average wealth levels for each of our
top groups.10 For illustration purposes, Table 1 displays the thresholds, the average wealth level
in each group, along with the number of individuals in each group all for 2000, the latest year
available.
We then estimate shares of wealth by dividing the wealth amounts accruing to each group by
total net-worth of the household sector in the United States. The total net-worth denominator
has been estimated from the Flow of Funds Accounts for the post-war period and from Goldsmith
et al. (1956) and Wolﬀ (1989) for the earlier period.11 The total net-worth denominator includes
all assets less liabilities corresponding to the items reported on estate tax returns so that the
deﬁnitions of wealth in the numerator and the denominator are as close as possible. Thus, our
denominator only includes deﬁned contribution pension reserves, and excludes deﬁned beneﬁts
pension reserves. Life insurance reserves, which reﬂect the cash surrender value of all policies
held are included in our denominator. The total wealth and average wealth (per adult) series
are reported in real 2000 dollars in Columns (3) and (4) of Table A. The CPI deﬂator used to
convert current incomes to real incomes is reported in Column (10). The average real wealth
series per adult along with the CPI deﬂator is plotted in Figure 1. Average real wealth per adult
has increased by a factor of three from 1916 to 2000 but the growth was very uneven during the
period. There was virtually no growth in average real wealth from 1916 to the onset of World
War II. Average wealth then grew steadily from World War II to the late 1960s. Since then,
wealth gross has been slower, except in the 1994-2000 period.12
After we have analyzed the top share data, we will also analyze the composition of wealth
10We also use Pareto interpolations to impute values at the bottom of 1% or 2% of the wealth distribution for
years where the coverage of our micro data is not broad enough.
11Unfortunately, no annual series exist before 1945. Therefore, we have built upon previous incomplete series
to construct complete annual series for the 1916-1944 period.
12It is important to note that comparing real wealth over time is diﬃcult because it requires to use a price
index and there is substantial controversy about how to construct such an index and account properly for the
introduction of new goods. That is why most of the paper focuses on top wealth shares which are independent of
the price index.
7and the age, gender, and marital status of top wealth holders, for all years where these data
are available. We divide wealth into six categories: 1) real estate, 2) bonds (federal and local,
corporate and foreign) 3) corporate stock, 4) deposits and saving accounts, cash, and notes, 5)
other assets (including mainly equity in non-corporate businesses), 6) all debts and liabilities.
In order to compare the composition of wealth in the top groups with the composition of total
net-worth in the U.S. economy, we display in columns (5) to (9) of Table A, the fractions of real
estate, ﬁxed claim assets, corporate equity, unincorporated equity, and debts in total net worth
of the household sector in the United States. We also present on Figure 1, the average real value
of corporate equity and the average net worth excluding corporate equity. Those ﬁgures show
that the sharp downturns and upturns in average net worth are primarily due to the dramatic
changes in the stock market prices, and that the pattern of net worth excluding corporate equity
has been much smoother.
3 The Evolution of Top Wealth Shares
3.1 Trends
The basic series of top wealth shares are presented in Table B1. Figure 2 displays the wealth
share of the top 1% from 1916 to 2000. The top 1% held close to 40% of total wealth, up to the
onset of the Great Depression. Between 1930 and 1932, the top 1% share fell by more than 10
percentage points, and continued to decline during the New Deal, World War II, and the late
1940s. By 1949, the top 1% share was around 22.5%. The top 1% share increased slightly to
around 25% in the mid-1960s, and then fell to less than 20% in 1976 and 1982. The top 1% share
increases signiﬁcantly in the early 1980s (from 19% to 22%) and then stays remarkably stable
around 21-22% in the 1990s. This evidence shows that the concentration of wealth ownership in
the United States decreased dramatically over the century. This phenomenon is illustrated on
Figure 3 which displays the average real wealth of those in the top 1% (left-hand-side scale) and
those in the bottom 99% (right-hand-side scale). In 1916, the top 1% wealth holders were more
than 60 times richer on average than the bottom 99%. The ﬁgure shows the sharp closing of the
gap between the Great Depression and the post World War II years, as well as the subsequent
parallel growth for the two groups (except for the 1970s). In 2000, the top 1% individuals are
8about 25 times richer than the rest of the population.
Therefore, the evidence suggests that the twentieth century’s decline in wealth concentration
took place in a very speciﬁc and brief time interval, 1930-1949 which spans the Great Depression,
the New Deal, and World War II. This suggests that the main factors inﬂuencing the concen-
tration of wealth might be short-term events with long-lasting eﬀects, rather than slow changes
such as technological progress and economic development or demographic transitions.
In order to understand the overall pattern of top income shares, it is useful to decompose
the top percentile into smaller groups. Figure 4 displays the wealth shares of the top 1-.5%
(the bottom half of the top 1%), and the top .5-.1% (the next .4 percentile of the distribution).
Figure 4 also displays the share of the second percentile (Top 2-1%) for the 1946-2000 period.
The ﬁgure shows that those groups of high but not super-high wealth holders experienced much
smaller movements than the top 1% as a whole. The top 1-.5% has ﬂuctuated between 5 and 6%
except for a short-lived dip during the Great Depression. The top .5-.1% has experienced a more
substantial and long-lasting drop from 12 to 8% but this 4 percentage point drop constitutes a
relatively small part of the 20 point loss of the top 1%. All three groups have been remarkably
stable over the last 25 years.
Examination of the very top groups in Figure 5 (the top .1% in Panel A and the top .01% in
Panel B) provides a striking contrast to Figure 4. The top .1% declined dramatically from more
than 20% to less than 10% after World War II. For the top .01%, the fall was even more dramatic
from 10% to 4%: those wealthiest individuals, a group of 20,000 persons in 2000, had on average
1000 times the average wealth in 1916, and have about 400 times the average wealth in 2000.
It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the groups below the very top on Figure 4, the fall
for the very top groups continued during World War II. Since the end of World War II, those
top groups have remained fairly stable up to the late 1960s. They experienced an additional
drop in the 1970s, and a very signiﬁcant increase in the early 1980s: from 1982 to 1985, the top
.01% increased from 2.5% to 4%, a 60% increase. However, as all other groups, those top groups
remained stable in the 1990s. Therefore, the evidence shows that the dramatic movements of
the top 1% share are primarily due to changes taking place within the upper fractiles of the top
1%. The higher the group, the larger the decline. It is thus important to analyze separately
each of the groups within the top 1% in order to understand the diﬀerence in the patterns.
9Popular accounts (see Section 5.3 below) suggest that the computer technology in the recent
decades has created many new rich individuals. Those newly rich individuals are likely to be
much younger than the older rich. However, even if the new rich are younger and hence less likely
to die than the old rich, our estimates based on estate tax data should not be biased downward.
This is because the estate multiplier method corrects for changes in the age distribution of top
wealth holders. Our estimates should, however, become noisier (as the sampling probability by
death is reduced). This phenomenon should generate noisier series in the recent period but with
no systematic bias as long as our multipliers correctly reﬂect the inverse probability of death
of the wealthy in each age-gender cell.13 However, the series displayed on Figures 2, 4, and 5
are very smooth in the 1990s, suggesting that the groups we consider are large enough so that
sampling variability is small.14
3.2 Composition
Figure 6 displays the composition of wealth within the top 1% for 1929, a year when top wealth
shares and stock prices were very high. Wealth is divided into four components: real estate,
corporate stock (including both publicly traded and closely held stock), ﬁxed claims assets
(all bonds, cash and deposits, notes, etc.), and other assets (including primarily non-corporate
business assets).15 Figure 6 shows that the share of corporate stock is increasing with wealth
while the share of real estate is decreasing with wealth, the share of ﬁxed claims assets being
slightly decreasing (the share of bonds is slightly increasing and the share of cash and deposits
slightly decreasing). In the bottom of the top 0.5%, each of those three component represents
about one third of total wealth. At the very top, stocks represent almost two thirds of total
wealth while real estate constitutes less than 10%. This broad pattern is evident for all the years
of the 1916-2000 period for which we have data:16 the share of stocks increases with wealth and
the share of real estate decreases. The levels, however, may vary over time due mainly to the
sharp movements in the stock market.
13If fewer than expected of these young wealthy individuals die, the estimate is downward biased but if more
than expected die, the estimate is upward biased.
14The estimates are independent across years as every person dies only once.
15Debts have been excluded from the ﬁgure but they are reported in Table B3.
16All these statistics are reported in Table B3.
10Figure 7 displays the fraction of corporate stock in net worth over the period 1916-2000 for
the top .5%, and for total net worth in the U.S. economy (from Tables B3 and A respectively).
Consistent with Figure 6, the fraction of stock is much higher for the top .5% (around 50%
on average) than for total net worth (around 20% on average). Both series are closely parallel
from the 1920s to the mid 1980s: they peak just before the Great Depression, plunge during the
depression, stay low during the New Deal, World War II, up to the early 1950s, and peak again
in the mid-1960s before plummeting in the early 1980s.
This parallel pattern can explain why the share of wealth held by the top groups dropped so
much during the Great Depression. Real corporate equity held by households fell by 70% from
1929 to 1933 (Figure 1) and the top groups hold a much greater fraction of their wealth in the
form of corporate stock (Figure 7). Those two facts mechanically lead to a dramatic decrease in
the share of wealth accruing to the top groups. The same phenomenon took place in the 1970s
when stock prices plummeted and the shares of top groups declined substantially (the real price
of corporate stock fell by 60% and the top 1% fell by about 20% from 1965 to 1982).
Corporate proﬁts increased dramatically during World War II, but in order to ﬁnance the
war, corporate tax rates increased sharply from about 10% before the war to over 50% during
the war and they stayed at high levels after the war. This ﬁscal shock in the corporate sector
reduced substantially the share of proﬁts accruing to stock-holders and explains why average
real corporate equity per adult increased by less than 4% from 1941 to 1949 while the average
net worth increased by about 23% (see Figure 1). Thus, top wealth holders, owning mostly
stock, lost relative to the average during the 1940s, and the top shares declined signiﬁcantly.
The central puzzle to understand is why this explanation does not work in reverse after 1949,
that is, why top wealth shares did not increase signiﬁcantly from 1949 to 1965 and from 1986
to 2000 when the stock market prices soared, and the fraction of corporate equity in total net
worth of the household sector increased from just around 12% (in 1949 and 1986) to almost 30%
in 1965 and almost 40% in 2000?
The series on wealth composition of top groups might explain the absence of growth in top
wealth shares during the 1986-2000 episode. The fraction of corporate stock in the top groups
did not increase signiﬁcantly during the period (as can be seen on Figure 7, it actually drops
signiﬁcantly up to 1990 and then recovers during the 1990s). Therefore, although the fraction of
11corporate equity in total net worth triples (from 12% to 38%), the fraction of corporate equity
held by the top groups is virtually the same in 1986 and 2000 (as displayed on Figure 7). Thus,
the data imply that the share of all corporate stock from the household sector held by the top
wealth holders fell sharply from 1986 to 2000. Several factors may explain those striking results.
First, the development of deﬁned contribution pensions plans, and in particular 401(k) plans,
and mutual funds certainly increased the number of stock-holders in the American population,17
and thus contributed to the democratization of stock ownership among American families. The
Survey of Consumer Finances shows that the fraction of families holding publicly traded stock
(directly or indirectly through mutual funds and pension plans) has increased signiﬁcantly in
the last two decades, and was just above 50% in 2001.18
Second, the wealthy may have re-balanced their portfolios as gains from the stock-market
were accruing in the late 1980s and the 1990s, and thus reduced their holdings of equity relative
to more modest families.
In any case, the data strikingly suggest that top wealth holders did not beneﬁt dispropor-
tionately from the bull stock market relative to the average wealth holder.19 This might explain
in part why top wealth shares did not increase in that period when top income shares were
dramatically increasing (see Section 5 below). By the year 2000, the fraction of wealth held
in stock by the top 1% is just slightly above the fraction of wealth held in stock by the U.S.
household sector (40% versus 38%). Therefore, in the current period, sharp movements of the
stock market are no longer expected to produce sharp movements in top wealth shares as was
the case in the past.20
17The Flow of Funds Accounts show that the fraction of corporate stock held indirectly through Deﬁned
Contribution plans and mutual funds doubled from 17% to 33% between 1986 and 2000.
18In 1989, only 31.7% of American households owned stock, either directly or indirectly though pension and
mutual funds, while 48.9% and 51.9% did in 1998 and 2001 respectively. See Kennickell et al. (1997) and Aizcorbe
et al. (2003).
19It is important to keep in mind that, because the wealth distribution is very skewed, the average wealth is
much larger than median wealth. Obviously, the stock market surge of the 1990s did not beneﬁt the bottom half
of American families who do not hold any stock.
20It should be emphasized, though, that the wealthy may not hold the same stocks as the general population.
In particular, the wealthy hold a disproportionate share of closely held stock, while the general population holds
in general only publicly traded stocks through mutual and pension funds (see e.g. Kennickell, 2003). Estate tax
returns statistics separate closely held from publicly traded stock only since 1986.
123.3 Age, Gender, and Marital Status
Figure 8 displays the average age and the percent female within the top .5% group since 1916.21
The average age displays a remarkable stability over time ﬂuctuating between 55 and 60. Since
the early 1980s, the average age has declined very slightly from 60 to around 57. Thus, the
evidence suggests that there have been no dramatic changes in the age composition of top
wealth holders over time.22 In contrast, the fraction of females among top wealth holders has
almost doubled from around 25% in the early part of the century to around 45% in the 1990s.
The increase started during the Great Depression and continued throughout the 1950s and
1960s, and has been fairly stable since the 1970s. Therefore, there has been substantial gender
equalization in the holding of wealth over the century in the United States, and today, almost
50% of top wealth holders are female. It is striking, comparing Figure 2 and Figure 8, to note
the negative correlation between the top wealth shares and the fraction of women in the top
wealth groups. This suggests that the gender equalization at the top might have contributed to
the decline in top wealth shares measured at the individual level. It is conceivable that wealth
concentration measured at the family level has not declined as much as wealth concentration
measured at the individual level.23
Estate tax law regarding bequests to spouses has changed over time and this might have
aﬀected the gender composition at the top through behavioral responses to estate taxation.
Before 1948, bequests to spouses were not deductible from taxable estates with an exception
of couples located in the so-called community property states where each spouse owned half of
all assets acquired during marriage. Starting in 1948, spousal bequests became deductible up
to 50% of the net estate. In 1981, spousal bequests became fully deductible.24 Those changes
might have increased the amount of spousal bequests made by wealthy individuals and hence
21Series for all groups are reported in Table B4.
22Although, due to signiﬁcant decreases in mortality over the course of the 20
th century, top wealth holders
nowadays have more years of potential lifespan ahead of them and are therefore younger relative to the average
population than in the early part of the century.
23We come back to this point in Section 5.3 when we compare our estimates with wealth concentration measures
at the family level obtained with the Survey of Consumer Finances for the recent period.
24Similarly, 50% and 100% of spousal gifts became deductible in 1948 and 1981 respectively. In 1976, the
marital deduction was modiﬁed to allow for the greater of 50% of estate or $250,000 to be deductible.
13potentially increased the fraction of women in the top wealth groups.25 Two points should be
noted.
First, Figure 8 shows that most of increase in female fraction in the top wealth groups
happened before the changes in estate tax law regarding spousal bequests (in 1948 and 1981)
implying that those tax law changes can explain at best a fraction of the trend. As we discuss
below, estate tax rates at the top became very high in the 1930s.26 As a result, in order to
avoid “double estate taxation”, wealthy husbands had an incentive to pass their wealth directly
to the next generations instead of passing it to their widowed spouses. Such a phenomenon
should have decreased the number of wealthy widows, which should have reduced the number of
wealthy widows at the top. Splitting wealth between spouses using gifts before death was not a
better tax strategy as it would have triggered substantial gift taxes (following the introduction
of the gift tax in 1932) before the marital deduction (for estates and gifts) was introduced in
1948. The main reason why the number of women in the top groups increases so much during
the Great Depression seems to be due to diﬀerences in wealth composition between genders. In
the late 1920s, wealthy women held a smaller fraction of their wealth in the form of stock than
wealthy men. As a result, wealthy men lost a larger fraction of their wealth following the stock
market crash of 1929 than wealthy women, thereby contributing to the increase in the fraction
of women at the top.
Second, even tax law induced changes in spousal bequests have a real impact on the distribu-
tion of wealth across gender lines, and thus should not necessarily be regarded as unimportant.
The marital status of top wealth holders has experienced relatively modest secular changes.
For males, the fraction of married men has always been high (around 75%), the fraction widowed
has declined slightly (from 10 to 5%) and the fraction single has increased (from 10 to 15%).
For females, the fraction widowed is much higher, although it has declined over the period from
about 40% to 30%. The fraction married has increased from about 40% to 50% for females and
thus the fraction single has been stable around 10%. This reinforces our previous interpretation
that the increase in the fraction female at the top of the wealth distribution has not been due
solely to an increase in the number of wealthy widows following increased spousal bequests,
25See Kopczuk and Slemrod (2003) for a detailed discussion of this point.
26The top estate rate increased from 20 to 45 percent in 1932, and then to 60% in 1935, to 70% in 1936, and
to 77% in 1941.
14but might reﬂect increases in female empowerment in the family (fairer distribution of assets
between spouses) and in the labor market (reduction of the income gender gap overtime).
4 Understanding the Patterns
4.1 Are the Results Consistent with Income Inequality Series?
One of the most striking and debated ﬁndings of the literature on inequality has been the sharp
increase in income and wage inequality over the last 25 years in the United States (see Katz and
Autor, 1999, for a recent survey). As evidenced from income tax returns, changes have been
especially dramatic at the top end, with large gains accruing to the top income groups (Feenberg
and Poterba, 1993, 2000; Piketty and Saez, 2003). For example, Piketty and Saez (2003) show
that the top 1% income share doubled from 8% in the 1970s to over 16% in 2000.27 How can
we reconcile the dramatic surge in top income shares with the relative stability of top wealth
shares estimated from estate tax data since the 1980s?
Figure 9 casts light on this issue. It displays the top .01% income share from Piketty and
Saez (2003), along with the composition of these top incomes28 into capital income (dividends,
rents, interest income, but excluding capital gains), realized capital gains, business income, and
wages and salaries. Up to the 1980s (and except during World War II), capital income and
capital gains formed the vast majority of the top .01% incomes. Consistently with our top .01%
wealth share series presented on Figure 5B, the top .01% income share was very high in the late
1920s, and dropped precipitously during the Great Depression and World War II, and remained
low until the late 1970s. Thus both the income and the estate tax data suggests the top wealth
holders were hit by the shocks of the Great Depression and World War II and that those shocks
persisted a long time after the war.
Over the last two decades, as can be seen on Figure 9, the top .01% income share has indeed
increased dramatically from 0.9% in 1980 to 3.6% in 2000. However, the important point to
note is that this recent surge is primarily a wage income phenomenon and to a lesser extent
27See the series of Piketty and Saez (2003) updated to year 2000.
28This group represents the top 13,400 taxpayers in 2000, ranked by income excluding realized capital gains
although capital gains are added back to compute income shares.
15a business income phenomenon.29 Figure 9 shows that capital income earned by the top .01%
relative to total personal income is not higher in 2000 than it was in the 1970s (around 0.4%).
Adding realized capital gains does not alter this broad picture: capital income including capital
gains earned by the top .01% represents about 1% of total personal income in 2000 versus about
0.75% in the late 1960s, a modest increase relative to the quadrupling of the top .01% income
share during the same period.
Therefore, the income tax data suggest that the dramatic increase in top incomes is a la-
bor income phenomenon that has not translated yet into an increased concentration of capital
income. Therefore, in the recent period as well, the income tax data paints a story that is con-
sistent with our estate tax data ﬁndings of stability of the top wealth shares since the mid-1980s.
The pattern of capital income including realized capital gains displayed on Figure 9 is strikingly
parallel to the pattern of the top .01% wealth share of Figure 5B: a mild peak in the late 1960s,
a decline during the bear stock market of the 1970s, a recovery in the early 1980s, and no growth
from 1990 to 2000.
Three elements might explain why the surge in top wages since the 1970s did not lead to
a signiﬁcant increase in top wealth holdings. First, it takes time to accumulate a large fortune
out of earnings.30 The top .01% average income in the late 1990s is around 10 million dollars
while the top .01% wealth holding is around 60 million dollars. Thus, even with substantial
saving rates, it would take at least a decade to the average top .01% income earner starting
with no fortune to become an average top .01% wealth holder. Second, it is possible that the
savings rates of the recent “working rich” who now form the majority of top income earners,
are substantially lower than the savings rates of the “coupon-clippers” of the early part of the
century. Finally, certain groups of individuals report high incomes on their tax return only
temporarily (e.g., executives who exercise stock-options irregularly, careers of sport or show-
business stars usually last for just a few years). To the extent that such cases became more
29Gains from exercised stock options are reported as wage income on income tax returns. There is no doubt
that the recent explosion in the use of stock options to compensate executives has contributed to the surge in top
wage incomes in the United States.
30Even in recent years after the explosion of executive compensation, few of the richest Americans listed on
the annual Forbes 400 survey are salaried executives. Most of them are still either family heirs or successful
entrepreneurs (see Section 5.3.3 below).
16prevalent in recent years (as seems possible based on popular accounts), the sharp increase in
the concentration of annual incomes documented by Piketty and Saez (2003) may translate into
a smaller increase in the concentration of lifetime incomes and accumulated wealth.
The very rough comparison between income and estate data that we have presented suggests
that it would be interesting to try and estimate wealth concentration from income tax return data
using the capitalization of income method. In spite of the existence of extremely detailed and
consistent income tax return annual data in the United States since 1913, this method has very
rarely been used, and the only existing studies have applied the method for isolated years.31 The
explanation for the lack of systematic studies is that the methodology faces serious challenges:
income data provides information only on assets yielding reported income (for example, owner-
occupied real estate or deﬁned contribution pension plans could not be observed), and there is
substantial and unobservable heterogeneity in the returns of many assets, especially corporate
stock (for example, some corporations rarely pay dividends and capital gains are only observed
when realized on income tax returns).32 More recently, Kennickell (2001a,b) has analyzed in
detail the link between income and wealth in order to calibrate sample weights for the Survey
of Consumer Finances. His analysis shows that the relation between capital income reported on
tax returns and wealth from the survey is extremely noisy at the individual level. Nevertheless,
it would certainly be interesting to use income tax return data to provide a tighter comparison
with our wealth concentration results from estates. We leave this important and ambitious
project for future research.
4.2 Possible Explanations for the Decline in Top Wealth Shares
We have described in the previous section the dramatic fall in the top wealth shares (concentrated
within the very top groups) that has taken place from the onset of the Great Depression to the
late 1940s. Our previous analysis has shown that stock market eﬀects might explain the sharp
drop in top wealth shares during the 1930s but cannot explain the absence of recovery in top
31King (1927) and Stewart (1939) used this method for years 1921 and 1922-1936 respectively. More recently,
Greenwood (1983) has constructed wealth distributions for 1973 using simultaneously income tax return data and
other sources.
32See Atkinson and Harrison (1978) for a detailed comparison of the income capitalization and the estate
multiplier methods for the United Kingdom.
17wealth shares in the 1950s and 1960s once stock prices recovered by the end of the 1960s. At
that time, the wealth composition in top groups was again very similar to what it had been in
the late 1920s, and yet top wealth shares hardly recovered in the 1950s and 1960s and were still
much lower in the 1960s than before the Great Depression. There are several possible elements
that might explain the absence of recovery of top wealth shares.
The ﬁrst and perhaps most obvious factor is the creation and the development of the pro-
gressive income and estate tax. The very large fortunes (such as the top .01%) observed at
the beginning of the 20th century were accumulated during the 19th century, at a time where
progressive taxes hardly existed and capitalists could dispose of almost 100% of their income
to consume, accumulate, and transmit wealth across generations. The conditions faced by 20th
century fortunes after the shock of the Great Depression were substantially diﬀerent. Starting in
1933 with the new Roosevelt administration, and continuously until the Reagan administrations
of 1980s, top tax rates on both income and estates have been set at very high levels.
These very high marginal rates applied only to a very small fraction of taxpayers and estates,
but the point is that they were to a large extent designed to hit incomes and estates of the top
0.1% and 0.01% of the distribution. In the presence of progressive capital income taxation,
individuals with large wealth levels need to increase their savings rates out of after tax income
much more than lower wealth holders to maintain their relative wealth position. Moreover,
reduced after-tax rate of return might have aﬀected savings rates of high wealth holders through
standard incentive eﬀects. In the presence of high income and estate taxes, wealthy individuals
also have incentives to give more to charities during their lifetime further reducing top wealth
shares.33
Second, starting with Sherman and Clayton Acts enacted in 1890 and 1914 respectively,
the U.S. federal government has taken important steps to limit monopoly power using antitrust
regulation. However, the degree of enforcement remained weak until the New Deal (see e.g.,
Thorelli, 1955). By curbing the power of monopolies, it is conceivable that such legislation
contributed to reduced wealth concentration at the very top. Perhaps more importantly, the
Roosevelt administration also introduced legislation to sever the link between ﬁnance and man-
33Lampman (1962) also favored progressive taxation as one important factor explaining the reduction in top
wealth shares in his seminal study (see below).
18agement of corporations. The Depression’s ﬁnancial market reforms act broke the links between
board membership, investment banking, and commercial banking. As a result, the model of
great ﬁnanciers-industrialists which had created the very large fortunes of the Robber Barons
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was no longer a possibility after the 1930s.
DeLong (2002) discusses those aspects in more detail and suggests that such regulations severely
prevented the creation of new billionaires during the very prosperous post-World War II decades.
Finally, the post World War II decades were characterized by a large democratization of
higher education. Following the G.I. bill, the number of college educated men increased very
quickly after World War II.34 This undoubtedly contributed to the emergence of a large middle
and upper middle income class in America which was able to accumulate wealth and hence
perhaps reduce the share of total wealth accruing to the groups in the top percentile.35
Although we cannot observe the counterfactual world without progressive taxation or an-
titrust regulations, we note that economic growth, in net worth and incomes, has been much
stronger starting with World War II, than in the earlier period. Thus, the macro-economic
evidence does not suggest that progressive taxation prevented the American capital stock from
recovering from the shock of the Great Depression. This is consistent with Piketty (2003), who
shows that, in the purest neo-classical model without any uncertainty, a capital income tax
aﬀecting only the rich does not aﬀect negatively the capital stock in the long-run. If credit
constraints due to asymmetric information are present in the business sector of the economy,
it is even conceivable that redistribution of wealth from large and passive wealth holders to
entrepreneurs with little capital can actually improve economic performance (see e.g., Aghion
and Bolton, 2003, for such a theoretical analysis). Gordon (1998) argues that high personal
income tax rates can result in a tax advantage to entrepreneurial activity, thereby leading to
economic growth. A more thorough investigation of the eﬀects of income and estate taxation
on the concentration of wealth is left for future work.
34The number of Bachelor’s degrees awarded relative to the size of the 23 year old cohort tripled from about
5% in the 1920s to over 15% after World War II (see U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), series H 755).
35For example, home ownership increased from 41% in 1920 to 62% in 1960 (see U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1975, series N 243).
195 Are Estimates from Estates Reliable?
In this section, we explore the issue of the reliability of our estimates. Our top wealth share
estimates depend crucially on the validity of the estate multiplier method that we use. Thus we
ﬁrst discuss the potential sources of bias and how they can aﬀect the results we have described.
Second, we compare our results with previous ﬁndings using estate data as well as other data
sources such as the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), and the Forbes 400 Wealthiest Amer-
icans. We focus on whether biases introduced by the estate multiplier methodology can aﬀect
our two central results: the dramatic drop in top shares since 1929 and the absence of increase
in top shares since the mid-1980s.
5.1 Potential Sources of Bias
The most obvious source of bias would be estate tax evasion. Three studies of evasion, Harris
(1949), McCubbin (1994), and Eller et al. (2001), have used results from Internal Revenue
Service audits of estate tax returns for years 1940-41, 1982, and 1992 (respectively). Harris
(1949) reports under-reporting of net worth of about 10% on average with no deﬁnite variation
by size of estate, while McCubbin (1994) and Eller et al. (2001) report smaller evasion of about
2-4% for audited returns.36 Those numbers are small relative to the size of the changes we have
presented. Thus, it sounds unlikely that direct tax evasion can have any substantial eﬀects on
the trends we have documented and can certainly not explain the dramatic drop in top wealth
shares. It seems also quite unlikely that evasion could have hidden a substantial growth in
top wealth shares in the recent period. From 1982 to 2000 in particular, the estate tax law
has changed very little and hence the extent of under-reporting should have remained stable
over time as well. A closely related problem is undervaluation of assets reported on estate tax
returns. We describe the issue of undervaluation in detail in appendix C, and we conclude that
those adjustments appear to be too small to produce a signiﬁcant eﬀect on estimated top wealth
shares.
As we have discussed brieﬂy in Section 2, the estate multiplier method requires precise
assumptions in order to generate unbiased estimates of the wealth distribution for the living.
36Those studies underestimate estate tax evasion to the extent that audits fail to uncover all the evaded wealth.
20We use the same multiplier within age, gender, and year cells for all estate tax ﬁlers, independent
of wealth. We apply the same social diﬀerential mortality rates for all years based on the Brown
et al. (2002) diﬀerential between college educated whites relative to the average population. This
is not fully satisfactory for two reasons. First, wealthy individuals (those who ﬁle estate tax
returns upon death) may not have exactly the same mortality rate as college educated whites
from Brown et al. (2002). The bias introduced, however, may be small, because the social
mortality gradient is steeper at the lower end of the wealth distribution than at the high end.
Second, we use the same social diﬀerential rates for the full 1916-2000 period although those
rates might have changed over time. In appendix B we analyze in detail life insurance and
annuities data compiled by the Society of Actuaries. Perhaps surprisingly, the data does not
point to a signiﬁcant narrowing over time between mortality rates of the general population and
life insurance policy holders. Therefore, our assumption of constant social mortality diﬀerential
rates might be acceptable.
Assuming that our multipliers are right on average, the key additional assumption required
to obtain unbiased wealth shares is that, within age and gender cells and for estate tax ﬁlers,
mortality is not correlated with wealth. A negative correlation would generate a downward bias
in top wealth shares as our multiplier would be too low for the richest decedents. For example, if
those with very large estates are less likely to die than those with moderately large estates, then
the estate multiplier will underestimate the very wealthy relative to the moderately wealthy.
There are two direct reasons why such a negative correlation might arise. First, extraordinary
expenses such as medical expenses and loss of labor income or of the ability to manage assets
eﬃciently may occur and reduce wealth in the years preceding death, producing a negative
correlation between death probability and wealth. Smith (1999) argues that out-of-pocket health
expenses are moderate and therefore are not a major factor driving the correlation of wealth
and mortality. However, his evidence is based on expenditures for the general population and it
is the end-of-life health expenditures that are most signiﬁcant. It seems unlikely, though, that
health-related expenses create a signiﬁcant dent in the fortunes of the super-rich but we were
unable to assess the importance of lost earnings due to health deterioration at the end of life.37
37For some years, our data set contains information about the length of terminal illness. A simple regression of
net worth on the dummy variable indicating a prolonged illness and demographic controls produced a signiﬁcant
21Second, even within the small group of estate tax ﬁlers, the top 1 or 2% wealth holders, it
might be the case that the most able and successful individuals, of a given age and gender, have
lower mortality rates. Although we cannot measure with any precision the quantitative bias
introduced by those eﬀects, there is no reason to believe that such biases could have changed
dramatically over the period we study. In particular, they cannot have evolved so quickly in the
recent period so as to mask a signiﬁcant increase in top wealth shares and, for the same reason,
they are unlikely to explain the sharp decrease in top wealth shares following the onset of the
Great Depression.
More importantly, however, for estate tax avoidance and other reasons, individuals may
start to give away their wealth to relatives and heirs as they feel that their health deteriorates.
Indeed, all estate tax planners recommend giving away wealth before death as the best strategy
to reduce transfer tax liability. Gifts, however, create a downward bias only to the extent that
they are made by individuals with higher mortality probability within their age and gender
cell. If gifts are unrelated to mortality within age and gender cells, then they certainly aﬀect
the wealth distribution of the living but the estate multiplier will take into account this eﬀect
without bias. Three important reasons suggest that gifts may not bias our results. First and
since the beginning of the estate tax, gifts made in contemplation of death (within 2-3 years of
death, see appendix C for details) must be included in gross estate and thus are not considered
as having been given in our wealth estimates. We expect that a large fraction of gifts correlated
with mortality falls into this category. Second, a well known advice of estate tax planners is
to start giving as early as possible. Thus, those most interested in tax avoidance will start
giving much before contemplation of death; in that case gifts and mortality have no reason to be
correlated.38 Last, since 1976, the estate and gift tax have been uniﬁed and the published IRS
tabulations show that taxable gifts (all gifts above the annual exemption of $10,000 per donee)
represents only about 2-3% of gross estate, even at the top. Thus, lifetime gifts do not seem to
be large enough to produce a signiﬁcant bias in our estimates for the recent period.
A more subtle possibility of bias comes from a related tax avoidance practice which consists
in giving assets to heirs without relinquishing control of those assets. This is mostly realized
negative coeﬃcient, suggesting that this eﬀect may play a role.
38Gifts will have a real impact on the individual distribution of wealth although it might not change the dynastic
distribution of resources.
22through trusts whose remainder is given to the heir but whose income stream is in full control
of the creator while he is alive. Like an annuity, the value of such a trust for the creator
disappears at death and thus does not appear on estate tax returns. This type of device falls in
between the category of tax avoidance through gifts and under-valuation of the assets eﬀectively
transferred. The popular literature (see e.g., Cooper, 1979 or Zabel, 1995) has suggested that
many such devices can be used to eﬀectively avoid the estate tax but careful interviews of
practitioners (Schmalbeck, 2001) suggest that this is a clear exaggeration and that reducing
signiﬁcantly the estate tax payments requires actually giving away (either to charities or heirs)
a substantial fraction of wealth. Again, such a source of reduction in wealth holdings reﬂects a
real de-concentration of individual wealth (though not necessarily welfare).
The key question we need to address is whether the wealthy derive substantial annuity income
from trusts which the estate multiplier method fails to capture because it disappears at death.
There are two indirect sources of data to cast light on the importance of trusts. First, trusts
are required to ﬁle income tax returns and pay annual income taxes on the income generated
by the assets in the trust which is not distributed to beneﬁciaries.39 Second, income from
trusts distributed to individuals has to be reported on those individuals’ income tax returns.
Therefore, statistics on individual and trust income tax returns published regularly by the
IRS (U.S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, various years) can be used to assess
the total value of income generated and distributed by trusts. The total income distributed by
trusts to individuals can then be capitalized to get an approximation of total individual wealth
in the form of trusts. This total wealth should be an upper bound of the annuitized trust wealth
that the estate multiplier method fails to capture. Using a 7.5% nominal rate of return on trust
assets (trust income includes both ordinary income and realized capital gains), total wealth in
trusts is only around 1.4% of our total wealth denominator in 1997, the last year for which
statistics on trust income are available.40 Thus, trust wealth is modest relative to the 21% share
of total wealth going to the top 1% or even relative to the 9% share going to the top 0.1% in
39Beneﬁciaries could be individuals or charitable organizations. Trusts face the top individual income tax rate
(above a very low exemption level) on undistributed income in order to prevent (untaxed) accumulation of wealth
within trusts.
40In 1997, trusts distributed $26.3 billion to beneﬁciaries (see Mikow (2000-01)), representing a total annuitized
wealth of $350 billion, or 1.4% of the $2.5 trillion total personal wealth in 1997.
231997.41
Therefore, the popular view that the wealthy hold most of their wealth through trusts which
escape estate taxation appears inconsistent with tax statistics. More importantly, estimated
trust wealth has declined overtime from around 3.5% of total wealth in the 1936, to around 2%
in 1965, to about 1.5% in 1997. Hence, including annuitized trust wealth to our estimates would
not modify much our results and would likely reinforce our main ﬁnding of a secular decline of
top wealth shares over the century.
5.2 Changes in Bias Over Time
It is important to emphasize that real responses to estate taxation, such as potential reductions
in entrepreneurship incentives, savings, or increases in gifts to charities or relatives, do not bias
our estimates in general because they do have real eﬀects on the distribution of wealth. Only
outright evasion or avoidance of the type we described in the previous section can bias our
results; and those eﬀects need to evolve over time in order to counteract the trends we have
described. We would expect that changes in the levels of estate taxation would be the main
element aﬀecting avoidance or evasion incentives over time.
It is therefore important to consider the main changes in the level of estate taxation over the
period (see Appendix C and Luckey, 1995, for further details). Since the beginning of the U.S.
federal estate tax, the rate schedule was progressive and subject to an initial exemption. The
1916 marginal estate tax rates ranged from 0 to 10%. The top rate increased to 40% by 1924,
a change that was repealed by the 1926 Act that reduced top rates to 20%. Starting in 1932, a
sequence of tax schedule changes increased the top rates to 77% by 1942, subject to a $60,000
nominal exemption. The marginal tax rate schedule remained unchanged until 1976, resulting in
a fairly continuous increase of the estate tax burden due to “bracket creep”. Following the 1976
tax reform, the exemption was increased every year. The top marginal tax rates were reduced
to 70% in 1977 and 55% by 1984. There were no major changes until 2001 (the nominal ﬁling
41Income tax statistics show that about 75% of total trust income goes to top 1% income earners and about
40% goes to the top 0.1% income earners. Thus, it seems reasonable to think that about 40% of trust wealth, or
about 0.6% of total individual wealth, is held by the top 0.1%, a small amount relative to the 9% share of wealth
held by that group in 1997.
24threshold stayed constant at $600,000 between 1988 and 1997). Figure 10 reports the average
marginal tax rate in the top 0.1% group42 and the statutory marginal tax rate applying to the
largest estates43 (left y-axis), along with the top 0.1% wealth share (right y-axis). It is evident
from this picture that the burden of estate taxation increased signiﬁcantly over time. Somewhat
surprisingly, the most signiﬁcant increases in the marginal estate tax burden were brought about
by holding brackets constant in nominal terms rather than by tax schedule changes.
There are very few attempts to measure the response of wealth to estate taxation.44 Kopczuk
and Slemrod (2001) used the same micro-data that we do to estimate the impact of the marginal
estate tax rates on reported estates. They relied on both time-series variation and cross-sectional
age variation that corresponds to having lived through diﬀerent estate tax regimes. They found
some evidence of an eﬀect, with estate tax rates at age of 45 or 10 years before death more
strongly correlated with estates than the actual realized marginal tax rates. Because the source
of their data are tax returns, they were unable to distinguish between tax avoidance and the real
response. Holtz-Eakin and Marples (2001) relied on the cross-sectional variation in state estate
and inheritance taxes to estimate the eﬀect on wealth of the living. They found that estate
taxation has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on wealth accumulation. It should be pointed out though that
their data contained very few wealthy individuals. Taken at face value, both of these studies
ﬁnd very similar magnitudes of response (see the discussion in Holtz-Eakin and Marples, 2001)
suggesting little role for outright tax evasion: the Holtz-Eakin and Marples (2001) data is not
skewed by tax evasion and avoidance while the eﬀect estimated by Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001)
reﬂects such potential responses. This would imply that trends in concentration due to tax
evasion and avoidance are not a major issue.
Regardless of these ﬁndings, given that between 1982 and 2000 the estate tax system has
changed very little, we would expect that the extent of tax avoidance and evasion has also
42These tax rates are computed by ﬁrst evaluating the marginal tax rates at the mean net worth in Top .01%,
.05-.01% and .1-.05% and then weighting the results by net worth in each category. These are “ﬁrst-dollar”
marginal tax rates that do not take into account deductions but just the initial exemption.
43After 1987, there is an interval of a 5% surtax intended to phase out the initial exemption in which the
marginal tax rate (60%) exceeds the marginal tax rate at the top (55%).
44There is a larger literature that concentrates on gifts. See for example, McGarry (1999); Bernheim et al.
(2001); Poterba (2001); Joulfaian (2003).
25remained fairly stable. Therefore, the absence of increase in top shares since in the 1990s is
probably not due to a sudden increase in estate tax evasion or avoidance.45
5.3 Comparison with Previous Studies and Other Sources
Another important way to check the validity of our estimates from estates is to compare them
to ﬁndings from other sources. We have presented a brief comparison above with ﬁndings from
income tax returns. After reviewing previous estate tax studies, we turn to comparisons with
wealth concentration estimations using other data sources.
5.3.1 Previous Estate Studies
Lampman (1962) was the ﬁrst to use in a comprehensive way the U.S. estate tax statistics pub-
lished by the IRS to construct top wealth shares. He reported the top 1% wealth shares for the
adult population for a number of years between 1922 and 1956.46 His estimates are reproduced
on Figure 11, along with our series for the top 1%.47 Although the method, adjustments, and
total net worth denominators are diﬀerent (see appendix E ), his estimates are generally similar
to ours and in particular display the same downward trend after 1929.
Smith (1984) used estate tax data to produce additional estimates for the top 0.5% and top
1% wealth shares for some years in the 1958-1976 period. In contrast to Lampman (1962) and
our series, the top 1% is deﬁned relative to the full population (not only adults) and individuals
are ranked by gross worth (instead of net worth).48 We reproduce his top 1% wealth share,
which looks broadly similar to our estimates and displays a downward trend which accelerates
in the 1970s. No study has used post 1976 estate data to compute top wealth shares series for
the recent period. A number of studies by the Statistics of Income Division of the IRS have
estimated wealth distributions from estate tax data for various years but those studies only
45Of course, technological advances in estate tax avoidance remains a possibility, especially given that many
changes relating to valuation issues are driven by judicial rather than legislative activity. It is striking to note,
however, that the many books on estate tax avoidance published over time seem to always propose the same type
of methods (see again Cooper, 1979 and Zabel, 1995).
46Lampman (1962) does not analyze smaller groups within the top 1% adults.
47Those statistics are also reported in Table C1.
48See Smith and Franklin (1974) for an attempt to patch the Lampman series with estimates for 1958, 1962,
1965, and 1969.
26produce distributions, and composition by brackets and do not try in general to estimate top
shares.49 An exception is Johnson and Schreiber (2002-03) who present graphically the top 1%
and .5% wealth share for 1989, 1992, 1995, and 1998. Their estimates are very close to ours,
and display very little variation over the period.
5.3.2 Survey of Consumer Finances
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is the only other data that can be used to estimate
adequately top wealth shares in the United States, because it oversamples the wealthy and asks
detailed questions about wealth ownership. However, the survey covers only years 1962, 1983,
1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001 and cannot be used to reliably compute top shares for groups
smaller than the top 0.5% because of small sample size.50 It should also be noted that all the
information in the SCF is at the family level and not the individual level. Top shares estimated
at the individual level might be diﬀerent from top shares estimated at the family level, and the
diﬀerence depends on how wealth is distributed among spouses within families. Atkinson (2003)
discusses this issue formally. He shows that for realistic parameters (on the Pareto distribution
and the number of married individuals relative to singles), for a given top share estimated at
the family level, the corresponding top share at the individual level will be about 20% higher if
all the rich are unmarried or have spouses with no wealth and will be about 20% lower if all the
rich are couples with wealth equally split between spouses. Thus, changes of wealth distribution
within families, which leave unchanged family based wealth shares, can have relatively large
eﬀects on individually based wealth shares. However, the magnitude is not large enough to
explain the dramatic decline of the very top shares over the century solely by equalization of
wealth between spouses within families.51
49See Schwartz (1994) for year 1982, Schwartz and Johnson (1994) for year 1986 and Johnson and Schwartz
(1994) for year 1989, Johnson (1997-98) for years 1992 and 1995, and Johnson and Schreiber (2002-03) for year
1998.
50The 1962 survey is called the Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers and is the predecessor of the
modern Surveys of Consumer Finances.
51The negative correlation, however, between the pattern of the top 1% wealth share on Figure 2 and the
fraction female in the top .5% on Figure 8 suggests that equalization of wealth between spouses might have
played a role in reducing individually based wealth concentration.
27Kennickell (2003) provides detailed shares and composition results for the 1989-2001 period,
and Scholz (2003) provides top share estimates for all the years available from the SCF. Ken-
nickell and Scholz results are very close. We reproduce the top 1% wealth share from Scholz
(2003) on Figure 11. The SCF produces estimates of top wealth shares larger than estimates
from estates: the top 1% share from estates is between 20 and 25% while to the top 1% share
from the SCF is slightly above 30%. We discuss below the reasons that have been put forward
to explain this diﬀerence by various studies. However, the important point to note is that,
as our estate estimates, the SCF does not display a signiﬁcant increase in top wealth shares
between 1962 and 2001. There is an increase from 1992 to 1995, but this increase has in large
part disappeared by 2001. As a result, the top 1% shares from the SCF in 1983 and 2001 are
almost identical.52 In particular, it is striking to note that the top 1% share did not increase
at all during the bull stock market in the second half of the 1990s. Therefore, two independent
sources, the estate tax returns and the SCF, arguably the best data sources available to study
wealth concentration in the United States, suggest that wealth concentration has not increased
signiﬁcantly since the mid-1980s, in spite of the surge in stock market prices.
A few studies have compared the estate tax data with the SCF data in order to check the
validity of each dataset and potentially estimate the extent of tax avoidance. Scheuren and
McCubbin (1994) and Johnson and Woodburn (1994) present such a comparison for years 1983
and 1989 respectively. They ﬁnd a substantial gap in top shares estimates based on the two
datasets, of similar magnitude than the one between our estimates and Scholz (2003) estimates.53
As discussed above, an important source of discrepancy comes from the fact that the SCF is
based on families while estate estimates are individually based. Johnson and Woodburn (1994)
tries to correct for this and ﬁnds a reduced gap, although, in absence of good information on
the distribution of wealth within rich families, the correction method might be very sensitive to
assumptions (see below).
Scheuren and McCubbin (1994) describes other potential sources creating biases. In addition
to the tax avoidance and under-valuation issues that we describe above, they show that SCF
52Kennickell (2003) reports standard errors of around 1.5 percentage points around the top 1% share estimates.
Thus, the small movements in the SCF top 1% share might be due in large part to sampling variation.
53The statistics they report do not allow a precise comparison of the gap in the top 1% wealth share.
28wealth might be higher than estate wealth because the value of closely held businesses might
drop substantially when the owner-manager dies. Thus, the SCF wealth measure of businesses
incorporates human wealth that is by deﬁnition excluded from estates. Therefore, the SCF and
estates may not measure the same wealth concept even though both measures are interesting.
The estate represents wealth that can be transferred while the SCF includes in part human
wealth that is destroyed at death.
The composition data reported in Kennickell (2003) do not report total stock ownership
separately. However, we can add together the categories of publicly traded stock directly held,
mutual and other investment funds, and cashable pension funds. In 2001, both the top 1%
wealthiest families and the average family held about 35% of their wealth in that form. This
suggests, consistently with our composition results, that the development of retirement pension
funds and mutual funds has contributed to the equalization of publicly held stock ownership
in the United States. We note, however, that the SCF data for 2001 show that the top 1%
hold a much larger fraction than the average (34% versus 19%) in the form of business assets
(which include sole proprietorships, partnerships, as well as closely held corporations). Further
systematic comparisons, asset by asset narrowly deﬁned, of the SCF and estate tax returns
would be very useful to understand better the quantitative importance of each of the sources of
discrepancy we have mentioned.
More recently, Wolﬀ (1996) uses the SCF 1992 data to estimate how much estate tax would
be collected by applying average mortality rates to the SCF population. He ﬁnds that expected
collections estimated from the SCF should be about 4 times larger than actual estate tax collec-
tions for those who died in 1992, suggesting massive tax evasion and avoidance. Poterba (2000),
however, repeats Wolﬀ study for 1995 and ﬁnds that estate taxes estimated from the SCF are
just 10% higher than what was actually collected. Eller et al. (2001) tries to reconcile this
discrepancy and shows that the results are quite sensitive to assumptions made about mortality
rates, as well as marital and charitable bequests, but ﬁnd a range of estimates much closer to
Poterba than to Wolﬀ. Our top wealth share estimates are about 25% lower than the SCF top
wealth shares, suggesting that there might be some under-reporting of estates, but that the
diﬀerence is actually much closer to the small gap found by Poterba (2000) than the very large
gap found by Wolﬀ (1996).
29Finally, Wolﬀ (1994) has produced series of top 1% wealth shares by pasting together the
earlier estate series by Lampman (1962) and Smith (1984) and the modern SCF estimates.54
These series represent the top 1% households (not individuals) and are reproduced on Figure
11. A close examination reveals that patching together data from diﬀerence sources is a per-
ilous exercise. The Wolﬀ series suggest that there has been a tremendous decline in wealth
concentration in the 1960s and 1970s from 34% to 20%, followed by an equally large surge in
concentration to above 35% in 1989. Our series based on an homogeneous estate tax data show
that the evolution of concentration has actually been much less dramatic during that period. As
can be seen from Figure 11, Wolﬀ-Marley’s estimate for 1976 is based on estate tax data while
the 1962 and 1983 estimates are based on the SCF. Thus, the failure to account for the large
gap between the SCF and estate estimates that exists in any given year generates a dramatic
distortion in the time pattern of the Wolﬀ-Marley series.
5.3.3 Forbes 400 Richest Americans
The popular view is that the personal computer revolution of the 1980s, and the development of
Internet in the 1990s, created many new business opportunities and the extremely quick creation
of new fortunes (the so called dot-comers). From this perspective, our ﬁnding of no increase in
wealth concentration during the 1990s seems surprising indeed. To pursue this question further,
we use the Forbes magazine annual survey of the top 400 richest Americans, available since
1982.55 This systematic source has certainly been highly inﬂuential in creating the feeling that
the last two decades had been extraordinary favorable to the creation of new fortunes.
The Forbes 400 represent an extremely small fraction of the U.S. adult population, about
the top .0002% in 2000, that is, a group 50 times smaller than our top .01% group. We have
used the Forbes 400 survey to estimate the top .0002% (corresponding almost exactly to the
top 400 individuals in 2000) wealth share. This share is displayed on Figure 12.56 It shows
that the fraction of wealth controlled by the top fortunes tripled from just above 1% in the
54These series are a revised and extended version of the earlier Wolﬀ-Marley series constructed in the same way
and presented in Wolﬀ and Marley (1989).
55Kennickell (2003) also examines the Forbes 400 data for the years corresponding to the SCF surveys between
1989 and 2001.
56Those statistics are also reported in Table C2.
30early 1980s to above 3.5% at the peak in 2000. From 2000 to 2002, the share came down to
just below 3% in 2002. Thus the Forbes data is indeed consistent with the popular view that
the richest individuals in the United States control a sizeable share of total wealth and, more
importantly, that this share has increased signiﬁcantly over the last two decades. The top .01%
share we estimated was around 4% since the mid-1980s. This is compatible with a top .0002%
share slightly above 1% as in the early 1980s but not with a top .0002% share equal to 3.5% as
in the peak of 2000.57 Therefore, it appears that our top wealth share series from estates have
failed to capture the increase due to the surge in the Forbes 400 top fortunes.58
For the early 1980s, McCubbin (1994) analyzed estate tax returns of Forbes 400 decedents
and found that wealth reported on estate tax returns was on average 35% lower than on the
Forbes list. The discrepancy was attributed mostly to the fact that the estate tax returns
include only the assets and property owned by the individual decedent while the Forbes survey
also includes wealth distributed to the spouse, and the full value of trusts set-up to distribute
wealth to family relatives but whose creator retains control. It would be extremely useful to
repeat this study for the full period 1982-2002 in order to understand the reasons for the growing
discrepancy that has taken place since the mid-1980s between top estates and the Forbes 400.59
It is interesting to divide further the group of the Forbes 400 into the top 100 and the
next 300 richest (for year 2000). Those top groups correspond to the top .00005% and top
.0002-.00005% using our usual notation. The share of wealth accruing to those two groups is
reported on Figure 12. It displays a striking contrast: the share of wealth of the top 100 have
been multiplied by a factor 4.3 from 1983 to 2000 while the share of wealth of the next 300
richest individuals has only been multiplied by a factor 2.1 during the same period.60 It is also
57More precisely, if wealth is Pareto distributed with parameter a, then the ratio of the top .01% wealth share
to the top .0002% wealth share is (.01/.0002)
1−1/a = 3.7 for a = 1.5, which is about the Pareto parameter that
can be obtained for the wealth distribution in 2000 from Table 1.
58If just a few billionaires are responsible for the surge, it is possible that they were simply not sampled (by
death). Given that these types of fortunes accrued to relatively young individuals and that death probability
(adjusted by the socioeconomic status) does not even reach 1% by the age of 60, it seems possible that a few-year
long surge of wealth of a few individuals can remain unnoticed.
59It should also be noted that the Forbes 400 estimates are often educated guesses with potentially large errors.
The Forbes 400 survey might also miss some wealthy individuals. The SCF survey does include a few individuals
missed by Forbes with wealth above the Forbes 400 lower bound.
60The threshold corresponding to the bottom of the top 400 has actually increased “only” by 75% from 1983
31important to note that the share of the two groups is closely parallel during the 1980s, a decade
of relatively modest growth for the Forbes shares, and that the bulk of the divergence between
the two Forbes groups, is concentrated in just 3 years, 1996 to 1999, which are the years of the
fastest growth of the stock market (see Figure 1). It would be interesting to use the Forbes
data to analyze to what extent the new technology stock market “bubble” can account for this
phenomenon. In sum, three quarters of all the gains to the Forbes 400 from 1983 to 2000 have
actually accrued to the top quarter of the list, and most of those gains happened in the second
half of the 1990s. Therefore, taken at face value, the Forbes data, combined with the absence
of a signiﬁcant increase in top wealth shares in the estate tax data and the SCF, suggest that
among the top fractiles of the wealth distribution, only the very top (perhaps a group limited
to just the hundred richest individuals in the country) has experienced sizeable gains since the
mid-1980s, while the other groups of high wealth holders actually did not experience much gains
relative to the average wealth holder in the U.S. population.
The number of fortunes created by the development and expansion of new technology sector
is certainly more than a few hundred. This fact can be consistent with our ﬁndings only if,
at the same time those new fortunes were created, fortunes of similar magnitude were being
destroyed. Analyzing in more detail the rise and fall of the new technology companies over the
last two decades could be an interesting way to cast light on this issue, and understand why the
results from estate tax returns or the SCF seem so much at odds with the popular perception
of the 1990s decade and the Forbes 400 data.
Our top wealth shares series from estates show a sharp drop in very top wealth shares from
1916 to 2000; although the Forbes data suggest that our estimates have missed the surge in
wealth of the very wealthiest richest Americans. How do the very richest Americans of today
compare with the richest individuals from the beginning of the twentieth century? Forbes
proposed a list in 1918 of the top 30 richest Americans. The richest person at the time was
John Rockefeller, who held an estimated fortune of $1.2 billion (current dollars), and thus held
0.54% of total net worth. How does this compare with the wealth of the richest Americans
in 2000, the very peak of the stock-market? As population has grown by a factor 3.33 from
1918 to 2000, to provide a meaningful comparison, we need to add the fortunes of Bill Gates,
to 2000.
32Lawrence Ellison, Paul Allen, and one third of Warren Buﬀet, the four richest Americans in
2000. They total $166.33 billion, which is 0.52% of total net worth, almost exactly the same as
John Rockefeller in 1918. Thus, even the peak of the stock market bubble did not produce top
fortunes larger relative to the average than the one accumulated by John Rockefeller by 1918,
and our top shares results suggest that there were many more wealthy individuals below him
than today below Bill Gates.
6 Conclusion
This paper has presented new homogeneous series on top wealth shares from 1916 to 2000 using
estate tax return data. Although many studies have analyzed wealth inequality in the United
States, none had presented consistent concentration estimates over such a long period on an
almost annual basis. We have found that the shocks of the Great Depression, the New Deal,
and World War II, have produced a dramatic decrease in the top wealth shares. This decrease
has been concentrated within the upper part of the top percentile, the top .1% of the wealth
distribution, with much more modest changes for lower wealth groups within the top 1%. This
evidence is consistent with the dramatic decline in top capital incomes documented in Piketty
and Saez (2003). The large shocks that large wealth holders experienced in the ﬁrst part of the
century seem to have had a permanent eﬀect: top wealth shares increased very modestly during
the stock market booms of the 1960s and 1990s, and are much lower today than in the pre-
Great Depression era. We have tentatively suggested that steep progressive income and estate
taxation, by reducing the rate of wealth accumulation, may have been the most important factor
preventing large fortunes from being reconstituted. Many other factors such as business and
ﬁnance regulations, the emergence of a large middle class in the post World War II period, and
the equalization of wealth across genders might have also contributed to reducing individual
wealth concentration.
Surprisingly, our top wealth shares series do not increase during the 1990s, a time of extra-
ordinary stock price growth and perceived as having been extremely favorable to the creation
of new fortunes. Our results are consistent with ﬁndings from the Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances (Kennickell, 2003; Scholz, 2003) which also display hardly any signiﬁcant growth in
33wealth concentration since 1995. This absence of growth in top wealth shares are also consistent
with the top income shares results from Piketty and Saez (2003) because the recent dramatic
growth in top income shares has been primarily due to a surge in top labor incomes, with little
growth of top capital incomes. Examination of the widely known Forbes 400 richest Amer-
icans survey shows a dramatic gain for those wealthy individuals but most of the gains are
concentrated within the top 100 and in the few years of the stock market “bubble” of the late
1990s. Our composition series suggest that by 2000, the top 1% wealth holders do not hold a
signiﬁcantly larger fraction of their wealth in the form of stocks than the average person in the
U.S. economy, explaining in part why the bull stock market of the late 1990s has not beneﬁted
disproportionately the rich.
To what extent is the U.S. experience representative of other developed countries’ long run
wealth concentration dynamics? Existing wealth concentration series are unfortunately very
scarce and incomplete for most countries, and it is therefore very diﬃcult to provide a fully
satisfactory answer to this question. However, it is interesting to compare the U.S. top wealth
series with comparable series constructed using the estate multiplier technique as well for the
United Kingdom by Atkinson and Harrison (1978) and the Inland Revenue, and for France
by Piketty et al. (2003). There are important similarities between the American, French, and
British pattern of the top 1% wealth share displayed on Figure 13. In all three countries, top
income shares fell considerably during the 1913 to 1950 period, and they were never able to
come back to the very high levels observed in the early decades of the century. By the end of the
century, the top 1% wealth shares are remarkably close around 22% is all three countries. It is
plausible to think that in all three countries, top capital incomes have been hit by the depression
and wars shocks of the ﬁrst part of the century and could not recover because of the dynamic
eﬀects of progressive taxation on capital.
Some important diﬀerences among these countries should be mentioned. First, in the early
decades of the twentieth century, top wealth shares were much higher in France, and especially
the United Kingdom, than in the United States. Just before the Great Depression, the top 1%
share is about 40% in the United States, 50% in France, and 60% in the United Kingdom. Thus,
the dramatic fall of top wealth shares that we described for the United States pales in comparison
to the French and British decline. Unsurprisingly, the decline in France is much steeper during
34World War II, which destroyed a large fraction of the capital stock in the country. Second, in
contrast to France and the United States where the top 1% wealth share has been relatively
stable since the late 1940s, the top 1% wealth share continues to fall in the United Kingdom
from over 45% in the 1950s to about 20% in the late 1970s.61 Finally, the increase in the top 1%
wealth share in the last decades in the United States and the United Kingdom has been of similar
and modest magnitude (from less than 20% to 22-23%) but the timing has been diﬀerent.62 All
of the gains occurred in the early 1980s in the United States, while all the gains happened in
the late 1990s in the United Kingdom. A detailed analysis of the U.K. very top shares (such as
the top .1%) and composition would be useful to understand whether this diﬀerence is driven
from diﬀerences in concentration of stock ownership or in the tax systems in the two countries.
It is striking that, in both the United States and the United Kingdom, top wealth shares
have increased so little in spite of a surge in top income shares. Atkinson (2002) shows that
the top 1% income share increased from less than 5% in the late 1970s to over 10% in 1999 in
the United Kingdom. The increase for the United States has been from less than 8% to about
16% during the same period (Piketty and Saez, 2003). Such a pattern might not last for very
long because our proposed interpretation also suggests that the decline of progressive taxation
observed since the early 1980s in the United States63 and in the United Kingdom could very
well spur a revival of high wealth concentration during the next few decades.
61Analyzing the evolution of top income and wealth taxation in the three countries more carefully could be
useful to test whether taxation is the main factor driving top wealth shares.
62The French top wealth share does not seem to have increased at all since the early 1980s.
63Top income tax rates have gone down dramatically from 70% to 35% since 1981 and the U.S. estate tax is
scheduled to be phased-out by 2011.
35Appendix A The Estate Multiplier Method
The estate multiplier method relies on the assumption that decedents represent a random draw
from the living population. Consequently, denoting the probability of dying by mi, a single
estate observation stands for 1
mi observations, so that the observed estate of Ei stands for the
wealth of 1
miEi. Our measure of Ei is described in Appendix C and our mortality measures are
presented in Appendix B.
An implementation of the multiplier technique requires that wealth and mortality rates are
appropriately measured. There are problems with both that we will discuss in what follows.
It also requires the assumption of a random draw from the population. There are at least two
reasons why this assumption is non-trivial.
First, individuals may de-cumulate wealth in anticipation of death, thereby making decedents
a non-representative sample from the population. For example, some individuals who died had
experienced a prolonged terminal illness. This is important because of accompanying expenses
and the potential tax planning activities in anticipation of death. The eﬀect may simply be
due to higher out of pocket health expenses of the individuals who died compared to survivors.
Smith (1999) argues that such expenses are moderate and therefore do not have major impact
on wealth. However, his evidence is based on expenditures of the living, while there is some
evidence that it is the end-of-life health expenditures that are most signiﬁcant. Alternatively,
when dealing with the tax data as we do here, there is also a possibility that observed estates are
skewed by tax avoidance and therefore do not accurately reﬂect wealth of a typical individual.64
Second, to the extent that a priori mortality risk varies in the population and people have
private information about their own frailty,65 their wealth accumulation patterns might well
be diﬀerent. Alternatively, under one of the theories explaining the relationship of health and
income or wealth, healthier people may simply be more productive and therefore wealthier. A
correlation of the error between actual and assumed mortality rates with wealth will tend to
bias the results even in the absence of any other measurement issues.
64This type of tax avoidance may be more prevalent among individuals who died compared to those who
survived, because increased likelihood of death may motivate taxpayers to undertake planning. The importance
of such an eﬀect is mitigated by the fact that some avoidance strategies (such as gift giving) that are performed
in anticipation of death are explicitly disallowed by the tax code. Note also that there is a qualitative diﬀerence
between tax avoidance and real behavioral response to taxation in this context. To the extent that taxpayers
truly adjust their behavior in response to taxation, it represents an economically meaningful impact on the wealth
distribution. Tax avoidance that allows to reduce the size of taxable estate without eﬀectively relinquishing
control (see Wojciech Kopczuk and Joel Slemrod (2003) and especially the comment by Ray Madoﬀ (2003) for
a related discussion) will bias our results toward ﬁnding lower share of wealth at the top without a real eﬀect.
Such response is likely to vary with changes in the tax rates and therefore the bias might have changed over
time. There is some evidence that the size of estates responds to tax incentives (Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2001;
Holtz-Eakin and Marples, 2001). It is unclear whether the eﬀect, if any, would be due to a real reduction in
wealth or else due to tax avoidance. Some authors suggest that tax avoidance is rampant (Cooper, 1979), others
disagree (Schmalbeck, 2001). Poterba (2001) and McGarry (1999) ﬁnd that easy avoidance strategies that rely
on gifts are not taken advantage of. On the other hand, Joulfaian (2003) ﬁnds using aggregate data that gift
tax revenue is highly sensitive to expected marginal tax rates, while Poterba and Weisbenner (2003) ﬁnd some
evidence of the quantitative importance of an abusive use of minority discount provisions.
65Hurd et al. (1999) ﬁnd that subjective survival probabilities predict mortality even when socio-economic
characteristics and health conditions are controlled for.
36Appendix B Population and Mortality
Mortality diﬀerential — its presence and its size One of the key issues in implementing
the estate multiplier technique to estimate wealth shares of the wealthy is the choice of appro-
priate mortality rates. The ideal mortality tables would apply speciﬁcally to the wealthy and
would be broken down by age and demographic characteristics. Our baseline mortality tables
were obtained from the Human Mortality Database (www.mortality.org) and rely on the life
tables constructed by the Oﬃce of the Actuary of the Social Security Administration (see Bell
et al., 1992, for a full description of the methodology). The mortality tables by age and gender
are available at annual frequency between 1900 and 1995. Between 1996 and 2000, we are using
mortality projections available from the same source. These mortality tables are representative
of the whole population.
It is well-known that health and mortality rates are negatively correlated with higher so-
cioeconomic status measured by education, income (Deaton and Paxson, 1999, show that the
eﬀect is still present when education is controlled for), wealth (Attanasio and Hoynes, 2000) and
wealth ranking (Attanasio and Emmerson, 2001). Deaton (2002, 2003) and Smith (1999) are
recent surveys of the literature on this topic. In their pioneering study, Kitagawa and Hauser
(1973) documented the importance of the socioeconomic diﬀerences in mortality rates in the
United States using 1960 Census data, but there is also some evidence of diﬀerences by social
classes that goes back much further (see Deaton, 2002, for references). The presence of such
diﬀerences is also found in more recent data. The U.S. National Longitudinal Mortality Study
was speciﬁcally designed to study socioeconomic diﬀerentials. The sample consists of 1.3 million
(approximately half of that in the public release data) individuals primarily drawn from the 12
CPS studies between March 1973 and March 1985 and matched with the National Death Index
between 1979 and 1985 to identify deaths (see Rogot et al., 1992, for the details of the design).
Extensive tabulations in Rogot et al. (1992) document substantial mortality diﬀerentials by race,
education and income categories. The study has its limitations: income is poorly measured and
the sample does not include institutionalized individuals. Figure A1 is based on the tabulations
in Rogot et al. (1992). It shows the ratio of mortality rates of white individuals with the highest
family incomes to the population average. Income categories are deﬁned in terms of 1980 dollars.
The whites in $25,000 and over group constitute approximately 25% of the population while the
whites in $50,000 and over groups constitute approximately 5%. There is considerable noise in
the estimates for the top income category due to limited number of observations: for example,
the category of 25 to 35 years old women with income above $50,000 includes a bit more than
3000 individuals but just 11 deaths. Nevertheless, the ﬁgure illustrates that mortality rates for
the higher income categories are usually signiﬁcantly below the population ones and that the
gap gets smaller for the elderly.66 Brown et al. (2002) use the NLMS data to estimate the size
of socioeconomic diﬀerentials by education and gender. As discussed in what follows, we rely
on their estimates in making adjustments to the mortality rates.
There is a considerable literature devoted to analyzing causal paths from income to health.67
The direction of causality is not directly relevant for our study, although, to the extent that
health aﬀects wealth, it suggests that the bias discussed earlier may be relevant.
66Using AHEAD data, Hurd et al. (1999) also ﬁnd that the mortality gap falls with age.
67See Deaton (2002) for a survey and discussion and Adams et al. (2003) for a recent study.
37Mortality diﬀerential — changes over time The major data problem from our point of
view is that no consistent mortality tables for the wealthy for the whole century are available. It
is certainly possible that the magnitude of the mortality diﬀerential between wealthy and the rest
changed over time. Duleep (1989) compared the mortality diﬀerentials in the 1970s by income
and education classes based on the Social Security records to the results of Kitagawa and Hauser
(1973) that were based on 1960 Census and found no signiﬁcant changes. By its design, however,
that study does not directly address the mortality experience of the wealthy (who are above the
Social Security limit). Pappas et al. (1993) replicated the analysis of Kitagawa and Hauser (1973)
using the 1986 National Mortality Follow-back Survey and the 1986 National Health Interview
Survey and concluded that diﬀerentials increased between 1960 and 1986. Hattersley (1999)
relies on the UK Longitudinal Study (a panel study) and reports changes in life expectancy
and survival probabilities by social classes (based on the initial occupation) between 1972 and
1996. For both men and women, the results show proportionally bigger increases in the survival
rates for professionals than for unskilled workers (who had lower survival rates to begin with).
Converting her results to mortality rates, they indicate a signiﬁcant widening of the mortality
diﬀerential.68
We can shed some additional light on the mortality diﬀerential over time using insurance
data. It is well-known that both annuitants and purchasers of life insurance are wealthier than
the average. The Society of Actuaries made available on its web page (www.soa.org) a collection
of more than 300 mortality tables for diﬀerent countries and diﬀerent periods, including some
tables based on the experience of insurance companies. Unfortunately, variation in the deﬁnitions
and approaches used in their construction makes them non-comparable and thus makes it diﬃcult
to credibly trace the evolution of the mortality diﬀerential over time. Furthermore, to the extent
that penetration of the insurance markets varied over time, this induces an additional source
of compositional changes. We present the numbers from the George B. Buck Consultants Inc.
U.S. mortality tables that are based on the experience of employees of large industrial clients
pension plans and are dated at 1963, 1974 and 1979. Additionally, the Buck table based on
the experience of employees in State Teacher Retirement Systems is available for 1982. In each
case, these mortality tables cover a few preceding years. Figure A2 compares these mortality
rates to population averages in 1960, 1971, 1975 and 1978 — years that fall in the middle of
the experience periods corresponding to the diﬀerent tables.69 All of these ﬁgures include as a
reference the arithmetic average of the diﬀerential over the four series. One thing to note here
is that the 1960 mortality diﬀerentials are smallest (the ratios are closest to one) and the 1978
values appear to indicate a bigger diﬀerential than the earlier years. As mentioned, however,
the 1978 data is based on a diﬀerent sample and therefore is likely not comparable to other
series. The education gradient is known to be signiﬁcant and, arguably, more important than
the income one. The pattern of the earlier data is certainly consistent with mortality diﬀerential
increasing over time but it is hardly conclusive.
Given diﬃculties involved in studying the size of the gradient in the second part of the 20th
68For example, according to these results, the estimated probability of survival to at least age 65 for a 25-29
year old male professional changed from 72% to 84%, while the respective probabilities for a male unskilled worker
changed from 61% to 64%. Taking these numbers at face value would suggest an large decrease in the ratio of
mortality rates of the skilled to the unskilled from 72% to 45%.
69There is no information about the period covered by the 1963 study so that the value of 1960 was selected
arbitrarily. The mortality rates are weighted by the sizes of policies.
38century, it is hardly surprising that the task is even more daunting if one is concerned with
the whole century. Scattered mortality tables based on annuity providers experience and relied
upon in valuation of annuities are available for many diﬀerent years and they underlie Figure
A3. It has to be stressed that these tables have diﬀerent sources and are not necessarily directly
comparable.70 No obvious trends in the evolution of mortality diﬀerentials are detectable.
Approach. We assume that the diﬀerential between mortality rates of the wealthy and those
of the general population stayed constant over time. The evidence regarding changes in the size
of this diﬀerential over time is very sketchy. It is somewhat reassuring that mortality tables
based on the experience of pension plans do not contradict our assumption. Even under this
simplifying assumption, we still need to measure the size of these constant diﬀerentials. We rely
on estimates from Brown et al. (2002) kindly provided by the authors. Relying on the NLMS
data, they estimated mortality diﬀerentials by educational status, sex and gender. We use in our
work the mortality diﬀerential for white college graduates (by gender). It would be preferable
from our point of view to use diﬀerentials by wealth or at least income classes. Such data is
unfortunately not available. The NLMS has only a poor measure of income and, despite its
large size (more than 1 million observations) the top income category is very thin. We modify
the Brown et al. (2002) factors slightly: their mortality ratios exceed 1 for ages close to 100,
in such cases we set them to equal 1 (and we set them to 1 for all higher ages).71 Figure A4
displays the socioeconomic mortality diﬀerentials that we use for both men and women.
Mortality-related sources of a potential bias. The mortality adjustments that we rely on
are crude. There are at least two issues that are of importance. First, the mortality rates may be
systematically biased. It is certainly possible that our assumption of the mortality diﬀerential
not changing over time is not correct, so that in any given year the mortality rates are in fact
biased. One would expect that the bias from this source, if any, evolves slowly over time, so
that short-term changes in wealth shares cannot be explained by it. Long-term biases remain,
however, a possibility.
Second, our assumption that the mortality rates are constant within year×gender×age clus-
ter may be in fact incorrect. The direction of the bias will depend on the sign of the covariance
between the mortality error and its eﬀect on wealth accumulation. In a given cluster, we esti-
mate the average wealth as 1
m ·W where “bar” stands for the mean. If the mortality rates are in
fact varying, the correct estimate should be 1
T · W = 1
m · W + cov( 1
m,W). Standard arguments
would suggest that higher mortality rates lead to lower wealth due to higher health expenditures,
increased tax avoidance and planning in contemplation of death, or lower productivity. If so,
then the multiplier and wealth are positively correlated, so that the covariance eﬀect tends to
bias our wealth shares estimates downward.
70We selected tables that were subsequently relied upon in valuation of annuities. These are tables numbered
803, 806, 888, 809, 810 and 814 (in chronological order). In some cases, they involve some interpolations (especially
for younger ages). The full methodology is not always fully explained.
71As Brown et al. (2002) point out, there must be a cross-over of mortality rates if groups have the same
maximum age. Eﬀectively then, our assumption implies that the maximum age for the two groups is diﬀerent.
There are naturally extremely few individuals of such advanced age, even among estate ﬁlers. Since mortality
rates by the age of 100 are of the order of .4 even in the most recent data and because our age variables are
truncated at 97, 98 or 99 (depending on the year), it is unlikely that this has any signiﬁcant eﬀect.
39Appendix C An Overview of Estate Taxation and the Net Worth
Measure
An excellent overview of the history of changes in the estate tax can be found in the CRS
report by Luckey (1995). Gale and Slemrod (2001) discuss the economic literature on estate
taxation. The modern estate tax was introduced in 1916. The original tax applied to net estates
above $50,000 dollars with a top marginal rate of 10%. Between 1916 and 1945, there were
11 tax reforms changing marginal tax rates and/or exemptions. By the end of this period, the
top marginal tax rate was 77% and the exemption was $60,000. Both the rate schedule and
the nominal exemption remained unchanged until 1976. Major revisions of the gift and estate
taxation were introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and the Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981. A number of smaller changes throughout the 1980s and 1990s were followed by major
increases in the exemption levels and the scheduled repeal (in 2010) of the tax enacted in 2001.
In what follows, we brieﬂy review the history of provisions that are of major importance to this
paper.
Filing Threshold. The coverage of our data naturally depends on the ﬁling threshold. The
tax applies to net estate (gross estate minus deductions). Beginning with the Revenue Act of
1918 (eﬀective February 24, 1919), a tax return had to be ﬁled for all gross estates exceeding
the exemption, regardless of whether net estate was above or below the threshold. Prior to that
change, the return had to be ﬁled if estate was subject to the tax or where gross estate at death
exceeded $60,000 (while the exemption was $50,000). Subsequent changes in the nominal ﬁling
threshold were as follows: February 26, 1926 — $100,000, June 6, 1932 — $50,000, August 31,
1935 — $40,000, October 21, 1942 — $60,000. Between 1977 and 1988, the exemption changed
every year (on January 1st) beginning with $120,667 and increasing to $600,000. It was further
increased to $625,000 in 1998, $650,000 in 1999 and $675,000 in 2000. The location of this
threshold determines what fraction of population our data represents.
Gross Estate. The 1916 deﬁnition of gross estate included all property, gifts made within two
years of death and all assets held jointly excluding those that may be shown to have originally
belonged to the other persons and never belonged to decedent. The Revenue Act of 1918
expanded the deﬁnition of estate to include dower, power of appointment, and life insurance.
Many aspects of this deﬁnition evolved over time since. Major changes involved the treatment
of jointly owned property, gifts, life insurance and relatively recent legislative and court activity
regarding valuation of certain kinds of assets.
• Community property/jointly owned property/marital deduction.72 There are nine com-
munity property states73 where half of all assets acquired while married is the property of
each spouse — such assets are called community property. Jointly held property is diﬀer-
ent from the legal point of view — this is anything jointly owned (not necessarily with the
spouse) except for the community property. The original deﬁnition of a gross estate called
for inclusion of all jointly owned property in the gross estate. As a consequence, residents
72We are grateful to Jon Bakija and Barry Johnson for their help in clarifying these issues.
73Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. Wisconsin eﬀectively
became a community property state in 1986.
40of the community property states were treated diﬀerently than others. A half of any com-
munity property was to be reported, while residents of other states had to report and were
subject to the tax on the full value of jointly held assets. This situation was perceived as
an important source of the (horizontal) inequity, and the 1942 Act attempted to address
this issue by requiring that community property be included in the gross estate unless the
surviving spouse could be shown to have contributed to the acquisition cost. This solution
was replaced in 1948 by the marital deduction: up to 50% of estate of the ﬁrst-to-die could
be deducted from gross estate. In 1976, this rule was modiﬁed to allow for a deduction of
the greater of 50% or $250,000, and in 1981 the unlimited marital deduction was allowed
for. Until 1976, all of the joint property was included in gross estate.74 After 1976, under
some conditions, only 50% must be included.75 After 1981, only 50% of joint property
(without any restrictions) must be included.
From the point of view of maintaining a consistent deﬁnition of gross estate, the 1943-
1948 period is diﬀerent than the rest, because the deﬁnition of gross estate in community
property states is broader than in other years. Our data do not provide a fully consistent
deﬁnition over time and across states.76 In Appendix D.5 we do though perform limited
sensitivity checks by comparing individuals in the community property states to the others
to see whether their relative shares between 1943-1948 appear unusual. We also discuss
there the quantitative relevance of changes in the treatment of joint property.
• Life insurance (receivable either by the executor of the estate or by others under policies
taken out by the decedent) was to be included in gross estate beginning with the Tax
Reform Act of 1918. Before 1942, up to $40,000 of life insurance could be excluded from
the estates. In 1954, rules governing taxation of life insurance were further extended to
include policies that were given away by the decedent within three years of death or in
contemplation of death. We can account for changes in the exemption, but not for the
1954 change in the deﬁnition.
While we observe life insurance payouts, we have no further information regarding con-
tracts that were their source. For example, we do not know whether the taxpayer held
a term- or a whole-life policy. This data problem makes it impossible to ascertain the
exact cash value of life insurance. Motivated by the composition of life insurance in the
SCF data as reported in Brown (1999), we assume that the life insurance payout is split
equally between term- and whole-life policies. We further assume that the whole-life part
has the cash value of 2/3 of the face value, while the term-life part has the cash value equal
to the expected payout (the mortality rate times the actual payout). We include the so
deﬁned cash value in our net worth measure but we order individuals based on net worth
excluding life insurance. Figure A5 shows estimates of the top 1% wealth share when (1)
74Unless it could be shown that it have originally belonged to the other persons and never belonged to decedent.
75However, with unlimited marital deduction available, there is a counteracting incentive to report all unrealized
capital gains as jointly owned property, in which case they are subject to a step-up in basis. The 1976 Act
introduced a “carryover basis” for unrealized capital gains, however this provision never became eﬀective and was
repealed by the Crude Oil Windfall Proﬁts Tax Act of 1980.
76We have no information about community property before 1976 and we have no information about jointly
owned property in 1965 and 1969. We investigated adjusting the deﬁnition of gross estate to always include half
of jointly owned property (imputing 1965 and 1969 values), but it had negligible quantitative consequences and
still does not address the community property problem.
41life insurance is excluded, (2) only cash surrender value is included (the baseline case) and
(3) when the full payout is included. It is evident from these pictures that life insurance
is small and that both quantitative and qualitative results are very robust to variations in
its treatment. The importance of life insurance falls with wealth: for example, the cash
surrender value of life insurance in the top .01% constituted at its peak (1943) just 1.56%
of net worth and it was usually much lower than 1%.
• Gifts. The gift tax was introduced in 1924. There was a lifetime exclusion of $50,000
and an annual exclusion of $500 per donee. The gift tax, as well as the 1924 estate tax
schedule were retroactively repealed in 1926. In 1932, the gift tax was reintroduced and
the marginal gift tax rates were set at three-quarters of the estate tax rates and the annual
exclusion was set at $5000. The next major modiﬁcation of gift taxation was introduced
in 1976 when the estate and gift taxation were “uniﬁed”. The 1976 Act introduced the
single uniﬁed exemption for combined gifts and estate transferred by the deceased. The
marginal estate and gift tax rates are set nominally at the same level, However the estate
tax liability is computed using a tax-inclusive basis while the gift tax liability is obtained
on a tax-exclusive basis, resulting in a signiﬁcant tax advantage of gifts.77
We exclude regular lifetime gifts from our deﬁnition of net worth, consistently with our
objective of computing the total wealth that is eﬀectively controlled by the wealthy. The
exception here are gifts in “contemplation of death” that were included in the estate since
the introduction of the tax in 1916. Some of speciﬁc rules changed over time to address
certain avoidance loopholes (e.g., the 1954 change in the treatment of life insurance that
was discussed earlier). The gross estate is now supposed to include regular gifts made
within 3 years of death78 (the original limit was two years, increased to three in 1950),
any transfers with retained life estate (i.e., if the decedent retained an interest), transfers
taking eﬀect at death, revocable transfers and transfers by the decedent with respect to a
life insurance policy made within 3 years before death. To the extent that such gifts are
indeed made in contemplation of death (as the tax law assumes), their inclusion potentially
reduces the “moral hazard” bias discussed earlier by eliminating one source of the diﬀerence
between decedents and survivors.
• Valuation. Many types of assets are inherently diﬃcult to value. As discussed by e.g., Schmal-
beck (2001) and Johnson et al. (2001), certain types of assets are routinely allowed by the
courts to be valued at a discount. This applies in particular to the situations where
the estate contains a signiﬁcant fraction of a certain kind of property (e.g., corporate
stock) so that its sale would likely result in a signiﬁcant reduction in price (so called non-
marketability discounts). Discounts are also granted to minority interests, even in the case
when the family owns a majority stake in the company. Some diﬃcult to sell assets (such
as works of art) are also occasionally granted such a treatment. Our data does not allow
for identifying the extent of such activity. Johnson et al. (2001) found that approximately
6% of returns claimed minority or lack-of-marketability discounts and that their average
size was about 10% of gross estate (for those who claimed the discounts), suggesting that
this does not have a large quantitative impact on the estimates. Poterba and Weisbenner
77On the other hand, gifts including any unrealized capital gains do not beneﬁt from the step-up of their basis.
78Even those for which a gift tax return was ﬁled
42(2003) pursue this direction further. It is quite possible that the bias resulting from these
kinds of discounts did not stay constant over time, because many of these approaches are
relatively new.
Changes in the approach to valuation are often driven by court cases rather than legisla-
tive activity. Two provisions were, however, directly enacted by the legislature. Since
1976, the so-called “special-use” rules allowed estates consisting primarily of a closely held
business or family farm to be signiﬁcantly undervalued.79 Because tax returns (and our
data) contain both the information about the fair market value and the adjusted value
of such assets, we are able to account for the full (i.e., fair market) value of these assets
and, therefore, maintain the consistent deﬁnition of estate over time. The special-use ad-
justment is of minor quantitative importance.80 Since 1935, the executor of an estate has
had an option of using the so-called “alternate valuation”, whereby assets can be valued
one year after death instead of being valued at the time of death. The alternate valuation
delay was later reduced to half a year. Our data contain both alternate and date-of-death
valuations starting in 1962, but we only have the actual for-tax-purposes value between
1935-1945. As a result, we are unable to have a fully consistent date-of-death deﬁnition
for our whole sample, but we can measure the size of the diﬀerence starting in 1962 and
it is quantitatively small.
Deductions Many deductions for tax purposes from the gross estate are possible (charitable
deductions since 1918, marital deduction since 1948, deductions for funeral and administrative
expenses and so on). Although all of them have tax consequences, they are not relevant for
the purpose of estimating wealth shares. We subtract from the estate only personal debts and
mortgages of the decedents. In particular, funeral expenses, executor’s commissions, attorneys’
fees and other administrative expenses of the estate are not subtracted. Some of these debts
(e.g., medical debts) may not be representative of debts of surviving individuals, our data does
not allow however for any systematic and consistent over time accounting for diﬀerent kinds of
debts.
Deﬁnition of net worth. Net worth is deﬁned as the total gross estate adjusted for the
special use valuation provisions and reduced by debts.81 Gross estates are measured at the
value for tax purposes which is either date of death or the date of alternative valuation. This is
due to lack of information on the date of death valuations between 1935 and 1945. After 1962,
we can observe both date-of-death and alternate valuations. We discuss the magnitude of the
diﬀerence between the two types of valuation below.
79Speciﬁcally, under certain circumstances, these kinds of assets can be valued at their present rather than best
use.
80With the exception of 1983 tabulations in brackets below the top .25% that are based on a very small number
of observations (see tables A2-A and B, and the further discussion of the estate composition data), in no other
bracket the special use adjustment exceeds the order of 1% of our ﬁnal ﬁgure assigned to net worth. In some of
the thin brackets in 1983, this adjustment is approximately 4%. The special-use adjustment was originally capped
at $500,000. The 2000 (the last year of our data) limit was $780,000. By deﬁnition then, this rule can only play
a minor role at the very top.
81Individuals are ordered according to net worth minus the estimated value of life insurance. To the extent
that inclusion of life insurance leads to rank reversal, the share of wealth held by the top percentiles is slightly
underestimated (see sensitivity analysis described above).
43Appendix D Top Wealth Shares
Appendix D.1 Aggregate Net Worth Series
In order to obtain a denominator for our top wealth shares computations, we need to obtain
estimates of total net worth of the household sector in the United States. Net worth will be
deﬁned as the sum of all tangible assets (owner occupied residential land and housing82 and
consumer durables), ﬁnancial assets (deposits, bonds, equity in corporate and non-corporate
businesses, etc.), net of all liabilities (consumer debt, mortgages, etc.). Our wealth measure
includes only the cash surrender value of pension fund reserves (that is, the value of pensions
that remains upon death). Our wealth measure includes life insurance reserves (as we include
the expected pay-out of life insurance in our estimates). It also excludes social security wealth,
and all forms of human wealth (expected value of future labor earnings). Our wealth deﬁnition
corresponds roughly to the deﬁnition of wealth W2 in Wolﬀ and Marley (1989).
Unfortunately, the United States has not developed a consistent set of estimates of household
wealth since 1916. As a result, aggregate net worth series have been computed using various
sources.
Period 1945-2002
For the period since 1945, detailed oﬃcial Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA) have been pro-
duced for each sector of the U.S. economy (see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(2000)). The FFA presents the detailed balance sheets of Households and Nonproﬁt Organiza-
tions. They report the amounts outstanding (on December 31st of each year) broken down for
a large number of assets and liability items. Net worth is divided into three broad categories:
Tangible Assets, Financial Assets, and Liabilities. The main diﬃculty with the FFA is that they
separate the household from the non-proﬁt sector only imperfectly before 1988.
As only the Cash Surrender Value (CSV) of pensions enters estates, we include only the CSV
of pension fund reserves in our total net worth series. According to Smith (1984) and Wolﬀ
(1989), the CSV of pensions has been traditionally very small in the United States (estimated
around 5%). However, over the last three decades, the development of Deﬁned Contribution
(DC) pension plans, and in particular 401(k) plans since the 1980s, has substantially increased
the CSV of pensions. In general, DC plans vest after a short period of employment (401(k)
employee contributions vest immediately in general) with the same employer and are portable
when an employee shifts to another employer; amounts accumulated in DC plans can be fully
bequeathed at death and thus are fully included on estate tax returns). Therefore, we assume
that all DC pension reserves have 100% CSV. The DC pension plans assets are obtained from
the FFA, Table L119c (Row 1, total ﬁnancial assets) since 1985. Before 1985, the FFA does not
report the DC plans assets but report the equity shares held by households through DC plans
(Table B100e, Row 13). We assume that the fraction of equity shares in DC plans before 1985
is equal to 40% (which is the fraction in 1985). Before 1955, DC plan assets is less than 5% of
pension reserves. Therefore for the period before 1955, we adopt the Smith-Wolﬀ assumption
82Tenant occupied residential land and buildings with more than four units are included in the business assets
category in the Flow of Funds Accounts and we have followed their methodology although rented land and
residential buildings would appear in large part as real estate on tax returns of decedent owners. This discrepancy,
however, has no eﬀect on our top share and composition estimates.
44and we estimate the CSV of pensions as 5% of total pension fund reserves. This approximation
is of little consequence as pension fund reserves are less than 5% of total net worth (and hence
the CSV of pensions is a negligible component of total net worth).
Pension funds assets are invested in corporate equities and ﬁxed claims assets. We compute
the total amount invested in corporate equities from Table B100e, Row 13 (see above); the
amount of ﬁxed claims assets is then obtained by substraction.
For the period since 1988, we deﬁned our wealth measure as net worth of households and
nonproﬁt organizations less the net worth of nonproﬁt organizations. For the period before
1988, the category tangible assets allows the separation between the household and the nonproﬁt
sector. The category ﬁnancial assets does not provide the breakdown and therefore, we have
assumed that the fraction of ﬁnancial assets in the nonproﬁt sector has stayed constant and
equal to the fraction for 1988 (the earliest year this estimate is provided). This assumption
seems reasonable because the share of nonproﬁt for the tangible asset category does not display
a trend and stays around 10% between 1945 and 1988. It is important to note that, in the
FFA, tenant occupied real estate for buildings with more than four units is not included in the
real estate category but included in equity in non-corporate business. We follow the same rule
although it should be noted that tenant occupied real estate (even for buildings with more than
four units) will most likely appear in the real estate category in the estate of the owner.
The category liabilities is partially broken down between the household and the non-proﬁt
sector for the period 1945 to 1987. Three separate sub-categories (municipal securities, com-
mercial mortgages, and trade payables) are liabilities of the nonproﬁt sector exclusively. In
the period 1988 to 2002, those three categories represent about 70% of all nonproﬁt liabilities.
Therefore, for the period 1945 to 1987, we have assumed that the total liabilities of the nonproﬁt
sector is equal to 1/0.7 times the sum of those three sub-categories.
In any case, the fraction nonproﬁt in the FFA of households and nonproﬁts is between 5%
and 10%, and closer to 5% for the liability and ﬁnancial assets categories for which we need to
do imputations. Therefore, we expect that errors in our imputations will lead to a very modest
bias in our net worth estimates (no more than 1-2%) for the period 1945-1987.
Period 1916-1944
Estimating total household net worth in the prewar period is complicated, because there
is no single oﬃcial source and most sources provide estimates only for some years during the
period. An earlier attempt to compute household wealth from various sources is Wolﬀ (1989).
However, he provides estimates only for years 1900, 1912, 1921, 1922, 1929, 1933, and 1939 for
the pre-1945 period. Our estimates are very close to his W2 series for those years. We build
upon his methodology and the same sources he did to extend our estimates to every year from
1916 to 1944.
Tangible assets are estimated as follows. For 1925 to 1945, consumer durables are taken
from the FFA series reported in Herman (2000), Table 1, Consumer durable goods column. For
1916 to 1924, we have used Goldsmith et al. (1956), Table W1, p. 14, column 12, Consumer
durables. The earlier Goldsmith series has been pasted (using a constant multiplicative factor)
so that they coincide with the most recent and oﬃcial FFA series in 1925 (in 1925, Goldsmith
series about 10% higher than the FFA series).
Residential land series is from Goldsmith et al. (1956), Table W1, p. 15, column (21), non-
45farm residential land. Owner occupied residential structures is from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/faweb/, Table 5.1, col. 14, for the period 1925 to
1945. For 1916 to 1924, we have used Goldsmith et al. (1956), Table W1, p. 14, column 4,
nonfarm residential structures. The Goldsmith series for 1916-1925 have been pasted (using a
constant multiplicative factor) to coincide with the most recent and oﬃcial BEA series in 1925
(in 1925, Goldsmith series about 20% higher than the BEA series because they include tenant
occupied housing as well).
Tangible assets are deﬁned as the sum of those three series: consumer durables, non-farm
residential land, and owner occupied residential structures. This series is about 8% higher in
1945 than the tangible assets series from the FFA (see above). Thus, we have reduced uniformly
our tangible assets series by about 8% before 1945 so that they match exactly in 1945.
Unlike Tangible Assets, there is no annual source available for each of the categories forming
the ﬁnancial assets and liabilities of the household sector. Goldsmith et al. (1956) provide
detailed estimates of the ﬁnancial assets, and liabilities of the household sector only for years
1900, 1912, 1922, 1929, 1933, 1939, 1945, and 1949. Wolﬀ (1989) uses the Goldsmith estimates
and reconciles them with the FFA estimates in order to cover the period 1900-1984. We therefore
use the Wolﬀ (1989) estimates available for the years 1912, 1922, 1929, 1933, 1939, and 1945,83
Financial assets are divided into ﬁxed claimed assets (deposits and currency, federal bonds,
state and local bonds, corporate and foreign bonds) and equity (corporate stock, equity in
farm businesses, equity in non-farm unincorporated businesses, trust equity). The Wolﬀ (1989)
estimates for each of these categories are reported in Table 5, “Final National Balance Sheet Es-
timates for the Household Sector for W2, by Detailed Component, 1900-1983”, in the electronic
data appendix to the paper that Professor Edward Wolﬀ kindly made available to us.
We start from the Wolﬀ (1989) estimates and we interpolate in between the years as follows.
For deposits and currency, state and local bonds, corporate and foreign bonds, and liabil-
ities, we have done a straight linear interpolation between each consecutive pair of years for
which Wolﬀ (1989) provides estimates. Each of these items is relatively small and was trending
upward relatively smoothly over the period.
For federal bonds, we interpolate between the years using the total outstanding Federal Debt
series from Historical Statistics of the United States (Series Y493).84 The interpolation proceeds
as follows: we compute the ratio of federal bonds in household wealth to outstanding federal
debt for the years available in Wolﬀ (1989). In between those years, we assume that this ratio
evolves linearly, and this allows us to estimate the amount of federal bonds in household wealth
for each year.
We proceed in the same fashion for corporate equity using the S&P500 index end of year
series compiled on line by Robert Shiller at http://aida.econ.yale.edu/ shiller/data.htm. We also
interpolate trust equity and unincorporated non-farm business equity using the same S&P500
index. Finally, we interpolate unincorporated farm business equity using an estimate of the
value of farms from Goldsmith et al. (1956), Table W1, the sum of columns (7) farm structures,
83Wolﬀ (1989) also provides estimates for year 1921 based on King (1927). King (1927) computes estimates
only for year 1921 and is diﬃcult to reconcile with the laterGoldsmith et al. (1956). Therefore, we do not use
the King (1927) and Wolﬀ (1989) estimate for 1921.
84Those series give the amount of debt on June 30th of each year. We estimate end of year amounts of debt in
year t as the average of year t and t+1 from the original series.
46(14) livestock inventories, (15) crops inventories, and (20) agricultural land. Contrary to the
FFA series, Goldsmith and Wolﬀ series do not include tenant occupied real estate for buildings
with more than four units in the unincorporated business category. Therefore, in order to be
consistent with FFA, we add tenant occupied residential structures from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/faweb/, Table 5.1, col. 15 to the category equity
in unincorporated businesses.85
Those interpolated series extend Wolﬀ (1989) series for ﬁnancial assets and liabilities for each
year from 1912 to 1945. In order to paste those series to the series for the 1945-2002 period, we
adjust by a proportional factor each the early series (1912-1945) for ﬁxed claim assets (deposits
and all bonds), corporate equity, non-corporate equity and trusts, and liabilities. For ﬁxed claim
assets, the adjustment is up by about 5%. For corporate equity, the adjustment is up by 10%,
and for unincorporated equity (including tenant occupied housing), the adjustment is down by
about 10%. For liabilities, the adjustment is about 2% up.
Overall, our series are within 5% of the Wolﬀ (1989) W2 series, and often within 2-3%, with
no trend over the period.86
From end-of-year to average-of-year estimates
All wealth series from FFA, Goldsmith et al. (1956), and Wolﬀ (1989) are end-of-year esti-
mates (for December 31st of each year). Estates represent wealth of decedents at time of death
and hence are distributed fairly uniformly over the year. Therefore, for our denominator series,
the best would be to obtain estimates of average aggregate wealth over the year. The simple
approximation we use consists in estimating the average for year t as the half-sum of our end-
of-year t − 1 and end-of-year t series. Smith (1984) adopted this method to obtain top wealth
shares for the 1958-1976 period. This approximation will be accurate when wealth is smoothly
increasing or decreasing in between the two end-of-year snapshots.
The only adjustments we made to this simple method were for corporate stocks for years
1929, 1932, and 1933. This is because the annual average value of stock prices (estimated as the
monthly average of the S&P 500 series) was substantially diﬀerent than the end-of-year averages
for the corresponding two consecutive years. Thus for those three years, we replaced the simple
end-of-year average by the monthly average over the year.87
Appendix D.2 Estimates Based on Micro-Data: 1916-1945, 1962, 1965, 1969,
1972, 1976, 1982-2000
We take advantage of an extraordinary dataset available through the Statistics of Income (SOI)
Division of the IRS.88 The data include information from all of the estate tax returns ﬁled for
85The BEA series are only available since 1925, we extrapolate the series from 1916 to 1925 using Goldsmith
et al. (1956) non-farm residential structures as we did for owner occupied residential structures (see above).
86The only exception is 1972 for which our series derived from FFA are 7% higher than Wolﬀ estimate.
87For all other years, the end-of-year average and the monthly average are very close and we did not do any
adjustment.
88The dataset is conﬁdential and is not released in its raw form. We are extremely grateful to Barry Johnson
of the SOI for his help and patience in explaining the data and facilitating our access to it by running our SAS
programs at the SOI.
47deaths occurring between 1916 and 1945,89 all returns ﬁled in 1963, samples of returns ﬁled in
1966, 1970, 1973, 1977 and samples of returns corresponding to years of death between 1982-
2000. For all years however, there is 100% coverage of very large estates (those corresponding
roughly to our top .01% group). A more detailed description of the 1916-1945 data can be found
in McCubbin (1990), while the post-1945 studies are described in Johnson (1994).
We rely on the relevant year-of-death datasets to characterize wealth distributions for 1916-
1945 and 1982-2000. We use returns ﬁled in 1963, 1966, 1970, 1973, 1977 to construct wealth
percentiles for 1962, 1965, 1969, 1972, and 1976 respectively, regardless of the actual year of
death. For 1962-1976, this choice is motivated by the sample design: in the absence of regular
sampling, no other approach is feasible. Conveniently, this period does not involve any signiﬁcant
legislative activity and most returns ﬁled in year t+1 correspond the deaths in year t.90 We
always ignore observations for which net worth falls below the ﬁling threshold because not 100%
of estates with net worth below the ﬁling threshold ﬁle estate tax returns.91
We impute estate multipliers when age is missing. Age of the decedent was present on the
tax return beginning with the August 1919 revision of the tax form. As a result, we do not
have age information for most of the decedents dying between 1916 and 1918. We also do not
know age for any of the 1965 observations. We do have age data for 77% of the 1919 decedents,
88% of the 1920 decedents and we have age information for over 90% of our sample in each
of the remaining years (between 1982 and 1995, we have age information for everyone). In
years when age information is available for most observations, imputations are performed by
setting the multiplier equal to the average of the multipliers of the 50 individuals in the wealth
distribution surrounding the one with missing age information. In order to impute multipliers
between 1916 and 1918, we proceed in an identical fashion, but we place each observation in
the 1919 distribution (adjusted for inﬂation) and base our imputations on the surrounding 1919
observations. Imputations in 1965 are performed similarly by using the joint distribution of 1962
and 1969 returns as the reference distribution.
Age is coded in the data using two digits. Except for 1982-1983, the age variable is top-coded
at 98, in 1982 the value of 96 stands for “96 or above”, while in 1983 the value of 97 stands for
“97 or above”. Using the top-coded value would lead to overestimation of the corresponding
multiplier, since some of the individuals are in fact older and therefore faced higher mortality
risk than the top-coded value would indicate. To correct this problem, we use as a multiplier
for top-coded observations the average (using population weights) multiplier for those aged at
the top code or above.
As discussed earlier, the ﬁling threshold and therefore the coverage of our data changed many
times over the years.92 Post-1945, all tax changes went into eﬀect as of midnight December 31st,
but the earlier reforms generally did not take place on such end-of-year dates. There were four
changes in the ﬁling threshold that became eﬀective in the middle of a year: on 2/26/1926,
6/6/1932, 8/30/1935 and 10/21/1942. The 1926 and 1942 changes increased the threshold,
89Returns ﬁled after 1945 are also included.
90The latest year available is for estate tax returns ﬁled during calendar year 2002. This year contains about
8% of returns for individuals deceased in 2000 and less than 1% for individuals deceased in 1999 or before. We
are therefore conﬁdent that extremely few estates for 2000 decedents will be ﬁled in years 2003 or later.
91A number of estates with net worth below the ﬁling threshold do ﬁle estate tax returns because the ﬁling
threshold is deﬁned based on gross worth.
92We ignore the issue of inﬂation eﬀects within a year which makes individuals with the same real net worth
more likely to be subject to the tax if they die later in the year
48the other two decreased it. Furthermore, the estate tax was adopted starting September 9th
1916, so that we do not have the full coverage for 1916. In those cases, we naturally re-weight
observations available for part of the year only by the inverse of the part of the year with lower
threshold.93 This amounts to assuming that decedents dying during the part of the year when
the low threshold was eﬀective constitute a representative sample of decedents of similar wealth
dying during the other part of the year.
Where relevant, we rely on the sample weights provided by the SOI. Post-1945 samples are
stratiﬁed samples of returns actually ﬁled. Generally, all returns above a certain high level of
wealth are included in the data ($5 million in most years), while returns below that level are
sampled using a complex design (Woodburn and Johnson, 1994). Certain rare types of returns
(e.g., individuals aged 45 or younger) are included with certainty. In the 1980s, returns were
sampled every year but samples for certain years (1982, 1986, 1989) are signiﬁcantly larger, with
samples for intermediate years treated as supplementary. This design reﬂects the fact that at
the time of the studies, one of the main SOI objective was to be able to produce wealth estimates
every three years. Beginning with 1991, the sampling strategy is essentially consistent over time.
We assign observations to the various top groups as follows. We deﬁne the corresponding
population count of an observation as the product of the sampling weight and the multiplier.
We use these weights we compute the rank of an individual in the distribution of net worth. We
then compute the thresholds of the fractiles of interest using the U.S. population over 20 in a
given year estimated from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) (series A29-32) and U.S. Bureau of
the Census (2002) (Table 2-12). Individuals who are located on the boundaries of two top groups
contribute to both of them in proportion to their overlap with each. All reported tabulations
are performed using top groups deﬁned in this way.
For 1916-1945, the data are not equally detailed for all observations. As mentioned, all
returns that were ﬁled are included in the data and they are all subject to the so called “basic
edit,” while only selected observations are subject to the “complete edit.” The former includes
basic information from the tax return such as age, sex, marital status, date of death, state
of residence, gross estate, debts, life insurance and a few other variables. The latter includes
in addition information on the composition of estates. Sub-samples of returns for decedents
who died in 1916-1920, 1928-1930, 1938-1940 and 1944 were subject to the complete edit. In
addition, gross estates above some high threshold were always subject to the complete edit. As
the result, for 1916-45 we are able to construct the complete estate composition series for the top
0.01% based on the complete coverage of decedents, while the composition for lower percentiles
is available only for selected years and is usually based on a sample of returns.
Column 2 of Table A displays the shares of population that we estimate are covered by our
data in each year. Table D contains basic information about the size and information contained
in our sample, by percentile category. Its ﬁrst panel lists the number of observations in each
percentile category. When no ﬁgure is shown, it indicates that ﬁlling out this category would
require including individuals with net worth below the threshold level. The second panel presents
average sample weights in various percentile groups, by year.94 In practical terms, our estimates
93For example, on June 6, 1935 the ﬁling threshold was decreased from $100,000 to $50,000. As a result, we
use only deaths occurring after June 6 to estimate wealth between $50,000 and $100,000 and re-weight those
observations by a factor 365/208 (208 is the number of days between June 6
th and the end of the year). We
re-weight all observations in 1916 by a factor 366/114 (1916 was a leap-year).
94The weight can be lower than 1 for observations which span two diﬀerent categories. By construction, it
49of the top 0.01% wealth are based on returns sampled with certainty, while estimates in lower
percentiles are for many years based on samples. It is clear from this table that the data for
1983-1985 and for 1987-1988 is based on the much sparser sampling than those in other years.
The last part of Table D shows the fraction of observations in each category that contain detailed
composition information about asset holdings.
Appendix D.3 Estimates Based on Published Tabulations: 1946-1950, 1953-
1954, 1956, 1958, and 1960
For years 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1953, 1954, 1956, 1958, and 1960, the IRS has not
constructed micro-data ﬁles but has published a set of detailed tabulations in U.S. Treasury
Department, Internal Revenue Service (various yearsa). We have used those Statistics of Income
(SOI) tabulations to estimate top wealth shares and composition for those years as well.
SOI tabulations are always presented by year of ﬁling: as most estates are ﬁled within 9
months of death, we assume that year of ﬁling t corresponds to year of death t − 1.95 The SOI
publication contains cross-tabulations by size of gross estate and age groups (for each of the two
genders) for years 1948, 1949, 1950, 1953, and 1958. For all years but 1958, the age groups are
quite detailed and deﬁned as 0-20, 21-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-64, 64-69, 70-74, 75-79,
80-84, and 85+.96
For each age group and gender cell, we compute the estate multiplier as the product of the
average mortality for the cell97 and the social diﬀerential mortality factor from Brown et al.
(2002) (see above). We multiply the number of decedents and the amount of gross estate they
report by the estate multiplier in order to obtain a distribution by gross estate brackets for
the living population. Because the number of observations in the very top brackets is small,
the corresponding multipliers tend to be noisy and vary from bracket to bracket and year to
year. Therefore, for each gender group, we average multipliers for all estates above one million
nominal dollars for years before 1950 and above two million nominal dollars for 1953 and after.
Such estates are very large and always represent less than the top 0.01% which is the smallest
group we analyze in this study.
We then estimate the thresholds and amounts corresponding to each fractile using the well
known empirical regularity that the top tail of the wealth distribution is very closely approxi-
mated by a Pareto distribution.
The ﬁrst step consists then in estimating the income thresholds corresponding to each of the
percentiles Top 2%, Top 1%, ,..., Top 0.01% thresholds, that deﬁne our top wealth groups. For
each percentile p, we look ﬁrst for the wealth bracket [s,t] containing the percentile p. We then
assume that the distribution of wealth is Pareto distributed within the bracket [s,t]. A Pareto
distribution has a cumulative distribution function of the form F(y) = 1 − (k/y)a where k and
a are constants, a is the Pareto parameter of the distribution. We estimate then the parameters
applies to at most two observations in a group.
95Micro-ﬁles from the IRS show that this assumption is reasonable although not completely accurate because
many returns are ﬁled late. The overwhelming majority of returns ﬁled in year t are composed by returns for
date of death t − 1 (about two thirds) and date of death t − 2 (about one third).
96For year 1958, the age groups are less detailed: 0-30, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, 70-79, and 80+.
97This average mortality is computed using the mortality tables for the U.S. population by 5 year age and
gender groups available at http://www.demog.berkeley.edu/wilmoth/mortality/states.html
50a and k of the Pareto distribution for the wealth bracket [s,t] by solving the two equations:
k = s · p1/a and k = t · q1/a where p is the fraction of individals above s and q the fraction
of individuals above t. Note that the Pareto parameters k and a may vary from bracket to
bracket.98 Once the density distribution on [s,t] is estimated, it is straightforward to estimate
the income threshold, say yp, corresponding to percentile p.
The second step consists of estimating the amounts of wealth reported above wealth threshold
yp. We estimate the amount reported between wealth yp and t (the upper bound of the wealth
bracket [s,t] containing yp) using the estimated Pareto density with parameters a and k. We
then add to that amount the amounts in all the brackets above t. Using the micro-data, we
have checked that this method provide very close estimates of the thresholds and amounts.
Gross estate is deﬁned as the sum of all assets (including life insurance) before deducting
debts and liabilities, and all other deductions. Therefore, to obtain net worth estimates, we
need to deduct life insurance and liabilities from our gross worth estimates and add back the
cash surrender value of life insurance. We estimate the cash surrender value of life insurance
from the pay-out value using the same method as the one described above for micro-data. For
each fractile, we compute the fraction of life insurance and the fraction of debts relative to gross
worth using the method to estimate composition of wealth described below. We then subtract
from the amounts and thresholds corresponding to each bracket the fraction of debt and life
insurance and we add back the cash surrender value of life insurance.99 This method provides
accurate results when the ranking according to gross estate and the ranking according to net
worth (gross estate less life insurance and debts plus CSV of insurance) are close. Using the
micro-data, we can check that those rankings are close and that our method provides results
very close to the exact computations (both can be computed with the micro-data).100
Once the corrected amounts and thresholds are obtained, we obtain directly the mean income
above percentile p by dividing the amount by the number of individuals above percentile p.
Finally, the share of income accruing to individuals above percentile p is obtained by dividing
the total amount above yp by our aggregate wealth series (Table A, col. (4)). Average wealth and
wealth shares for intermediate groups (Top 2-1%, Top 1-0.5%, etc.) are obtained by subtraction.
The shares are reported in Table B1, and the thresholds and average wealth levels are reported
in Table B2.
For years 1946, 1947, 1954, 1956 and 1960, the IRS has not published tabulations by brackets
of gross estate, by age and gender. Therefore, for those years, we apply the multipliers by
brackets obtained above using the closest year. For 1946 and 1947, we use the multipliers from
1948. For year 1954, we use year 1953. For years 1956, we use the average of 1953 and 1958.
For 1960, we use year 1958. This method is acceptable because multipliers by wealth brackets
vary little from year to year.
For years 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1953, 1954, 1958, and 1960, composition tables published
98If the threshold falls in the top bracket, we estimate the Pareto parameter a for the top bracket using the
fact that the average wealth in the top bracket is equal to a/(a − 1) times the top bracket threshold.
99For each threshold, we subtract the average fraction of debt and life insurance and add back the CSV of life
insurance from the bracket above and the bracket below.
100For years 1950 and 1956, no composition tables have been published. Therefore, we assume the same average
liabilities and life insurance as the average of 1954 and 1958 by bracket for 1956 and years 1949 and 1951 for year
1950.
51by brackets of gross estates have been used to estimate the fraction of net worth for each fractile
falling into each of the categories: real estate, bonds, stocks, cash, deposits and notes, other
assets, and debts. The composition of wealth within each group was estimated from these tables
using a simple linear interpolation method. As those composition tables are not published by age
or gender, we assumed that the composition by brackets was the same for the living population
and for decedents. This assumption does not seem to bias our results signiﬁcantly as we see no
evidence of discontinuity with the years where we can use the micro-data and hence relax this
assumption. The composition estimates are also reported on Table B3.
As we discussed above and as can be seen in Table D, for a number of years during the period
1916-1945, the micro estate tax data do not provide composition information for returns with
gross estate below a very high threshold for years 1921-1927, 1931-1937, 1941-1943, and 1945.
For all these years, except 1926 and 1945, we have used the published composition tabulations
by size of estate from U.S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service (various yearsa) to
estimate the composition of net worth for our top groups using the same methodology as above.
Appendix D.4 Pareto Extrapolations when Coverage is too Low
As can be seen on Table A, column (3), for a number of years and especially in the 1916-1945
period, the estate tax data does not cover the top 1% of the population (or even the top .5%
for some years). In order to produce top 1% shares for all years, we have used a simple Pareto
extrapolation technique to estimate those shares. We assume that the Pareto coeﬃcient for the
groups for which we do not have enough data is the same as the one for the lowest group fully
covered by our data. For example, in 1918, as the data covers the top 0.571%, the lowest group
covered is the top .5-.25%, and we assume that the Pareto parameter for group 1-.5% is the
same of the Pareto parameter we estimated for the group .5-.25%. This method is acceptable
because the variations in the Pareto parameters are relatively small from one group to the next.
This method can be checked with years with good coverage.
Appendix D.5 Sensitivity to certain data inconsistencies
As discussed earlier, between 1942 and 1948 the gross estate was supposed to include the full
value of community property. This change took place in October 1942. By deﬁnition, this
rule aﬀected directly only married individuals, although an eﬀect (with a lag) on widows is
also possible. Its mechanical consequence is a temporary increase in the reported assets of the
married individuals in community property states. As the result, if this change had a signiﬁcant
eﬀect, it should aﬀect the values of estates of married residents of the community property states
relative to the rest. Figure A6 shows fractions of the top .05% and Top .25-.05% accounted for
by residents of the community property states, by marital status. The mechanical eﬀect should
lead to an increase in the share of community property residents among married individuals in
the top group but not necessarily in the other groups. The evidence of such a change is weak.
The share of married community property residents in the top group indeed increased in 1943
but then fell back to the usual level. The trend is much stronger for single individuals (who
are not aﬀected by the change). In the lower bracket, it appears that the share of community
property residents among the married was indeed increasing relative to other groups, but the
52eﬀect is the strongest some two years after the change went into eﬀect. Overall, we conclude
that there is no evidence that this source of data inconsistency plays an important role.
The tax treatment of jointly owned property changed in 1976 and 1981 by allowing to include
only 50% of jointly held assets in the estate of the decedents. Our dataset includes the value
of the includible portion of jointly owned assets as reported on Schedule E for 1962, 1972, 1976
and from 1982 on. Starting with 1992, we can observe both total and the includible part of
assets jointly held with the spouse. Indeed, approximately 50% of the total is included. Assets
held jointly with the spouse constitute more than 80% of all jointly held assets in all wealth
categories. Generally, the importance of jointly owned assets falls with wealth. There is little
evidence of a signiﬁcant decrease of the value of jointly held assets included in the estate after
1976. In the top .1%, the includible part of jointly held assets was approximately 2.3% of the
total net worth in 1972, 1.1% in 1976 and it ﬂuctuated between .7 and 4% (with the mean of
2.2%) since, with no discernible trend. At lower percentiles, there is similarly no evidence of a
major decrease in the included jointly owned assets (although the importance of jointly owned
assets is much larger: they steadily increase as net worth falls and, e.g., they are more than
10% of net worth around the .5% percentile). Speculating somewhat, because the change in tax
law should have had a mechanical eﬀect of halving the jointly owned property, it suggests that
additional outside assets might have been reported as jointly owned, presumably to beneﬁt from
a step-up while escaping taxation via marital deduction. If so, doubling jointly owned property
after 1976 would lead to a signiﬁcant overestimation of net worth relative to the pre-1977 period.
In any case, at least at the very top, how jointly owned assets are accounted for would have
no major impact on our shares. Either doubling of the post-1976 jointly owned property or
including a fraction of the pre-1977 would change the shares only in a minor way (in the top
.1%, net worth would change by approximately 2%). Such a change would lead to showing a
slightly stronger recovery in the early 1980s without an eﬀect on trends pre- or post-1976.
Appendix E Earlier Estimates and Estimates from other Sources
Table C1 reports top 1% wealth share estimates in the United States from previous studies.
Appendix E.1 Lampman Estimates
Lampman (1962) was the ﬁrst to use in a comprehensive way the U.S. estate tax data to construct
top wealth shares. He focused his analysis on years 1922, 1929, 1933, 1939, 1945, 1949, 1953,
1954, and 1956, for which the IRS published detailed tables by age and gender groups. However,
for all these years, Lampman’s analysis is always focused on all estate tax returns ﬁlers as a
whole representing the living population of wealth holders with gross wealth above the ﬁling
threshold. Because of inﬂation, economic growth and downturns, and changes in the nominal
ﬁling threshold, the adult population represented by estate tax ﬁlers has changed dramatically
from less than 0.5% in 1929 to almost 2% in 1956. Lampman’s provides consistent top wealth
1% shares for the adult population (aged 20 and above) from those estimates using a simple
graphical Pareto interpolation method (Table 94 and Chart 32 on pp. 204-205).101 He assumed
101Lampman also provides estimates of the top 0.5% share of the total population (adults and minors) using the
same method. As a result, the top 1% and top 0.5% Lampman series are not comparable.
53that the Pareto parameter for all years was equal to the one estimated for 1953 (for which he
provided much detail in the ﬁrst part of the book).
Therefore, although Lampman’s study was very detailed and careful in the analysis of the
group represented by all estate tax ﬁlers, his derivation of consistent top shares, the most
inﬂuential piece in his study, was very rough. Our own estimation method shows that the
Pareto parameters do vary substantially from year to year. The Pareto parameter for year 1953
in the range Top 1-0.5% (which Lampman used for the other years) is equal to about 1.6 but
is lower for pre-war years (around 1.3). Therefore, Lampman’s graphical method might have
introduced non-negligible errors, especially for the years for which the fraction of the population
represented by tax returns is far from 1%. It is also important to note that there are many
other reasons why our estimates might diﬀer from Lampman’s, as his deﬁnition of net worth is
not identical to ours, and the social diﬀerential mortality rates are also diﬀerent.
Nevertheless, overall, Lampman’s estimates (reproduced in Table C1 and graphically dis-
played on Figure 11) are comparable to ours. The downward trend is of similar magnitude. The
main diﬀerence is for 1939. Our series suggest than there was a continuous decline in the top
1% from 1933 to 1945, while Lampman’s series displays a rebound in 1939. This discrepancy is
in part explained by diﬀerences in our denominator series. Lampman denominator is relatively
low in 1939 (displaying less than a 10% increase from 1933) whereas our denominator increases
by about 20% (in nominal terms). Both Wolﬀ (1989) and Goldsmith et al. (1956) display a
similar 20% increase in nominal terms from 1933 to 1939.
Appendix E.2 Smith Estimates
Smith (1984) constructs top 0.5% and 1% net worth shares for years 1958, 1962, 1965, 1969,
1972, and 1976 using micro estate tax data. He also estimates the composition of wealth for
those two groups. Smith deﬁnes the top groups relative to the total population instead of adults
(as we do). Moreover, because of data issues, the top groups are deﬁned by ranking individuals
by gross worth instead of net worth (although shares are computed based on the net worth
concept). Those two features make Smith’s data not directly comparable with our results and
with the previous estimates by Lampman.102
Appendix E.3 SCF and Combined Estimates
Kennickell (2003) and Scholz (2003) have used the Survey of Consumer Finances to construct
top net worth shares. Kennickell (2003) estimates shares and composition of wealth for 5 groups:
the bottom 50% (percentiles 0-50), the next 40% (percentiles 50-90), the bottom half of the top
decile (percentiles 90-95), the next 4% (percentiles 95-99), and the top 1%. Those estimates are
provided for years 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001.103
Scholz (2003) provides wealth shares for the top 10%, 5%, 2%, 1%, and 0.5% for all survey
years available: 1962, 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001. Kennickell (2003) uses the non-
public large SCF data which have a more observations at the very top and which are not included
102The top .5% Smith series, however, can be compared more easily with the top .5% Lampman series for the
total population. See footnote above.
103According to Kennickell, earlier surveys, 1962 and 1983 are not directly comparable due to substantial changes
in the surveying and weighting methodology.
54in the publicly available SCF data used in Scholz (2003). This, however, seems to have only a
minor eﬀect on the estimates as Kennickell’s and Scholz’ top wealth share estimates are very
close.
Wolﬀ and Marley (1989) and Wolﬀ (1994) provides top 1% household wealth shares based on
the previous estimates by Lampman and Smith from estate tax data and more recent estimates
from the SCF.
Appendix E.4 Computations Based on Forbes 400 Richest
Every late September since 1982, Forbes magazine has constructed a list of the richest 400
Americans, along with estimates of their net worth, age, and the main source of their wealth. It
is important to keep in mind that those wealth estimates are not exact measures of net worth as
some of those richest individuals may not be willing to cooperate with Forbes and reveal precisely
their net worth. It is also possible that some of the wealthiest (but not highly visible) Americans
have not been discovered and listed by Forbes.104 This problem was more acute in the early
years of the survey (especially the ﬁrst year 1982).105 With the years and the incredible success
and publicity of the Forbes 400, most wealthy individuals provide voluntarily information to
Forbes and it is quite unlikely that a signiﬁcant fraction of the wealthiest Americans has been
able or willing to escape the attention of Forbes magazine.
We report in columns (1) and (2) of Table C2, the total net worth of the Forbes 400 and the
average wealth of the Forbes 400 in 2000 dollars.
Because the total adult population has increased by almost 30% over the period, measuring
the share of total net worth of the Forbes 400, might be misleading. In order to provide estimates
robust to population growth, we have constructed series for the top .0002% and top .00005%
wealth shares from 1982 to 2002. We also provide the share of top .0002-.00005% which is
simply the diﬀerence of the two former shares. The top .0002% corresponds almost exactly
to the top 400 richest individuals, and the top .00005% to the top 100 richest individuals in
2000 (as there are 201.9 million adults in the population in 2000, see Table A). The top .0002-
.00005% corresponds to individuals ranked 101 to 400 in 2000. The shares are computed simply
by summing the net worth levels of the corresponding individuals on the Forbes list.106 For the
ﬁnal years (2000, 2001, and 2002), the top .00005% corresponds to a few more individuals than
the top 400. In that case, we use the complementary list of near misses (those individuals who
almost made it to the Forbes 400) to compute our estimates.
The shares of those three groups are reported in columns (3), (4), (5), and the ratio of the
average wealth to the average wealth in the adult population is reported on columns (6), (7),
and (8) for each of these three groups. Finally, and for comparison purposes, the share of the top
.01% (top 20,000 individuals in 2000) estimated from estate tax returns is reported in column
(9).
104For example, the SCF has found believable interviews of individuals with wealth above the Forbes 400
minimum but not included in the Forbes list (see Kennickell, 2003). Estate tax returns with net worth above the
Forbes 400 minimum have also been found by the IRS (see McCubbin, 1994).
105This is why we do not reproduce very top wealth shares from the Forbes 400 for year 1982, the ﬁrst year of
the survey, on Figure 12.
106For example, if the top .00005% corresponds to the top 100.5 individuals, we sum the top 100 wealth levels
plus one-half of the wealth of the 101st individual.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Population 201,865,000 $163,161 
2.00% $729,932 Top 2-1% 2,018,650 $920,073
1.00% $1,172,896 Top 1-0.5% 1,009,325 $1,472,456
0.50% $1,841,697 Top 0.5-0.25% 504,663 $2,314,011
0.25% $3,067,676 Top 0.25-0.1% 302,798 $3,989,132
0.10% $5,503,678 Top 0.1-0.05% 100,933 $6,717,885
0.05% $8,219,720 Top 0.05-0.01% 80,746 $12,675,629
0.01% $24,415,150 Top 0.01% 20,187 $63,564,151
Notes: Computations based on estate tax return statistics (see Appendix Section D). 
Wealth defined as total assets less liabilities. It includes the estimated cash surrender value of life insurance. 
It excludes annuitized wealth, and future pensions with no cash surrender value, future labor income and 
social security benefits. Amounts are expressed in 2000 dollars.
Source: Table A and Table B2, row 2000.
Thresholds and Average Wealth in Top Groups within the Top 2% in 2000Wealth Composition (in percent) Inflation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Population Population Total Wealth Average Wealth Real EstateFixed Claim Corporate Non-Corp. Life Liabilities CPI-U
(aged 20+) covered by (billions 2000 $) (2000 $) and Durables Assets Equity Equity Insurance (2000 base)
estate Reserves
('000s) tax returns
1916 60,063 0.454% 3,011 50,127 24.2 19.5 21.1 38.4 2.7 -5.7 6.324
1917 60,914 0.482% 2,770 45,481 26.5 20.3 17.8 38.4 2.7 -5.7 7.425
1918 60,477 0.571% 2,621 43,346 28.4 21.2 15.3 38.0 2.6 -5.6 8.716
1919 61,758 0.718% 2,709 43,868 29.2 20.5 15.6 37.3 2.3 -5.0 10.015
1920 63,117 0.770% 2,494 39,521 31.2 20.9 14.4 36.2 2.3 -5.0 11.598
1921 64,360 0.718% 2,667 41,432 31.4 23.1 14.3 34.1 2.6 -5.6 10.357
1922 65,237 0.716% 2,895 44,374 29.4 23.9 16.9 32.9 2.7 -5.8 9.704
1923 66,498 0.705% 3,000 45,110 29.8 23.7 17.7 32.2 2.8 -6.2 9.879
1924 67,945 0.734% 3,136 46,153 30.7 23.6 18.4 31.3 3.1 -7.0 9.899
1925 69,137 0.738% 3,298 47,709 30.1 22.8 20.7 30.6 3.2 -7.5 10.146
1926 70,348 0.763% 3,471 49,342 29.9 22.4 22.5 29.9 3.3 -8.0 10.248
1927 71,615 0.389% 3,796 53,005 28.9 21.8 25.2 29.1 3.4 -8.3 10.053
1928 72,882 0.399% 4,314 59,191 26.8 20.2 29.6 28.2 3.3 -8.1 9.922
1929 74,112 0.430% 4,773 64,401 25.1 19.0 34.6 26.1 3.2 -8.1 9.922
1930 75,505 0.380% 4,281 56,701 28.4 21.9 27.6 27.5 3.9 -9.2 9.674
1931 76,620 0.296% 3,892 50,792 31.1 25.7 20.8 27.6 5.0 -10.2 8.823
1932 77,683 0.416% 3,548 45,674 33.4 30.7 13.4 27.5 6.3 -11.4 7.914
1933 78,764 0.420% 3,785 48,052 31.4 29.7 14.8 27.7 6.5 -10.2 7.510
1934 79,915 0.423% 3,917 49,016 30.0 27.4 16.9 28.3 6.4 -9.0 7.766
1935 81,064 0.544% 4,054 50,006 28.8 25.7 18.4 29.2 6.5 -8.5 7.960
1936 82,156 0.608% 4,535 55,205 26.6 22.6 22.0 30.3 6.1 -7.6 8.040
1937 83,216 0.618% 4,417 53,080 28.2 22.2 20.4 30.3 6.4 -7.5 8.329
1938 84,344 0.604% 4,365 51,758 30.3 22.7 17.7 30.1 6.9 -7.8 8.171
1939 85,486 0.620% 4,570 53,464 30.2 21.8 18.1 30.4 7.0 -7.6 8.056
1940 86,832 0.620% 4,627 53,288 31.3 22.6 16.3 29.8 7.3 -7.5 8.137
1941 88,173 0.657% 4,610 52,287 32.9 24.4 13.4 28.9 7.6 -7.2 8.544
1942 89,560 0.663% 4,550 50,802 33.0 25.8 11.8 28.5 7.4 -6.6 9.458
1943 90,999 0.552% 4,867 53,485 31.4 26.8 12.1 28.5 7.0 -5.8 10.035
1944 92,376 0.700% 5,408 58,543 29.8 27.8 12.7 28.2 6.6 -5.2 10.205
1945 93,697 0.827% 6,025 64,306 27.7 28.3 14.4 28.0 6.1 -4.6 10.440
1946 94,933 1.176% 6,221 65,533 27.3 28.0 14.5 29.0 5.9 -4.6 11.328
1947 96,183 1.303% 5,918 61,526 29.4 26.7 12.7 30.7 5.9 -5.3 12.959
1948 97,552 1.341% 5,884 60,320 31.7 25.3 11.6 31.5 5.8 -6.0 13.969
1949 98,941 1.410% 6,233 62,993 33.6 24.4 11.5 31.2 5.9 -6.6 13.830
1950 100,224 1.494% 6,567 65,524 35.3 23.4 12.5 30.3 5.8 -7.4 13.968
1951 101,452 6,638 65,431 36.5 22.1 13.8 29.7 5.6 -7.8 15.072
1952 102,626 6,928 67,507 37.5 21.9 14.1 29.2 5.6 -8.3 15.403
1953 103,611 1.884% 7,101 68,539 39.0 22.6 13.5 28.5 5.6 -9.1 15.526
1954 104,623 1.861% 7,432 71,036 39.4 22.5 14.9 27.3 5.6 -9.7 15.604
1955 105,603 8,037 76,109 39.2 22.1 17.8 25.8 5.4 -10.4 15.542
1956 106,687 2.266% 8,483 79,514 39.5 22.1 19.2 24.9 5.3 -11.0 15.775
1957 107,748 8,522 79,090 40.5 22.5 18.4 24.9 5.3 -11.5 16.343
1958 108,710 2.611% 8,761 80,595 40.3 22.4 19.2 24.5 5.2 -11.7 16.784
1959 110,223 9,303 84,398 39.4 22.3 21.6 23.6 5.1 -12.0 16.918
Adult population Personal Wealth
Table A: Reference Totals for Population, Wealth, and Inflation, 1916-20021960 111,314 2.950% 9,526 85,579 39.7 22.8 22.0 23.1 5.1 -12.7 17.189
1961 112,450 9,978 88,733 39.1 22.8 23.4 22.6 5.0 -13.0 17.361
1962 113,754 2.700% 10,382 91,268 38.7 23.0 24.2 22.4 5.0 -13.4 17.552
1963 115,096 10,614 92,215 39.0 23.8 24.2 22.2 5.0 -14.3 17.762
1964 116,796 11,108 95,103 38.5 24.2 25.7 21.5 4.9 -14.9 17.993
1965 118,275 2.923% 11,737 99,231 37.5 24.2 27.5 21.1 4.8 -15.2 18.299
1966 119,724 11,963 99,918 38.0 24.9 26.4 21.4 4.8 -15.6 18.830
1967 121,143 12,425 102,562 38.1 25.3 26.2 21.2 4.7 -15.6 19.376
1968 123,507 13,343 108,037 37.3 24.6 28.5 20.2 4.4 -15.0 20.190
1969 125,543 4.069% 13,447 107,108 38.6 25.0 26.9 20.4 4.3 -15.1 21.280
1970 127,674 13,026 102,028 40.3 26.2 23.7 20.9 4.4 -15.5 22.535
1971 130,774 13,420 102,619 40.2 26.4 23.5 21.0 4.2 -15.3 23.527
1972 133,502 5.343% 14,606 109,410 39.6 25.8 25.0 20.7 4.0 -15.1 24.280
1973 136,006 14,885 109,446 41.4 26.1 22.4 21.9 3.8 -15.6 25.785
1974 138,444 13,574 98,048 44.4 28.2 15.6 24.8 4.0 -17.0 28.621
1975 141,055 13,232 93,809 45.1 29.1 13.4 25.7 4.0 -17.3 31.226
1976 143,609 6.517% 14,136 98,433 44.5 28.3 15.2 25.1 3.7 -16.8 33.037
1977 146,305 14,686 100,378 46.0 28.1 14.2 25.5 3.5 -17.3 35.185
1978 149,142 15,125 101,413 48.2 28.0 12.1 26.4 3.4 -18.1 37.859
1979 152,105 15,518 102,022 49.1 27.5 11.8 26.8 3.1 -18.3 42.137
1980 155,268 15,701 101,122 48.8 26.8 12.8 26.7 2.9 -17.9 47.825
1981 158,033 15,739 99,594 49.2 26.9 12.3 26.5 2.7 -17.6 52.751
1982 160,665 1.966% 15,803 98,360 49.6 27.8 11.5 25.9 2.6 -17.5 56.022
1983 163,135 1.800% 16,275 99,767 48.8 29.1 12.1 24.9 2.6 -17.5 57.814
1984 165,650 1.483% 16,737 101,040 49.5 30.7 11.8 23.5 2.5 -18.0 60.300
1985 168,205 1.178% 17,700 105,231 50.7 32.0 11.9 21.7 2.3 -18.7 62.471
1986 170,556 1.147% 19,199 112,570 50.8 32.7 13.2 20.4 2.2 -19.3 63.658
1987 172,552 1.125% 20,086 116,408 50.9 33.3 13.4 19.7 2.2 -19.5 65.950
1988 174,344 1.046% 20,902 119,890 50.9 33.7 13.5 19.2 2.2 -19.4 68.654
1989 176,060 1.192% 21,736 123,460 50.5 33.2 14.9 18.5 2.2 -19.3 71.949
1990 178,365 1.305% 21,588 121,034 50.7 33.6 15.1 18.3 2.3 -20.0 75.834
1991 180,978 1.312% 21,630 119,519 49.9 33.8 16.6 17.7 2.4 -20.4 79.019
1992 183,443 1.371% 22,186 120,942 49.0 32.8 19.5 16.6 2.4 -20.3 81.390
1993 185,685 1.504% 22,478 121,053 48.8 31.9 21.4 16.1 2.5 -20.6 83.832
1994 187,757 1.541% 22,619 120,472 48.7 31.7 22.0 16.2 2.6 -21.3 86.011
1995 189,911 1.598% 23,407 123,251 47.8 30.8 24.1 16.2 2.6 -21.5 88.419
1996 192,043 1.808% 24,908 129,698 45.7 29.2 27.9 15.6 2.6 -21.0 91.072
1997 194,426 1.930% 26,847 138,082 43.3 27.7 31.9 15.0 2.5 -20.4 93.167
1998 196,795 2.032% 29,306 148,916 41.6 26.2 35.1 14.4 2.5 -19.8 94.657
1999 199,255 2.206% 32,183 161,519 40.0 25.0 38.3 13.5 2.4 -19.2 96.740
2000 201,865 2.072% 32,936 163,161 41.2 24.8 37.9 13.5 2.4 -19.8 100.000
2001 204,323 31,510 154,217 45.6 26.5 33.0 14.2 2.6 -21.8 102.846
2002 206,811 30,194 146,000 50.8 28.8 26.9 14.9 2.9 -24.2 104.472
Notes: Population estimates based on census data from Historical Statistics of the United States and the U.S. Statistical Abstract.
Population covered by tax returns is defined by the population represented, using the multiplier technique, by estate tax returns with net worth above the filing threshold.
Total wealth is defined as net worth of the personal sector excluding all future social security benefits and human wealth but including life insurance reserves.
Only the cash surrender value of pension reserves is included (such as vested defined contribution and 401(k) accounts). 
The series is estimated from the Flow of Funds Accounts since 1945 and from several other sources before 1945. The series estimate average wealth during the 
corresponding year (and not end of year estimates). Wealth composition column reports the percent shares of tangible assets (owner occupied real estate and tenant occupied 
buildings with four units or less, consumer durables), fixed claim assets (cash and saving deposits, all bonds, mortgages), corporate equity, non-corporate equity (which includes 
tenant occupied net real estate for buildings with more than 4 units), and life insurance reserves. Liabilities include all debts (mortgages and consumer credit). 
Columns (5) to (10) add up to 100%. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) series is used to express all nominal values into real 2000 dollars.2% 1% 0.50% 0.25% 0.10% 0.05% 0.01% 2-1% 1-.5% .5-.25% .25-.1% .1-.05% .05-.01%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1916 38.12 32.67 27.44 21.03 16.90 9.69 5.45 5.23 6.40 4.13 7.21
1917 35.58 30.17 25.15 19.31 15.47 8.85 5.41 5.02 5.84 3.84 6.62
1918 36.80 31.17 25.97 20.02 16.11 9.49 5.63 5.19 5.96 3.91 6.63
1923 39.93 33.82 28.42 22.39 18.38 11.32 6.11 5.40 6.03 4.01 7.06
1920 37.61 31.65 26.29 20.36 16.61 10.07 5.96 5.35 5.93 3.75 6.54
1921 35.22 29.12 23.68 17.54 13.68 7.48 6.10 5.43 6.15 3.86 6.20
1922 36.02 29.81 24.11 17.55 13.39 6.38 6.21 5.70 6.55 4.17 7.00
1923 35.22 29.49 24.13 17.80 13.66 6.84 5.73 5.35 6.34 4.14 6.82
1924 36.70 30.85 25.39 19.00 14.95 8.23 5.85 5.46 6.39 4.05 6.72
1925 36.02 30.08 24.77 18.45 14.55 7.79 5.94 5.32 6.31 3.90 6.76
1926 35.15 29.75 24.46 18.41 14.59 8.26 5.40 5.29 6.05 3.82 6.33
1927 39.21 33.19 27.72 21.28 17.19 10.16 6.02 5.46 6.45 4.09 7.03
1928 36.50 31.03 25.93 19.70 15.62 8.87 5.47 5.10 6.23 4.08 6.75
1929 36.76 31.84 26.91 20.80 16.65 9.15 4.92 4.93 6.11 4.16 7.49
1930 40.29 34.47 29.17 22.85 18.71 10.77 5.82 5.31 6.31 4.15 7.94
1931 34.70 29.47 24.63 18.77 14.87 8.25 5.23 4.84 5.85 3.90 6.62
1932 28.40 24.04 19.75 14.68 11.50 6.03 4.36 4.28 5.07 3.18 5.47
1933 30.31 25.80 21.46 16.28 12.91 6.91 4.51 4.34 5.18 3.37 6.00
1934 28.09 23.84 19.76 14.94 11.89 6.57 4.24 4.08 4.83 3.04 5.32
1935 27.77 23.76 19.69 14.98 11.88 6.54 4.01 4.08 4.71 3.10 5.34
1936 29.70 25.51 21.47 16.63 13.30 7.25 4.19 4.04 4.83 3.33 6.05
1937 26.97 22.64 18.73 14.22 11.37 6.14 4.32 3.91 4.52 2.85 5.23
1938 27.06 22.70 18.70 14.13 11.21 6.11 4.36 4.00 4.57 2.93 5.10
1939 25.95 21.59 17.65 13.18 10.40 5.56 4.36 3.94 4.47 2.78 4.84
1940 25.27 20.83 16.87 12.42 9.67 4.96 4.44 3.96 4.45 2.75 4.71
1941 25.30 20.74 16.71 12.35 9.67 5.02 4.56 4.03 4.37 2.67 4.65
1942 23.74 19.34 15.48 11.31 8.69 4.13 4.40 3.85 4.17 2.63 4.56
1943 24.26 19.46 15.35 10.96 8.35 4.23 4.80 4.11 4.39 2.62 4.11
1944 25.49 20.35 16.00 11.40 8.64 4.31 5.14 4.35 4.60 2.76 4.33
1945 24.65 19.38 15.05 10.54 7.92 3.69 5.27 4.33 4.51 2.62 4.23
1946 30.90 24.49 19.06 14.70 10.28 7.61 3.84 6.41 5.43 4.36 4.42 2.67 3.78
1947 31.07 24.28 18.81 14.57 10.26 7.76 4.07 6.79 5.46 4.25 4.30 2.50 3.69
1948 29.67 23.04 17.69 13.54 9.45 7.04 3.65 6.63 5.35 4.15 4.09 2.41 3.39
1949 29.42 22.59 17.25 13.08 9.03 6.69 3.33 6.83 5.34 4.17 4.04 2.35 3.36
1950 29.53 22.78 17.49 13.34 9.24 6.96 3.49 6.75 5.28 4.15 4.10 2.27 3.48
1953 30.91 23.77 18.26 13.95 9.73 7.31 3.60 7.14 5.52 4.31 4.22 2.42 3.72
1954 29.99 23.18 17.89 13.71 9.60 7.31 3.74 6.81 5.30 4.18 4.11 2.29 3.56
1956 31.49 24.75 19.25 14.89 10.48 7.93 3.99 6.74 5.50 4.35 4.41 2.55 3.94
1958 31.19 24.18 18.64 14.35 10.06 7.69 4.15 7.01 5.55 4.29 4.28 2.38 3.54
1960 32.45 25.25 19.50 15.02 10.53 7.99 4.14 7.21 5.75 4.48 4.49 2.54 3.85
1962 31.01 24.39 19.06 14.74 10.36 7.88 4.03 6.61 5.33 4.32 4.38 2.47 3.86
1965 30.75 24.70 19.59 15.35 10.85 8.27 4.41 6.05 5.10 4.25 4.50 2.58 3.86
1969 29.11 22.86 17.84 13.84 9.87 7.64 4.34 6.25 5.02 4.00 3.98 2.22 3.30
1972 29.52 23.13 18.06 14.03 9.89 7.47 3.99 6.39 5.07 4.02 4.14 2.42 3.48
1976 25.67 19.32 14.52 10.91 7.45 5.63 2.91 6.35 4.80 3.61 3.46 1.83 2.72
1982 25.17 19.06 14.36 10.79 7.33 5.40 2.53 6.11 4.70 3.56 3.47 1.93 2.87
1983 26.96 21.07 15.93 12.06 8.40 6.40 3.19 5.89 5.15 3.87 3.66 1.99 3.21
1984 26.57 20.95 16.23 12.23 8.60 6.62 3.51 5.62 4.72 4.00 3.63 1.99 3.10
1985 28.49 22.35 17.43 13.49 9.45 7.25 4.09 6.14 4.92 3.95 4.04 2.20 3.16
1986 28.80 22.66 17.62 13.63 9.61 7.37 3.91 6.14 5.03 4.00 4.02 2.23 3.46
1987 27.78 21.57 16.66 12.79 8.98 6.73 3.44 6.22 4.91 3.88 3.80 2.25 3.29
1988 27.77 21.70 16.85 12.92 8.95 6.80 3.60 6.07 4.86 3.93 3.97 2.15 3.21
1989 28.04 21.96 17.02 13.13 9.30 7.11 3.79 6.08 4.94 3.89 3.83 2.19 3.32
1990 27.39 20.86 15.95 12.21 8.73 6.78 3.63 6.53 4.91 3.74 3.48 1.95 3.15
1991 27.73 21.54 16.56 12.73 8.95 6.79 3.55 6.20 4.98 3.83 3.78 2.16 3.24
1992 27.23 21.18 16.34 12.66 8.99 6.88 3.72 6.06 4.84 3.68 3.67 2.12 3.16
1993 27.53 21.31 16.33 12.44 8.69 6.72 3.76 6.22 4.98 3.89 3.75 1.98 2.96
1994 28.08 21.58 16.63 12.84 9.00 6.96 3.86 6.50 4.96 3.79 3.84 2.04 3.11
1995 27.74 21.54 16.67 12.91 9.29 7.23 3.99 6.20 4.87 3.76 3.62 2.07 3.24
1996 27.68 21.45 16.51 12.71 9.08 6.98 3.84 6.23 4.94 3.80 3.63 2.10 3.15
1997 27.24 21.24 16.41 12.56 8.92 6.91 3.78 6.00 4.83 3.85 3.64 2.01 3.13
1998 27.67 21.70 16.86 13.08 9.38 7.31 3.99 5.97 4.83 3.78 3.70 2.08 3.32
1999 27.68 21.68 16.86 13.16 9.40 7.28 3.91 6.00 4.82 3.69 3.76 2.12 3.37
2000 26.43 20.79 16.27 12.73 9.06 7.00 3.90 5.64 4.51 3.55 3.67 2.06 3.11
Notes: Computations by authors based on estate tax return statistics. See Appendix Section D for details.
Series display the top of total net-worth accruing to each upper wealth group.
Series for Top 2-1% are estimated only for the 1946-2000 period because the tax return population does not cover that group in the pre-war period.
Table B1: Top Wealth Shares in the United States, 1916-2000
Top groups Intermediate Groups2% 1% 0.50% 0.25% 0.10% 0.05% 0.01% 2-1% 1-.5% .5-.25% .25-.1% .1-.05% .05-.01% 2% 1% 0.50% 0.25% 0.10% 0.05% 0.01%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
1916 1,911 3,275 5,501 10,543 16,947 48,582 547 1,049 2,140 4,139 9,038 403 773 1,487 3,274 5,536 19,602
1917 1,618 2,745 4,575 8,781 14,071 40,230 492 914 1,772 3,490 7,531 368 684 1,264 2,715 4,700 14,964
1918 1,595 2,702 4,504 8,678 13,968 41,123 488 900 1,721 3,387 7,180 364 682 1,225 2,611 4,568 13,591
1923 1,752 2,967 4,987 9,823 16,125 49,643 536 948 1,763 3,520 7,745 411 727 1,258 2,713 4,966 13,414
1920 1,486 2,501 4,156 8,046 13,129 39,781 471 846 1,563 2,964 6,466 348 663 1,123 2,318 3,917 13,185
1921 1,459 2,413 3,925 7,266 11,334 30,981 506 901 1,697 3,199 6,422 386 688 1,214 2,501 4,186 12,689
1922 1,598 2,645 4,279 7,790 11,879 28,314 551 1,012 1,939 3,701 7,770 414 764 1,379 2,869 5,058 14,498
1923 1,589 2,660 4,355 8,029 12,327 30,869 517 966 1,905 3,731 7,692 385 722 1,327 2,919 4,988 13,205
1924 1,694 2,847 4,687 8,767 13,799 37,993 540 1,008 1,967 3,734 7,751 398 761 1,374 3,020 4,675 15,048
1925 1,718 2,870 4,726 8,804 13,888 37,179 567 1,014 2,007 3,721 8,065 431 774 1,440 2,888 5,025 15,978
1926 1,734 2,936 4,827 9,084 14,396 40,757 533 1,044 1,989 3,771 7,806 383 790 1,430 2,921 5,009 14,397
1927 2,078 3,518 5,878 11,278 18,222 53,853 638 1,158 2,279 4,334 9,314 483 877 1,590 3,462 5,434 20,334
1928 2,160 3,673 6,139 11,663 18,491 52,487 647 1,208 2,456 4,835 9,992 483 902 1,683 3,716 6,477 18,018
1929 2,367 4,101 6,933 13,398 21,443 58,947 634 1,269 2,623 5,353 12,067 457 915 1,800 4,055 7,156 25,056
1930 2,285 3,910 6,615 12,959 21,216 61,043 660 1,204 2,386 4,702 11,260 498 909 1,659 3,579 6,343 24,560
1931 1,763 2,994 5,003 9,535 15,105 41,922 532 984 1,982 3,965 8,401 399 738 1,365 3,090 5,183 15,735
1932 1,297 2,196 3,609 6,706 10,507 27,540 398 783 1,544 2,905 6,249 290 570 1,089 2,298 4,008 11,400
1933 1,456 2,479 4,124 7,821 12,406 33,209 433 834 1,659 3,237 7,205 319 613 1,165 2,555 4,274 13,565
1934 1,377 2,337 3,875 7,322 11,660 32,211 416 799 1,577 2,984 6,523 306 588 1,123 2,348 4,016 11,563
1935 1,389 2,377 3,938 7,491 11,885 32,722 401 815 1,569 3,098 6,675 282 595 1,110 2,365 4,211 12,119
1936 1,640 2,816 4,740 9,182 14,687 40,021 463 893 1,779 3,678 8,354 338 660 1,229 2,750 5,013 17,301
1937 1,431 2,404 3,978 7,547 12,072 32,614 459 830 1,598 3,022 6,936 348 630 1,126 2,372 4,187 12,675
1938 1,401 2,350 3,872 7,315 11,599 31,615 452 828 1,577 3,030 6,595 336 631 1,119 2,316 4,060 13,123
1939 1,387 2,308 3,774 7,048 11,125 29,745 467 842 1,592 2,972 6,470 352 644 1,139 2,356 3,753 14,481
1940 1,347 2,220 3,596 6,620 10,305 26,433 473 845 1,579 2,935 6,273 359 647 1,138 2,289 3,961 12,631
1941 1,323 2,169 3,495 6,456 10,117 26,267 477 843 1,522 2,795 6,079 363 652 1,110 2,212 3,775 12,938
1942 1,206 1,965 3,147 5,747 8,826 20,985 447 783 1,413 2,668 5,786 343 606 1,033 2,063 3,605 10,222
1943 1,298 2,082 3,285 5,863 8,927 22,630 514 878 1,566 2,800 5,501 398 689 1,142 2,262 3,605 10,036
1944 1,492 2,383 3,747 6,673 10,118 25,220 602 1,019 1,796 3,227 6,342 468 804 1,327 2,583 4,135 11,435
1945 1,585 2,493 3,871 6,778 10,181 23,725 678 1,114 1,933 3,375 6,795 533 886 1,447 2,690 4,656 10,397
1946 1,013 1,605 2,498 3,853 6,737 9,979 25,145 420 712 1,143 1,930 3,496 6,187 328 559 937 1,458 2,824 4,197 11,098
1947 956 1,494 2,315 3,585 6,313 9,544 25,017 418 672 1,045 1,766 3,082 5,676 335 540 869 1,335 2,498 3,765 11,085
1948 895 1,390 2,134 3,267 5,702 8,493 22,003 400 645 1,001 1,644 2,911 5,115 320 519 817 1,267 2,359 3,510 8,892
1949 927 1,423 2,173 3,296 5,691 8,426 20,969 430 673 1,050 1,699 2,956 5,291 349 548 860 1,311 2,410 3,607 9,383
1950 967 1,492 2,292 3,496 6,054 9,127 22,850 442 692 1,089 1,790 2,981 5,697 360 562 889 1,379 2,440 3,819 9,552
1953 1,059 1,629 2,503 3,823 6,669 10,024 24,653 489 756 1,182 1,927 3,314 6,366 401 618 958 1,486 2,669 4,273 10,946
1954 1,065 1,647 2,541 3,894 6,818 10,380 26,596 484 753 1,188 1,945 3,255 6,326 395 613 961 1,502 2,635 4,232 11,230
1956 1,252 1,968 3,061 4,737 8,334 12,610 31,747 536 874 1,385 2,339 4,058 7,826 413 707 1,132 1,770 3,259 5,234 13,998
1958 1,257 1,949 3,004 4,625 8,109 12,388 33,429 565 894 1,383 2,302 3,830 7,128 445 728 1,130 1,762 3,138 4,859 12,902
1960 1,389 2,161 3,337 5,141 9,010 13,676 35,399 617 985 1,533 2,562 4,345 8,245 487 797 1,238 1,963 3,536 5,469 14,564
1962 1,415 2,226 3,479 5,380 9,453 14,391 36,757 604 974 1,578 2,664 4,515 8,800 477 777 1,277 2,044 3,658 5,737 15,936
1965 1,526 2,451 3,889 6,091 10,766 16,413 43,720 601 1,013 1,686 2,975 5,120 9,587 470 795 1,335 2,230 4,205 6,384 17,953
1969 1,559 2,449 3,822 5,930 10,568 16,376 46,527 670 1,075 1,714 2,839 4,760 8,838 535 863 1,388 2,182 3,921 5,940 15,623
1972 1,615 2,531 3,952 6,142 10,822 16,338 43,636 699 1,110 1,761 3,022 5,305 9,514 557 901 1,422 2,251 4,336 6,461 17,061
1976 1,264 1,902 2,859 4,297 7,337 11,075 28,621 625 945 1,420 2,271 3,599 6,689 509 795 1,170 1,789 3,028 4,501 11,384
1982 1,238 1,874 2,824 4,247 7,208 10,615 24,836 601 924 1,402 2,273 3,802 7,059 492 760 1,159 1,752 3,117 4,774 12,800
1983 1,345 2,102 3,178 4,813 8,377 12,777 31,869 587 1,027 1,543 2,436 3,978 8,004 447 802 1,279 1,828 3,537 4,950 15,910
1984 1,342 2,117 3,280 4,944 8,694 13,371 35,510 568 953 1,617 2,443 4,017 7,837 453 738 1,353 1,929 3,386 5,094 14,064
1985 1,499 2,352 3,669 5,676 9,943 15,251 42,991 646 1,035 1,662 2,832 4,635 8,316 517 837 1,314 2,173 4,014 5,528 14,344
1986 1,621 2,550 3,968 6,135 10,814 16,603 44,052 691 1,133 1,800 3,016 5,026 9,740 546 908 1,445 2,329 4,076 6,464 16,201
1987 1,617 2,511 3,879 5,953 10,458 15,675 40,023 724 1,142 1,805 2,950 5,241 9,588 589 921 1,488 2,191 4,284 6,495 16,977
1988 1,665 2,602 4,040 6,197 10,735 16,310 43,111 727 1,165 1,882 3,172 5,160 9,610 587 935 1,513 2,426 4,384 6,454 17,132
1989 1,731 2,712 4,203 6,484 11,482 17,552 46,810 750 1,220 1,923 3,152 5,412 10,238 599 975 1,583 2,427 4,337 6,716 18,732
1990 1,658 2,525 3,862 5,912 10,566 16,403 43,948 790 1,189 1,811 2,810 4,729 9,516 655 985 1,485 2,214 3,828 5,902 18,481
1991 1,657 2,574 3,958 6,087 10,699 16,230 42,412 740 1,190 1,830 3,012 5,169 9,684 594 957 1,488 2,306 4,210 6,443 17,049
1992 1,647 2,561 3,952 6,124 10,877 16,632 44,932 732 1,170 1,780 2,956 5,122 9,558 587 947 1,455 2,257 4,176 6,341 17,151
1993 1,666 2,580 3,953 6,023 10,522 16,263 45,524 753 1,206 1,883 3,023 4,782 8,948 607 969 1,537 2,365 4,060 5,721 16,305
1994 1,691 2,600 4,006 6,185 10,841 16,776 46,471 783 1,194 1,826 3,082 4,906 9,352 647 979 1,487 2,355 4,184 5,981 16,896
1995 1,709 2,655 4,109 6,364 11,451 17,811 49,150 764 1,201 1,853 2,972 5,092 9,976 620 975 1,522 2,296 4,106 6,666 16,532
1996 1,795 2,782 4,283 6,592 11,775 18,114 49,752 808 1,281 1,974 3,137 5,437 10,205 650 1,042 1,642 2,397 4,416 6,829 17,593
1997 1,880 2,933 4,531 6,937 12,315 19,083 52,167 828 1,335 2,124 3,352 5,547 10,812 663 1,073 1,722 2,644 4,545 6,979 19,146
1998 2,060 3,231 5,023 7,793 13,970 21,760 59,370 890 1,439 2,252 3,675 6,181 12,357 703 1,160 1,823 2,827 5,045 7,568 23,559
1999 2,236 3,502 5,446 8,505 15,185 23,532 63,149 969 1,558 2,387 4,052 6,839 13,627 760 1,262 1,974 3,024 5,507 8,960 25,581
2000 2,156 3,392 5,311 8,308 14,786 22,853 63,564 920 1,472 2,314 3,989 6,718 12,676 730 1,173 1,842 3,068 5,504 8,220 24,415
Notes: All amounts are reported in thousands 2000 dollars.
Computations by authors based on income tax return statistics. All details in Appendix Section D.
Series report the thresholds, and average wealth corresponding to each of the upper groups.
Table B2: Top Groups Wealth Levels in the United States, 1916-2000 (in thousands of 2000 dollars)
Top groups Intermediate Groups ThresholdsReal Bonds StockLife Ins Other Debts Real Bonds StockLife Ins Other Debts Real Bonds StockLife Ins Other Debts Real Bonds StockLife Ins Other Debts Real Bonds StockLife Ins Other Debts
1916 1916 1916 28.1 35.5 36.4 0.3 7.8 -8.1 1916 23.6 36.5 39.1 0.3 7.2 -6.7 1916 19.7 37.5 41.4 0.3 7.4 -6.3
1917 1917 1917 29.5 32.3 39.9 0.4 6.2 -8.2 1917 24.8 32.4 44.0 0.3 5.9 -7.4 1917 19.9 31.1 49.4 0.3 5.8 -6.5
1918 1918 1918 27.7 33.3 40.1 0.5 8.3 -10.0 1918 23.9 33.5 43.5 0.4 8.1 -9.4 1918 19.7 33.4 47.4 0.3 7.7 -8.4
1919 1919 1919 25.1 29.9 45.3 1.0 9.2 -10.4 1919 21.0 30.0 48.9 0.8 8.9 -9.7 1919 17.1 30.3 52.1 0.7 9.2 -9.4
1920 1920 1920 24.2 28.1 49.4 1.3 8.8 -11.7 1920 20.1 27.5 53.7 1.1 8.4 -10.8 1920 16.3 26.3 58.8 0.8 7.7 -10.0
1921 1921 1921 29.9 32.1 42.1 2.0 7.7 -13.7 1921 26.9 32.0 45.7 1.7 8.0 -14.3 1921 23.9 32.0 50.2 1.2 8.3 -15.6
1922 1922 1922 27.3 32.5 44.0 2.4 7.2 -13.6 1922 24.3 31.8 48.6 2.1 7.3 -14.1 1922 21.4 30.5 54.6 1.4 7.4 -15.3
1923 1923 1923 25.7 30.6 46.5 2.5 6.9 -12.2 1923 22.4 29.5 51.6 2.2 6.7 -12.5 1923 18.6 28.2 58.4 1.6 6.3 -13.1
1924 1924 1924 22.5 33.2 45.1 2.4 7.3 -10.6 1924 19.4 32.8 49.1 1.8 7.3 -10.3 1924 15.7 32.4 53.4 1.0 7.3 -9.8
1925 1925 1925 21.9 31.3 46.7 2.3 8.2 -10.3 1925 19.0 30.3 50.7 1.9 8.3 -10.2 1925 16.1 29.2 56.0 1.2 8.0 -10.4
1926 1926 1926 1926 1926
1927 1927 1927 18.7 28.5 54.7 2.4 6.4 -10.7 1927 16.1 27.2 58.9 2.0 6.3 -10.6 1927 13.2 25.4 64.9 1.2 6.2 -10.9
1928 1928 1928 17.4 24.1 58.1 2.2 7.9 -9.7 1928 13.9 23.5 62.3 1.7 7.8 -9.2 1928 10.8 21.5 66.4 1.3 7.7 -7.8
1929 1929 1929 15.6 26.6 58.9 1.6 8.1 -10.7 1929 12.7 26.2 62.1 1.3 7.9 -10.2 1929 10.2 25.1 65.1 1.0 8.1 -9.4
1930 1930 1930 15.3 29.1 58.1 2.4 7.4 -12.4 1930 13.3 28.1 61.7 1.7 7.7 -12.5 1930 10.7 27.2 65.1 1.5 7.8 -12.3
1931 1931 1931 17.5 34.4 48.3 4.0 8.0 -12.1 1931 16.0 33.6 50.8 3.4 8.5 -12.3 1931 13.6 32.6 54.8 2.1 9.3 -12.5
1932 1932 1932 19.1 38.6 42.5 5.1 16.8 -22.0 1932 17.7 36.9 46.0 4.2 19.4 -24.2 1932 15.2 34.9 51.0 2.5 24.3 -28.0
1933 1933 1933 19.4 40.4 41.9 4.9 9.2 -15.8 1933 17.8 40.2 44.6 3.9 9.8 -16.4 1933 16.1 39.8 48.6 2.5 11.1 -18.2
1934 1934 1934 17.7 38.5 46.8 4.5 9.4 -17.0 1934 16.2 37.7 50.7 3.7 10.1 -18.3 1934 14.1 36.2 56.9 2.5 11.3 -21.1
1935 1935 1935 15.8 38.7 43.8 4.3 9.4 -12.0 1935 13.8 37.8 47.1 3.5 10.0 -12.2 1935 10.9 36.5 52.1 2.2 11.2 -13.0
1936 1936 1936 14.1 36.3 50.3 2.0 6.8 -9.6 1936 11.2 35.5 53.9 1.9 6.9 -9.3 1936 8.1 34.6 58.4 1.4 6.9 -9.4
1937 1937 1937 15.8 36.3 48.9 2.1 7.4 -10.5 1937 13.2 35.6 52.4 1.9 7.5 -10.6 1937 10.9 35.0 56.3 1.5 7.7 -11.3
1938 1938 1938 15.2 35.5 45.7 3.0 9.0 -8.4 1938 12.5 35.0 48.8 2.4 9.1 -7.8 1938 9.0 34.8 50.6 1.9 9.4 -5.7
1939 1939 1939 14.9 34.1 49.3 3.2 7.1 -8.7 1939 12.3 33.9 52.6 2.8 6.4 -8.0 1939 9.2 34.0 56.3 2.1 5.7 -7.2
1940 1940 1940 16.6 34.4 45.0 3.2 9.3 -8.5 1940 13.9 34.5 48.0 2.6 9.0 -7.9 1940 11.4 34.5 51.7 1.9 8.1 -7.7
1941 1941 1941 20.9 40.6 45.3 1.3 6.2 -14.3 1941 17.8 40.7 48.9 1.3 6.1 -14.8 1941 14.1 41.5 52.4 1.2 5.6 -14.7
1942 1942 1942 20.3 35.7 49.4 1.2 6.5 -13.1 1942 17.1 35.1 53.9 1.2 6.4 -13.7 1942 13.6 34.1 59.4 1.1 6.1 -14.1
1943 1943 1943 19.4 35.1 50.2 1.4 7.9 -14.0 1943 16.4 34.6 55.3 1.4 7.6 -15.3 1943 13.0 34.1 61.7 1.4 7.1 -17.3
1944 1944 1944 15.2 31.9 46.3 3.2 9.7 -6.3 1944 12.5 31.8 49.8 2.7 8.9 -5.8 1944 10.5 31.5 53.6 2.2 7.2 -4.9
1945 1945 1945 1945 1945
1946 25.4 34.1 39.1 0.9 7.4 -6.0 1946 22.5 32.9 42.7 0.9 7.4 -6.4 1946 18.9 32.7 46.9 0.8 7.1 -6.5 1946 16.0 32.7 50.4 0.7 6.5 -6.3 1946 13.2 32.8 53.6 0.5 5.8 -5.9
1947 26.2 34.3 37.8 1.0 8.1 -6.4 1947 23.0 32.9 41.9 0.9 8.1 -6.8 1947 19.4 32.9 46.1 0.8 7.7 -6.8 1947 16.1 33.2 49.5 0.7 7.0 -6.5 1947 13.0 33.5 52.7 0.5 6.3 -5.9
1948 27.0 34.4 37.2 1.0 8.0 -6.5 1948 23.5 32.6 41.7 1.0 8.1 -6.9 1948 19.9 32.4 46.0 0.9 7.9 -7.0 1948 16.5 32.5 49.7 0.7 7.3 -6.8 1948 13.3 32.6 53.3 0.5 6.6 -6.3
1949 27.4 33.2 37.7 1.0 8.2 -6.5 1949 24.0 31.6 42.2 1.0 8.4 -7.1 1949 20.5 31.1 46.7 0.9 8.2 -7.2 1949 17.5 30.9 50.4 0.7 7.8 -7.4 1949 14.6 30.8 54.1 0.6 7.3 -7.4
1950 27.1 33.1 38.4 0.9 8.3 -6.8 1950 23.7 31.5 42.9 0.9 8.4 -7.4 1950 20.3 31.0 47.4 0.8 8.2 -7.7 1950 17.6 30.8 50.9 0.7 7.9 -7.9 1950 15.0 30.7 54.6 0.5 7.4 -8.2
1953 25.4 28.7 42.9 0.9 9.0 -6.1 1953 21.4 27.0 48.2 0.8 8.9 -6.3 1953 17.8 26.4 52.9 0.7 8.5 -6.3 1953 14.4 26.2 57.0 0.6 7.9 -6.1 1953 10.9 26.0 61.1 0.4 7.2 -5.6
1954 25.1 27.7 43.8 0.8 9.1 -5.7 1954 21.1 25.8 49.2 0.8 9.2 -6.0 1954 17.4 25.2 53.9 0.7 8.9 -6.0 1954 14.4 24.5 57.7 0.6 8.5 -5.7 1954 11.2 23.8 61.8 0.4 8.2 -5.4
1956 23.6 26.3 47.0 0.8 8.9 -5.8 1956 19.6 24.7 52.1 0.7 8.8 -5.9 1956 16.2 24.0 56.6 0.6 8.5 -5.9 1956 13.3 23.5 60.3 0.5 8.2 -5.6 1956 10.6 23.1 63.6 0.3 7.7 -5.5
1958 23.8 25.2 48.0 0.7 8.9 -5.9 1958 19.9 23.5 53.1 0.6 8.8 -6.0 1958 16.6 22.7 57.5 0.5 8.6 -6.0 1958 13.8 22.3 61.2 0.4 8.2 -5.9 1958 11.2 22.1 64.4 0.3 7.8 -5.9
1960 21.5 24.6 51.6 0.7 7.8 -5.5 1960 17.9 22.8 56.5 0.6 7.7 -5.5 1960 14.7 22.0 60.6 0.5 7.5 -5.3 1960 12.1 21.4 63.9 0.4 7.3 -5.1 1960 9.3 21.0 67.0 0.3 7.2 -4.8
1962 20.1 23.7 52.9 1.0 10.1 -6.8 1962 17.1 21.1 57.7 1.0 10.1 -6.9 1962 14.6 19.8 62.0 1.0 9.7 -7.1 1962 12.8 19.0 65.7 1.1 9.0 -7.5 1962 9.7 18.8 70.1 0.6 8.3 -7.5
1965 20.3 26.3 53.5 1.3 4.7 -4.9 1965 17.1 23.4 58.9 1.1 4.4 -4.9 1965 14.5 22.1 63.4 0.9 4.1 -4.9 1965 12.4 21.3 66.8 0.7 3.8 -5.0 1965 10.3 20.8 70.0 0.5 3.5 -5.1
1969 23.6 25.9 48.7 2.3 12.4 -10.5 1969 19.9 22.3 53.5 1.8 12.7 -10.2 1969 17.1 21.2 58.0 1.4 12.5 -10.2 1969 14.4 20.3 61.5 1.1 13.1 -10.4 1969 10.8 18.8 65.6 0.8 13.8 -9.9
1972 24.7 27.8 46.3 2.0 10.6 -9.4 1972 21.3 24.3 51.3 1.6 10.6 -9.1 1972 18.8 21.9 56.5 1.3 10.3 -8.7 1972 16.2 20.5 60.3 1.0 10.4 -8.3 1972 13.6 19.1 64.2 0.7 10.3 -7.8
1976 31.7 30.8 35.8 2.3 12.2 -10.5 1976 28.3 27.4 40.4 1.7 12.5 -10.3 1976 24.4 27.4 44.5 1.4 12.3 -10.1 1976 20.0 27.4 48.2 1.1 12.7 -9.5 1976 16.1 26.7 52.9 0.8 13.1 -9.6
1982 1982 34.4 23.6 32.1 2.1 18.8 -11.0 1982 31.2 22.4 35.3 1.8 19.3 -10.1 1982 28.4 21.2 38.4 1.5 20.2 -9.7 1982 25.0 19.9 41.7 1.2 21.2 -9.1
1983 1983 32.0 23.6 33.0 2.5 18.6 -9.7 1983 28.6 23.1 36.1 2.1 19.1 -9.1 1983 25.1 22.9 41.3 1.3 18.4 -9.0 1983 23.4 19.9 45.4 1.0 20.7 -10.4
1984 1984 33.1 25.1 33.5 2.1 18.3 -12.1 1984 31.7 23.8 37.6 1.7 17.8 -12.6 1984 27.7 23.5 40.8 1.1 18.6 -11.8 1984 24.0 21.5 45.1 1.0 20.1 -11.8
1985 1985 27.2 24.9 37.2 2.2 17.8 -9.3 1985 25.6 23.5 40.6 1.7 17.7 -9.1 1985 23.3 22.4 44.2 1.4 17.3 -8.7 1985 18.3 21.1 50.5 0.9 16.8 -7.5
1986 1986 27.1 24.1 37.5 1.9 19.0 -9.6 1986 24.4 22.8 41.5 1.6 19.0 -9.2 1986 22.6 20.6 45.6 1.3 19.3 -9.4 1986 19.2 18.7 52.1 1.1 18.3 -9.4
1987 1987 27.8 24.9 33.5 2.3 20.5 -8.9 1987 25.3 23.4 36.5 2.0 21.4 -8.6 1987 23.0 21.8 40.3 1.5 22.2 -8.9 1987 21.0 20.8 42.7 1.2 23.5 -9.2
1988 1988 30.3 26.4 31.9 2.7 17.4 -8.7 1988 28.0 24.9 35.4 2.6 17.6 -8.5 1988 25.2 24.6 38.7 2.3 17.3 -8.1 1988 23.1 22.7 42.6 2.2 17.2 -7.9
1989 1989 30.2 25.1 29.0 2.1 22.1 -8.5 1989 28.1 23.7 31.8 1.8 22.9 -8.3 1989 26.2 22.2 34.1 1.4 24.0 -7.9 1989 22.2 21.2 36.6 1.0 25.7 -6.6
1990 1990 28.5 28.9 27.8 2.0 21.0 -8.3 1990 26.2 28.2 30.2 1.6 21.9 -8.1 1990 24.5 27.8 32.7 1.2 21.8 -8.1 1990 20.7 27.1 35.4 1.0 23.7 -7.9
1991 1991 25.8 28.5 31.8 2.1 20.1 -8.3 1991 24.0 27.4 35.2 1.7 19.8 -8.1 1991 21.7 26.5 38.6 1.4 19.9 -8.1 1991 18.4 24.5 43.4 1.1 20.3 -7.8
1992 1992 23.3 25.5 39.7 1.9 16.7 -7.1 1992 21.4 24.3 44.2 1.5 15.7 -7.0 1992 19.1 23.3 47.9 1.2 15.1 -6.6 1992 15.9 22.0 52.8 0.9 13.6 -5.3
1993 1993 20.3 26.9 39.7 2.0 17.2 -6.2 1993 17.9 26.3 44.0 1.6 15.9 -5.8 1993 16.0 25.9 47.5 1.4 14.6 -5.4 1993 14.2 22.4 53.9 1.0 13.5 -5.1
1994 1994 23.8 29.1 33.5 2.1 18.5 -7.0 1994 21.3 29.2 37.1 1.7 17.7 -6.9 1994 19.2 28.7 40.4 1.4 16.9 -6.5 1994 16.9 27.9 45.7 1.2 14.9 -6.6
1995 1995 25.7 25.4 34.6 2.0 19.0 -6.7 1995 23.9 24.6 38.5 1.5 17.9 -6.5 1995 22.7 23.0 42.4 1.1 16.9 -6.2 1995 21.3 21.3 46.5 0.8 15.8 -5.7
1996 24.1 27.5 34.6 2.6 20.9 -7.2 1996 21.9 24.5 38.6 2.0 19.6 -6.6 1996 20.0 24.0 42.8 1.6 18.2 -6.6 1996 18.4 22.9 46.5 1.3 17.3 -6.5 1996 17.0 21.2 51.7 0.9 15.8 -6.7
1997 23.2 26.5 36.8 2.1 20.4 -6.8 1997 20.9 23.8 40.5 1.8 19.4 -6.4 1997 19.0 23.2 44.6 1.4 18.0 -6.1 1997 17.7 22.5 47.9 1.1 16.6 -5.8 1997 16.2 20.7 52.7 0.9 15.6 -6.0
1998 22.5 27.3 40.6 2.3 16.1 -6.4 1998 20.3 24.6 44.5 1.9 14.9 -6.2 1998 18.5 23.7 48.3 1.5 14.0 -6.0 1998 16.9 22.8 51.3 1.1 13.9 -5.9 1998 15.1 21.3 56.1 0.7 12.8 -5.9
1999 22.1 25.3 37.7 2.0 21.0 -6.2 1999 20.0 22.9 41.5 1.4 20.1 -6.0 1999 18.3 22.8 44.4 1.1 19.0 -5.6 1999 17.2 22.8 47.5 0.9 17.2 -5.5 1999 15.1 22.5 51.6 0.6 15.8 -5.6
2000 23.9 23.3 36.9 2.1 22.7 -6.8 2000 22.5 20.8 39.9 1.6 22.0 -6.8 2000 21.0 19.6 43.9 1.2 20.8 -6.6 2000 19.5 20.0 46.2 0.9 20.0 -6.7 2000 17.4 19.8 47.8 0.8 21.0 -6.8
Notes: Wealth is defined as all sources of (non-human) wealth net of debts and liabilities but excludes annuities, and claims on future pensions. 
Real is defined as real estate. Bonds is the sum of federal, local, foreign, and corporate bonds. Stock is corporate stock
Cash is currency, deposits, and notes. Other is equity in unincorporated business, and miscellaneous assets
The sums of all sources less debts add up to 100%.
Top 0.1%
Table B3: Composition by Sources of Wealth and by Fractiles of Total Wealth in the United States, 1916-2000 
Top 2% Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.25%Real Bonds Stock Life Ins. Other Debts Real Bonds StockLife Ins Other Debts Real Bonds StockLife Ins Other Debts Real Bonds Stock Life Ins. Other Debts
1916 17.2 39.3 41.3 0.2 7.2 -5.2 1916 16.4 42.2 38.4 0.2 8.1 -5.2 1916 1916
1917 17.6 30.6 52.4 0.3 5.4 -6.3 1917 13.1 28.1 58.8 0.2 5.6 -5.8 1917 1917
1918 17.9 33.0 49.4 0.2 7.3 -7.9 1918 15.3 33.1 53.0 0.1 5.4 -6.8 1918 1918
1919 14.8 30.0 54.6 0.5 8.6 -8.6 1919 10.8 29.6 60.3 0.2 8.7 -9.5 1919 1919
1920 13.9 25.3 61.2 0.6 7.5 -8.5 1920 8.0 23.5 67.7 0.3 6.3 -5.8 1920 1920
1921 22.8 32.0 52.8 0.5 8.8 -17.0 1921 15.3 36.1 51.0 0.4 5.5 -8.3 1921 1921
1922 20.2 29.7 58.4 0.7 7.8 -16.9 1922 12.8 33.0 57.9 0.7 10.1 -14.6 1922 1922
1923 16.5 26.1 64.5 0.9 6.2 -14.2 1923 9.8 25.9 64.0 1.1 5.5 -6.2 1923 1923
1924 13.5 32.0 56.9 0.4 7.3 -10.0 1924 8.5 31.1 59.0 0.2 7.0 -5.9 1924 1924
1925 14.6 28.1 59.3 0.6 8.3 -10.9 1925 11.2 26.8 58.0 0.6 9.4 -6.0 1925 1925
1926 1926 11.3 27.6 63.0 0.5 8.5 -10.8 1926 1926
1927 11.5 24.3 68.9 0.5 5.9 -11.1 1927 7.8 21.9 73.6 0.3 5.1 -8.7 1927 1927
1928 9.2 20.1 68.8 1.2 7.2 -6.5 1928 6.1 16.4 74.4 1.0 7.5 -5.4 1928 1928
1929 8.8 24.8 65.4 0.7 8.5 -8.2 1929 6.3 24.8 65.3 0.4 9.4 -6.2 1929 1929
1930 9.3 26.4 67.8 0.8 8.3 -12.6 1930 6.2 27.2 71.6 0.4 8.2 -13.5 1930 1930
1931 12.2 32.0 57.6 0.9 10.3 -13.0 1931 9.4 32.5 55.8 0.5 9.0 -7.2 1931 1931
1932 13.7 32.8 55.7 1.0 29.3 -32.5 1932 9.8 44.7 44.9 0.7 9.4 -9.4 1932 1932
1933 16.0 39.7 51.2 1.3 12.4 -20.6 1933 8.0 39.2 48.3 0.8 10.6 -7.0 1933 1933
1934 13.4 35.1 61.8 1.3 12.7 -24.3 1934 8.4 35.7 55.2 1.2 5.7 -6.2 1934 1934
1935 9.2 35.4 56.0 1.0 12.5 -14.1 1935 5.9 29.1 58.3 0.6 10.5 -4.3 1935 1935
1936 6.1 33.8 61.6 1.0 7.2 -9.7 1936 5.1 34.4 59.7 0.9 5.7 -5.7 1936 1936
1937 9.7 34.3 59.3 1.1 8.0 -12.4 1937 6.5 37.6 56.3 0.7 8.3 -9.4 1937 1937
1938 7.6 35.6 50.7 1.5 9.6 -5.0 1938 4.6 37.2 49.7 0.8 12.1 -4.3 1938 1938
1939 7.5 34.1 57.9 1.7 5.3 -6.5 1939 4.6 34.7 60.6 1.2 4.1 -5.2 1939 1939
1940 10.0 34.2 53.3 1.6 8.3 -7.4 1940 6.3 35.7 54.0 1.0 9.4 -6.4 1940 1940
1941 12.2 42.8 54.3 1.2 5.4 -15.8 1941 7.1 39.4 53.0 1.0 5.1 -5.6 1941 1941
1942 11.7 32.7 63.8 1.1 5.7 -15.1 1942 10.7 37.2 53.8 0.9 6.6 -9.2 1942 1942
1943 11.1 33.2 66.9 1.5 7.0 -19.7 1943 4.5 36.3 59.4 1.6 3.6 -5.4 1943 1943
1944 9.5 32.3 55.2 1.6 6.2 -4.7 1944 6.8 33.9 57.6 1.0 4.8 -4.0 1944 1944
1945 10.7 35.7 49.8 1.3 9.8 -7.4 1945 6.4 39.5 53.6 0.9 4.3 -4.7 1945 1945
1946 11.5 33.0 55.3 0.4 5.3 -5.5 1946 8.4 34.7 55.9 0.2 4.7 -4.0 1946 36.5 34.2 25.4 1.1 7.4 -4.5 1946 34.9 33.4 27.9 1.2 8.6 -6.1
1947 11.0 33.9 54.4 0.4 5.8 -5.5 1947 7.9 35.2 55.2 0.2 5.7 -4.2 1947 37.8 34.8 23.2 1.1 8.0 -4.8 1947 35.5 33.0 27.3 1.3 9.6 -6.6
1948 11.2 33.3 54.9 0.4 6.1 -6.0 1948 7.7 37.0 55.6 0.2 4.8 -5.4 1948 39.0 36.2 21.7 1.0 7.4 -5.4 1948 35.5 33.1 27.5 1.3 8.9 -6.3
1949 12.9 30.9 56.3 0.5 6.9 -7.4 1949 10.5 31.6 58.9 0.3 6.1 -7.5 1949 38.8 34.5 22.8 0.9 7.6 -4.6 1949 35.4 33.1 27.7 1.3 9.1 -6.6
1950 13.5 30.7 56.7 0.4 7.1 -8.4 1950 12.5 31.4 58.9 0.2 6.7 -9.6 1950 38.7 34.5 23.0 1.0 7.7 -4.8 1950 35.0 33.0 28.3 1.3 9.2 -6.7
1953 9.1 26.2 63.1 0.3 6.7 -5.4 1953 5.3 27.9 66.5 0.2 5.4 -5.2 1953 38.7 30.9 25.3 1.0 9.4 -5.4 1953 33.2 28.8 32.8 1.2 10.5 -6.3
1954 9.6 23.2 63.9 0.4 8.1 -5.2 1954 7.0 20.9 68.1 0.2 8.5 -4.7 1954 38.8 30.6 25.6 0.9 8.9 -4.8 1954 33.8 27.9 33.3 1.1 10.1 -6.1
1956 9.1 22.9 65.5 0.3 7.6 -5.3 1956 6.9 21.7 68.6 0.1 7.7 -5.1 1956 38.1 28.7 28.3 1.0 9.2 -5.3 1956 31.7 27.2 36.2 1.1 10.0 -6.2
1958 9.9 22.0 66.1 0.2 7.7 -5.9 1958 8.3 21.6 68.1 0.1 8.0 -6.0 1958 37.2 27.6 30.5 1.0 9.2 -5.5 1958 31.0 26.2 38.2 1.0 9.8 -6.1
1960 7.3 20.7 68.9 0.2 7.2 -4.4 1960 5.0 20.8 69.9 0.1 7.5 -3.3 1960 34.2 27.6 34.2 1.0 8.4 -5.4 1960 28.6 25.7 42.7 0.9 8.3 -6.1
1962 8.7 18.6 73.6 0.7 6.5 -8.2 1962 6.3 16.0 79.6 0.3 5.4 -7.6 1962 31.0 28.7 35.0 1.1 10.4 -6.2 1962 25.9 25.6 42.4 0.9 11.3 -6.2
1965 9.1 20.6 71.7 0.4 3.4 -5.2 1965 7.9 19.4 74.4 0.2 3.4 -5.3 1965 33.8 31.6 31.2 2.4 6.0 -5.0 1965 26.9 28.5 41.7 1.8 5.6 -4.6
1969 9.7 18.0 66.8 0.7 15.0 -10.1 1969 7.3 17.5 65.9 0.4 18.4 -9.5 1969 36.9 28.5 31.1 4.0 11.1 -11.6 1969 30.1 26.2 37.5 3.2 13.4 -10.5
1972 12.0 18.2 67.6 0.5 9.3 -7.6 1972 7.4 13.8 73.7 0.3 10.3 -5.5 1972 36.9 31.0 28.0 3.6 10.8 -10.4 1972 30.3 32.9 33.1 2.7 11.4 -10.4
1976 13.9 26.1 55.8 0.6 13.4 -9.7 1976 10.6 23.1 57.9 0.3 16.2 -8.1 1976 42.0 31.9 21.8 3.9 11.4 -11.0 1976 40.0 27.3 27.9 2.8 12.9 -10.9
1982 23.0 19.9 42.0 1.1 22.8 -8.8 1982 16.0 20.2 44.5 0.5 25.6 -6.9 1982 1982 44.1 27.3 22.2 3.1 17.0 -13.7
1983 21.1 19.2 47.4 0.8 21.7 -10.4 1983 14.0 16.7 52.5 0.3 23.4 -6.8 1983 1983 42.6 25.2 23.4 3.7 16.7 -11.7
1984 22.0 20.8 47.6 0.8 20.7 -11.9 1984 17.0 17.9 54.6 0.4 22.2 -12.1 1984 1984 38.0 29.6 19.5 3.4 19.8 -10.3
1985 14.5 19.7 53.4 0.7 17.3 -5.7 1985 10.1 15.4 60.2 0.2 17.8 -3.7 1985 1985 32.9 29.6 25.3 4.0 18.4 -10.1
1986 17.5 17.5 55.8 0.8 17.6 -9.2 1986 11.7 15.5 61.7 0.3 17.8 -7.1 1986 1986 36.4 28.6 23.7 3.2 18.9 -10.7
1987 20.2 20.7 44.9 0.9 22.5 -9.2 1987 15.7 18.4 51.9 0.3 23.0 -9.4 1987 1987 36.4 29.8 23.2 3.1 17.6 -10.1
1988 22.3 21.1 45.1 2.4 16.6 -7.5 1988 21.7 18.6 49.1 0.7 16.5 -6.6 1988 1988 38.0 31.7 19.7 3.4 16.7 -9.4
1989 19.5 20.1 37.9 0.7 27.7 -5.9 1989 13.9 15.6 39.8 0.4 34.9 -4.6 1989 1989 37.6 29.7 19.3 3.3 19.1 -9.1
1990 18.7 27.7 35.4 0.7 24.4 -6.9 1990 13.8 27.9 36.8 0.3 27.3 -6.0 1990 1990 36.1 31.0 20.0 3.5 18.3 -8.9
1991 17.5 23.2 47.7 0.9 19.3 -8.5 1991 12.9 22.2 52.7 0.3 20.0 -8.1 1991 1991 31.7 32.4 20.3 3.5 21.0 -8.7
1992 13.4 21.3 57.0 0.7 12.3 -4.7 1992 9.2 17.5 64.7 0.5 12.1 -4.1 1992 1992 29.9 29.7 24.5 3.2 20.0 -7.3
1993 12.8 21.3 57.1 0.8 13.0 -5.0 1993 8.7 17.5 66.9 0.5 10.5 -4.1 1993 1993 28.2 29.1 25.4 3.2 21.5 -7.4
1994 16.5 25.0 49.4 0.9 15.0 -6.9 1994 11.7 22.3 58.4 0.6 14.7 -7.7 1994 1994 32.3 28.7 21.7 3.8 21.0 -7.4
1995 21.1 19.8 48.9 0.5 15.3 -5.6 1995 23.3 14.1 52.4 0.1 15.5 -5.3 1995 1995 31.6 28.1 21.4 3.5 22.8 -7.4
1996 15.4 20.5 55.6 0.6 14.7 -6.9 1996 12.1 20.1 61.2 0.3 13.3 -7.0 1996 31.7 26.1 21.0 4.6 25.5 -8.9 1996 28.2 26.3 24.6 3.6 24.0 -6.8
1997 14.4 19.4 56.9 0.7 14.7 -6.1 1997 10.9 16.0 62.3 0.4 14.7 -4.4 1997 31.0 26.6 23.8 3.1 23.9 -8.4 1997 27.5 25.9 26.7 3.0 24.1 -7.3
1998 14.2 20.5 58.0 0.5 12.8 -5.9 1998 11.5 20.4 62.6 0.2 12.0 -6.6 1998 30.6 26.2 26.4 3.9 20.4 -7.4 1998 26.4 27.8 31.1 3.3 18.0 -6.6
1999 13.6 20.5 55.6 0.4 15.7 -5.9 1999 9.8 19.8 60.7 0.2 15.9 -6.5 1999 29.6 24.9 24.1 3.9 24.4 -6.9 1999 26.2 23.4 31.4 2.4 23.9 -7.4
2000 16.3 19.5 49.3 0.5 21.4 -6.9 2000 12.5 17.8 52.6 0.3 23.4 -6.5 2000 29.1 23.0 25.8 3.8 25.2 -7.0 2000 27.9 25.0 25.6 3.0 26.1 -7.6
Notes: Wealth is defined as all sources of (non-human) wealth net of debts and liabilities but excludes annuities, and claims on future pensions. 
Real is defined as real estate. Bonds is the sum of federal, local, foreign, and corporate bonds. Stock is corporate stock
Cash is currency, deposits, and notes. Other is equity in unincorporated business, and miscellaneous assets
The sums of all sources less debts add up to 100%.
Top 1-0.5%
Table B3: Composition by Sources of Wealth and by Fractiles of Total Wealth in the United States, 1916-2000 (continued)
Top 0.05% Top 0.01% Top 2-1%Real Bonds Stock Life Ins. Other Debts Real Bonds Stock Life Ins. Other Debts Real Bonds Stock Life Ins. Other Debts Real Bonds Stock Life Ins. Other Debts Real Bonds Stock Life Ins. Other Debts
1916 51.7 30.5 22.3 0.6 10.4 -15.5 1916 36.5 33.1 31.4 0.4 6.9 -8.3 1916 30.2 30.2 41.8 0.6 8.1 -10.9 1916 18.2 35.4 45.2 0.2 6.0 -5.1 1916 16.4 42.2 38.4 0.2 8.1 -5.2
1917 52.9 32.0 19.7 0.4 7.7 -12.7 1917 40.9 36.7 26.0 0.4 6.1 -10.1 1917 29.0 32.9 37.5 0.6 7.5 -7.4 1917 23.7 34.0 43.8 0.3 5.0 -6.9 1917 13.1 28.1 58.8 0.2 5.6 -5.8
1918 47.1 32.2 23.1 0.9 9.3 -12.6 1918 37.8 34.1 30.6 0.9 9.4 -12.7 1918 27.3 34.8 39.0 0.5 9.2 -10.8 1918 21.6 33.0 44.3 0.4 10.0 -9.3 1918 15.3 33.1 53.0 0.1 5.4 -6.8
1919 46.7 29.6 26.1 1.6 10.4 -14.4 1919 35.2 28.9 37.0 1.3 8.0 -10.4 1919 27.7 31.8 40.8 1.4 11.6 -13.3 1919 21.3 30.6 45.6 1.1 8.5 -7.1 1919 10.8 29.6 60.3 0.2 8.7 -9.5
1920 44.1 31.1 28.2 2.2 10.8 -16.4 1920 33.3 31.4 36.2 2.2 10.6 -13.7 1920 26.9 30.9 48.2 1.7 8.8 -16.4 1920 22.9 28.1 51.2 1.1 9.3 -12.6 1920 8.0 23.5 67.7 0.3 6.3 -5.8
1921 42.6 32.5 26.1 3.3 6.5 -10.9 1921 35.7 31.9 33.0 3.2 7.0 -10.8 1921 27.6 32.0 40.8 3.4 6.8 -10.5 1921 31.8 27.1 55.1 0.7 12.7 -27.5 1921 15.3 36.1 51.0 0.4 5.5 -8.3
1922 40.2 35.6 24.3 4.0 7.1 -11.2 1922 32.0 35.4 32.6 3.9 7.0 -10.8 1922 25.3 33.1 42.5 3.4 6.1 -10.4 1922 27.0 26.6 58.9 0.8 5.7 -19.0 1922 12.8 33.0 57.9 0.7 10.1 -14.6
1923 40.7 35.1 23.5 3.9 7.8 -11.1 1923 32.9 33.5 32.5 4.1 8.0 -10.9 1923 25.7 35.0 38.5 3.7 6.6 -9.3 1923 23.2 26.3 65.0 0.8 6.9 -22.3 1923 9.8 25.9 64.0 1.1 5.5 -6.2
1924 36.8 35.0 26.8 5.5 7.7 -11.7 1924 30.4 34.1 36.2 4.0 7.2 -11.8 1924 24.1 33.8 40.8 3.5 7.1 -9.2 1924 19.5 33.1 54.2 0.5 7.7 -15.1 1924 8.5 31.1 59.0 0.2 7.0 -5.9
1925 35.0 36.1 27.6 4.3 7.8 -10.9 1925 27.6 33.4 35.4 3.8 9.4 -9.6 1925 21.8 33.4 43.5 3.3 6.5 -8.6 1925 18.4 29.5 60.8 0.7 7.2 -16.5 1925 11.2 26.8 58.0 0.6 9.4 -6.0
1926 1926 1926 1926 1926 11.3 27.6 63.0 0.5 8.5 -10.8
1927 31.9 34.8 33.3 4.5 6.9 -11.4 1927 25.9 33.2 39.1 4.8 6.8 -9.8 1927 20.0 30.4 48.1 4.0 7.4 -9.9 1927 16.9 27.6 62.2 0.9 7.1 -14.6 1927 7.8 21.9 73.6 0.3 5.1 -8.7
1928 34.9 27.3 36.7 4.6 8.5 -12.0 1928 23.7 29.9 49.2 2.7 8.2 -13.7 1928 16.9 27.0 57.4 1.7 9.4 -12.6 1928 13.2 25.0 61.4 1.5 6.8 -7.9 1928 6.1 16.4 74.4 1.0 7.5 -5.4
1929 31.0 28.4 41.5 3.4 9.1 -13.4 1929 21.4 30.2 51.8 2.5 7.0 -12.9 1929 15.7 26.3 63.9 1.9 6.7 -14.5 1929 11.8 24.8 65.4 1.1 7.4 -10.5 1929 6.3 24.8 65.3 0.4 9.4 -6.2
1930 26.4 35.0 38.6 6.2 5.8 -11.9 1930 23.0 31.2 49.2 2.5 7.3 -13.2 1930 16.9 30.8 52.8 4.9 5.8 -11.3 1930 13.5 25.3 62.8 1.3 8.4 -11.3 1930 6.2 27.2 71.6 0.4 8.2 -13.5
1931 25.4 38.2 35.4 6.8 5.7 -11.4 1931 23.6 36.8 37.8 7.4 5.8 -11.5 1931 18.7 35.3 44.2 6.8 5.5 -10.5 1931 15.7 31.3 59.9 1.5 12.0 -20.3 1931 9.4 32.5 55.8 0.5 9.0 -7.2
1932 25.6 46.0 26.7 9.1 4.8 -12.2 1932 24.8 42.7 31.3 9.2 5.3 -13.2 1932 20.7 42.7 34.1 7.9 6.2 -11.5 1932 18.0 19.7 67.5 1.4 51.3 -57.9 1932 9.8 44.7 44.9 0.7 9.4 -9.4
1933 27.4 41.3 28.4 9.7 6.0 -12.8 1933 23.1 41.3 32.1 8.2 6.0 -10.8 1933 16.7 40.3 38.6 7.5 5.9 -9.1 1933 25.1 40.3 54.5 1.8 14.5 -36.2 1933 8.0 39.2 48.3 0.8 10.6 -7.0
1934 25.4 42.8 28.0 8.3 6.3 -10.8 1934 22.5 42.1 31.5 7.5 6.1 -9.6 1934 17.0 40.5 37.9 7.0 6.2 -8.5 1934 19.5 34.4 70.0 1.5 21.3 -46.8 1934 8.4 35.7 55.2 1.2 5.7 -6.2
1935 25.4 42.9 28.0 8.3 6.2 -10.8 1935 22.9 42.2 31.0 7.6 6.1 -9.7 1935 17.4 40.7 37.4 7.0 6.2 -8.7 1935 13.3 43.1 53.2 1.5 15.0 -26.1 1935 5.9 29.1 58.3 0.6 10.5 -4.3
1936 29.4 40.5 31.5 3.0 6.6 -11.0 1936 22.1 38.3 38.3 3.3 6.8 -8.9 1936 15.8 37.9 45.7 3.3 5.7 -8.5 1936 7.4 33.2 63.8 1.0 9.0 -14.4 1936 5.1 34.4 59.7 0.9 5.7 -5.7
1937 28.0 39.8 32.3 2.9 7.1 -10.1 1937 20.5 37.6 40.2 3.4 6.9 -8.5 1937 15.8 37.9 44.2 2.9 6.3 -7.1 1937 13.5 30.3 62.9 1.5 7.6 -15.9 1937 6.5 37.6 56.3 0.7 8.3 -9.4
1938 27.7 37.7 31.3 5.3 8.8 -10.8 1938 23.4 35.7 43.1 4.1 8.1 -14.3 1938 14.6 31.7 50.3 3.4 8.5 -8.5 1938 11.1 33.8 51.9 2.4 6.7 -5.9 1938 4.6 37.2 49.7 0.8 12.1 -4.3
1939 26.5 35.3 34.4 5.3 10.3 -11.8 1939 21.7 33.5 41.7 4.8 8.6 -10.3 1939 15.5 33.6 50.0 3.5 7.2 -9.9 1939 10.8 33.5 54.9 2.3 6.6 -8.0 1939 4.6 34.7 60.6 1.2 4.1 -5.2
1940 28.5 33.8 32.4 5.8 10.3 -10.7 1940 20.7 34.4 37.6 4.4 11.7 -8.7 1940 16.5 35.6 46.1 3.0 7.4 -8.6 1940 13.9 32.7 52.6 2.2 7.0 -8.4 1940 6.3 35.7 54.0 1.0 9.4 -6.4
1941 33.7 40.6 30.4 1.2 6.6 -12.4 1941 28.5 38.4 39.1 1.6 7.6 -15.0 1941 20.7 36.7 45.7 1.2 6.3 -10.6 1941 17.7 46.5 55.6 1.4 5.6 -26.9 1941 7.1 39.4 53.0 1.0 5.1 -5.6
1942 33.2 38.4 31.1 1.4 6.9 -11.0 1942 26.7 37.8 39.1 1.5 7.5 -12.5 1942 19.8 38.4 44.6 1.1 7.1 -11.0 1942 12.6 28.7 72.9 1.2 5.0 -20.3 1942 10.7 37.2 53.8 0.9 6.6 -9.2
1943 30.6 36.9 31.2 1.4 8.8 -9.0 1943 24.8 35.9 39.3 1.3 8.9 -10.2 1943 18.8 36.9 45.3 1.1 7.6 -9.7 1943 17.9 30.1 74.5 1.5 10.4 -34.5 1943 4.5 36.3 59.4 1.6 3.6 -5.4
1944 24.9 32.3 33.6 4.9 12.7 -8.3 1944 17.4 32.6 40.4 4.0 13.4 -7.9 1944 13.8 28.7 48.8 4.0 10.3 -5.6 1944 12.2 30.8 52.8 2.2 7.5 -5.4 1944 6.8 33.9 57.6 1.0 4.8 -4.0
1945 1945 1945 1945 14.4 32.4 46.6 1.6 14.7 -9.7 1945 6.4 39.5 53.6 0.9 4.3 -4.7
1946 28.9 32.8 35.2 1.2 8.9 -7.0 1946 22.4 32.4 43.1 1.1 8.2 -7.1 1946 18.3 32.1 48.7 0.8 7.4 -7.2 1946 14.6 31.4 54.6 0.6 5.9 -7.0 1946 8.4 34.7 55.9 0.2 4.7 -4.0
1947 30.6 32.0 34.4 1.4 9.8 -8.1 1947 23.6 32.4 41.9 1.1 8.8 -7.8 1947 19.1 32.1 47.5 0.9 7.7 -7.2 1947 14.4 32.5 53.4 0.6 6.0 -6.9 1947 7.9 35.2 55.2 0.2 5.7 -4.2
1948 30.8 32.3 33.7 1.3 9.8 -7.9 1948 24.0 32.2 41.6 1.1 8.9 -7.7 1948 19.3 30.5 48.5 1.0 8.1 -7.4 1948 15.0 29.4 54.1 0.6 7.5 -6.6 1948 7.7 37.0 55.6 0.2 4.8 -5.4
1949 29.7 31.7 35.0 1.2 9.2 -6.9 1949 24.0 31.1 42.2 1.1 9.0 -7.4 1949 19.6 30.7 47.6 0.9 8.5 -7.3 1949 15.2 30.1 53.8 0.7 7.6 -7.3 1949 10.5 31.6 58.9 0.3 6.1 -7.5
1950 29.0 31.6 35.9 1.2 9.2 -6.9 1950 23.4 31.1 42.8 1.1 9.0 -7.4 1950 19.4 30.6 48.0 0.9 8.4 -7.3 1950 14.6 30.0 54.5 0.6 7.5 -7.2 1950 12.5 31.4 58.9 0.2 6.7 -9.6
1953 28.9 27.3 39.5 1.1 10.3 -7.1 1953 22.5 26.6 47.6 0.9 9.6 -7.1 1953 16.5 25.5 55.2 0.7 8.5 -6.3 1953 12.8 24.4 59.9 0.5 8.1 -5.6 1953 5.3 27.9 66.5 0.2 5.4 -5.2
1954 27.2 27.3 41.3 1.1 10.1 -6.9 1954 21.7 26.4 48.1 0.9 9.4 -6.4 1954 16.2 25.4 55.2 0.7 8.5 -6.1 1954 12.4 25.7 59.4 0.5 7.6 -5.7 1954 7.0 20.9 68.1 0.2 8.5 -4.7
1956 26.1 25.7 44.2 1.0 9.7 -6.6 1956 19.7 24.3 52.2 0.7 9.2 -6.1 1956 15.4 23.9 57.8 0.6 8.2 -5.9 1956 11.3 24.0 62.4 0.4 7.4 -5.5 1956 6.9 21.7 68.6 0.1 7.7 -5.1
1958 26.0 24.3 45.3 0.9 9.7 -6.2 1958 19.8 22.6 53.7 0.7 9.3 -6.0 1958 15.7 22.6 58.9 0.6 8.0 -5.8 1958 11.8 22.5 63.8 0.4 7.4 -5.8 1958 8.3 21.6 68.1 0.1 8.0 -6.0
1960 23.7 23.9 49.6 0.8 8.1 -6.0 1960 18.6 22.5 56.7 0.6 7.5 -5.8 1960 15.6 21.8 60.7 0.5 7.4 -6.0 1960 9.8 20.7 67.9 0.3 6.8 -5.5 1960 5.0 20.8 69.9 0.1 7.5 -3.3
1962 20.9 22.7 49.4 0.6 12.2 -5.7 1962 20.1 19.5 55.3 2.1 10.8 -7.7 1962 13.1 19.4 58.7 0.3 13.7 -5.2 1962 11.2 21.3 67.4 1.2 7.7 -8.8 1962 6.3 16.0 79.6 0.3 5.4 -7.6
1965 22.0 24.9 50.9 1.5 5.3 -4.6 1965 17.5 22.5 59.1 1.1 4.5 -4.7 1965 14.1 21.4 64.8 0.9 3.7 -4.8 1965 10.4 21.9 68.6 0.6 3.5 -5.0 1965 7.9 19.4 74.4 0.2 3.4 -5.3
1969 26.3 24.4 45.9 2.5 10.2 -9.3 1969 23.3 23.9 51.4 1.7 11.5 -11.8 1969 14.7 21.6 61.5 1.4 9.9 -9.1 1969 12.8 18.6 68.0 1.0 10.4 -10.9 1969 7.3 17.5 65.9 0.4 18.4 -9.5
1972 27.8 26.6 43.2 2.3 10.3 -10.3 1972 22.3 23.9 51.0 1.7 10.4 -9.4 1972 18.4 21.8 53.7 1.2 13.5 -8.6 1972 17.3 23.2 60.5 0.8 8.2 -9.9 1972 7.4 13.8 73.7 0.3 10.3 -5.5
1976 37.7 27.4 33.4 2.2 11.1 -11.8 1976 28.4 28.9 38.1 1.8 12.0 -9.2 1976 23.1 28.5 44.2 1.4 12.2 -9.4 1976 17.4 29.4 53.5 1.0 10.3 -11.5 1976 10.6 23.1 57.9 0.3 16.2 -8.1
1982 39.6 26.3 26.1 2.6 16.5 -11.2 1982 35.7 23.9 31.3 2.0 18.2 -11.1 1982 30.5 19.7 41.1 1.7 16.7 -9.8 1982 29.2 19.6 39.7 1.5 20.4 -10.5 1982 16.0 20.2 44.5 0.5 25.6 -6.9
1983 39.8 23.7 20.0 4.5 21.5 -9.5 1983 28.9 30.0 31.9 1.9 13.1 -5.8 1983 30.7 21.9 38.8 1.7 17.4 -10.6 1983 28.3 21.8 42.4 1.4 20.1 -13.9 1983 14.0 16.7 52.5 0.3 23.4 -6.8
1984 44.0 24.5 27.8 3.3 15.4 -15.1 1984 36.3 28.2 30.7 1.5 15.2 -11.9 1984 30.8 24.1 36.6 1.7 18.1 -11.3 1984 27.7 24.0 39.8 1.2 19.0 -11.6 1984 17.0 17.9 54.6 0.4 22.2 -12.1
1985 33.2 27.3 28.1 3.0 19.1 -10.7 1985 35.2 25.7 29.6 2.3 18.4 -11.3 1985 30.7 25.4 40.8 1.8 15.0 -13.6 1985 20.1 25.3 44.7 1.2 16.8 -8.1 1985 10.1 15.4 60.2 0.2 17.8 -3.7
1986 30.8 30.1 27.5 2.3 17.8 -8.7 1986 30.5 25.1 30.1 2.0 21.6 -9.4 1986 24.8 23.0 39.9 2.0 20.6 -10.3 1986 24.1 19.6 49.0 1.3 17.5 -11.5 1986 11.7 15.5 61.7 0.3 17.8 -7.1
1987 32.8 28.6 23.9 3.7 18.5 -7.5 1987 27.8 24.3 34.6 2.4 19.1 -8.2 1987 23.4 20.9 36.2 2.0 26.6 -9.1 1987 24.8 23.2 37.6 1.4 22.1 -9.1 1987 15.7 18.4 51.9 0.3 23.0 -9.4
1988 37.3 26.1 24.4 3.4 18.6 -9.7 1988 30.2 28.8 29.9 2.4 17.4 -8.6 1988 25.5 27.7 35.0 1.8 19.3 -9.3 1988 23.0 23.9 40.5 4.3 16.7 -8.4 1988 21.7 18.6 49.1 0.7 16.5 -6.6
1989 34.4 29.0 24.0 3.0 19.4 -9.8 1989 36.0 24.6 27.9 2.5 19.9 -10.9 1989 30.9 24.8 32.3 1.9 19.3 -9.1 1989 25.9 25.2 35.9 1.0 19.3 -7.3 1989 13.9 15.6 39.8 0.4 34.9 -4.6
1990 31.9 29.5 22.0 2.8 21.9 -8.2 1990 33.9 29.6 26.1 1.9 17.2 -8.8 1990 27.7 25.2 35.3 1.8 21.2 -11.2 1990 24.4 27.4 33.9 1.3 21.0 -8.0 1990 13.8 27.9 36.8 0.3 27.3 -6.0
1991 31.7 30.3 23.8 2.8 19.6 -8.2 1991 29.5 31.2 27.3 2.0 18.7 -8.8 1991 21.1 28.8 30.0 1.9 23.7 -5.5 1991 22.6 24.2 42.2 1.5 18.5 -8.9 1991 12.9 22.2 52.7 0.3 20.0 -8.1
1992 29.1 27.6 31.6 2.6 17.9 -8.7 1992 27.0 26.4 35.7 1.9 18.6 -9.6 1992 24.0 24.5 39.2 1.7 18.0 -7.4 1992 18.3 25.7 48.0 0.8 12.6 -5.4 1992 9.2 17.5 64.7 0.5 12.1 -4.1
1993 24.1 27.5 32.9 2.3 20.2 -6.9 1993 20.1 34.1 32.6 2.3 17.1 -6.2 1993 19.2 26.0 43.0 1.8 15.5 -5.4 1993 17.9 26.1 44.7 1.2 16.1 -6.0 1993 8.7 17.5 66.9 0.5 10.5 -4.1
1994 28.3 31.1 25.7 2.4 20.5 -8.0 1994 24.4 30.6 27.9 2.0 21.4 -6.3 1994 18.4 37.6 33.1 2.1 14.5 -5.7 1994 22.4 28.4 38.3 1.3 15.4 -5.9 1994 11.7 22.3 58.4 0.6 14.7 -7.7
1995 28.0 30.2 25.0 2.9 21.2 -7.3 1995 26.5 27.3 32.0 2.1 19.7 -7.6 1995 22.0 26.9 38.1 1.6 17.5 -6.1 1995 18.4 26.8 44.5 1.0 15.1 -5.8 1995 23.3 14.1 52.4 0.1 15.5 -5.3
1996 25.2 27.6 30.5 2.3 21.4 -6.9 1996 22.1 27.2 33.5 2.2 21.0 -6.1 1996 22.2 23.5 38.6 1.9 19.5 -5.8 1996 19.5 21.1 48.7 1.0 16.5 -6.8 1996 12.1 20.1 61.2 0.3 13.3 -7.0
1997 23.4 25.4 33.6 2.3 22.4 -7.1 1997 21.3 26.9 36.1 1.8 19.1 -5.2 1997 22.2 25.1 38.3 1.6 18.7 -5.9 1997 18.7 23.5 50.3 1.0 14.6 -8.1 1997 10.9 16.0 62.3 0.4 14.7 -4.4
1998 24.1 26.9 37.8 3.1 14.5 -6.4 1998 21.4 26.6 39.2 2.0 16.6 -5.8 1998 18.2 24.2 49.4 1.5 12.8 -6.1 1998 17.4 20.6 52.5 0.8 13.8 -5.0 1998 11.5 20.4 62.6 0.2 12.0 -6.6
1999 21.9 22.9 33.5 2.1 25.4 -5.8 1999 22.6 23.5 37.0 1.6 20.6 -5.3 1999 20.3 29.3 38.1 1.0 16.0 -4.8 1999 17.9 21.3 49.6 0.7 15.6 -5.1 1999 9.8 19.8 60.7 0.2 15.9 -6.5
2000 26.7 18.1 35.5 2.3 23.7 -6.4 2000 24.6 20.7 42.4 1.1 17.5 -6.4 2000 21.1 20.7 42.7 2.0 19.7 -6.2 2000 21.0 21.5 45.1 0.8 18.9 -7.4 2000 12.5 17.8 52.6 0.3 23.4 -6.5
Notes: Wealth is defined as all sources of (non-human) wealth net of debts and liabilities but excludes annuities, and claims on future pensions. 
Real is defined as real estate. Bonds is the sum of federal, local, foreign, and corporate bonds. Stock is corporate stock
Cash is currency, deposits, and notes. Other is equity in unincorporated business, and miscellaneous assets
The sums of all sources less debts add up to 100%.
Top 0.01%
Table B3: Composition by Sources of Wealth and by Fractiles of Total Wealth in the United States, 1916-2000 (continued)
Top 0.5-0.25% Top 0.25-0.1% Top 0.1-0.05% Top 0.05-0.01%Age Female Married Widows Married Widowers Age Female Married Widows Married Widowers Age Female Married Widows Married Widowers Age Female Married Widows Married Widowers Age Female Married Widows Married Widowers
1916 1916 1916 25 1916 25 1916 25
1917 1917 1917 27 1917 29 1917 30
1918 1918 1918 27 1918 27 1918 27
1919 1919 54 21 1919 56 25 1919 56 25 1919 56 25
1920 1920 54 20 1920 55 23 1920 55 23 1920 56 25
1921 1921 54 20 1921 55 24 1921 56 25 1921 57 26
1922 1922 54 22 1922 55 26 1922 55 25 1922 56 24
1923 1923 54 23 1923 56 28 1923 56 27 1923 56 29
1924 1924 54 23 1924 56 27 1924 56 27 1924 56 27
1925 1925 54 24 36 40 72 10 1925 56 26 38 42 73 10 1925 56 25 39 42 74 10 1925 57 25 41 43 73 10
1926 1926 54 24 40 41 72 12 1926 56 27 39 42 74 11 1926 57 27 41 44 75 9 1926 58 25 45 41 74 10
1927 1927 1927 55 25 43 40 78 10 1927 56 27 43 41 76 10 1927 56 27 43 42 74 11
1928 1928 1928 55 24 40 42 77 10 1928 56 26 40 44 76 10 1928 56 23 40 49 76 10
1929 1929 1929 55 27 40 41 76 10 1929 56 29 38 43 77 10 1929 56 26 42 43 75 12
1930 1930 1930 55 25 41 39 79 8 1930 56 29 43 40 78 8 1930 57 29 48 39 80 9
1931 1931 1931 55 23 43 41 80 8 1931 57 32 37 43 76 10 1931 58 31 40 45 76 10
1932 1932 1932 56 30 40 42 73 11 1932 56 31 37 44 74 11 1932 57 32 39 44 76 10
1933 1933 1933 56 32 38 45 73 11 1933 57 33 37 46 74 12 1933 57 30 36 47 70 12
1934 1934 1934 57 34 40 42 72 11 1934 57 35 40 41 71 11 1934 58 35 40 43 71 11
1935 1935 1935 57 37 37 43 70 12 1935 57 38 38 43 71 11 1935 58 35 35 46 73 11
1936 1936 55 26 39 41 73 11 1936 57 34 35 45 72 11 1936 57 34 38 44 73 12 1936 58 34 43 42 74 11
1937 1937 55 29 39 41 73 11 1937 58 37 38 42 72 11 1937 58 37 39 42 74 11 1937 58 36 41 41 71 10
1938 1938 55 27 40 39 75 9 1938 58 35 36 43 72 11 1938 58 34 37 43 73 10 1938 58 35 37 40 68 11
1939 1939 55 28 39 42 73 10 1939 58 36 38 44 70 11 1939 58 35 39 44 71 11 1939 58 35 40 40 70 12
1940 1940 56 29 39 39 75 10 1940 58 36 37 42 73 10 1940 58 37 37 41 75 10 1940 59 38 37 42 76 10
1941 1941 56 31 37 42 74 10 1941 58 37 35 44 74 10 1941 58 37 40 43 74 10 1941 58 38 39 43 73 11
1942 1942 55 31 40 41 75 9 1942 57 37 37 43 72 10 1942 57 38 36 43 71 10 1942 57 37 37 45 71 9
1943 1943 54 24 44 38 77 8 1943 56 33 39 41 74 8 1943 56 34 37 41 74 9 1943 56 34 40 42 70 9
1944 53 20 49 34 79 6 1944 53 26 39 40 73 8 1944 54 31 40 40 73 8 1944 55 34 41 39 72 8 1944 55 32 40 42 73 8
1945 52 21 41 39 78 7 1945 54 29 39 40 77 8 1945 55 32 41 40 76 8 1945 55 32 42 40 76 7 1945 56 34 48 37 77 8
1946 1946 1946 1946 1946
1947 1947 1947 1947 1947
1948 54 32 1948 54 31 1948 55 36 1948 55 26 1948 56 28
1949 55 31 1949 54 31 1949 55 36 1949 56 25 1949 57 29
1950 55 32 1950 54 31 1950 55 36 1950 56 27 1950 57 29
1953 55 32 1953 55 31 1953 55 37 1953 55 29 1953 57 33
1954 1954 1954 1954 1954
1956 1956 1956 1956 1956
1958 55 30 1958 55 32 1958 56 38 1958 57 32 1958 58 35
1960 1960 1960 1960 1960
1962 58 40 43 40 83 7 1962 59 40 44 40 82 7 1962 59 41 45 39 82 7 1962 59 42 48 36 81 7 1962 60 44 53 35 84 6
1965 41 1965 43 1965 42 1965 42 1965 44
1969 59 43 38 40 82 7 1969 59 42 42 41 83 7 1969 60 41 44 39 83 7 1969 60 41 48 38 82 7 1969 60 44 46 37 84 8
1972 58 44 39 45 77 8 1972 57 44 37 43 77 8 1972 58 44 40 39 80 8 1972 58 46 40 37 82 8 1972 56 47 38 37 81 7
1976 59 40 36 45 82 6 1976 59 39 38 43 80 7 1976 61 42 37 45 82 7 1976 60 42 40 44 83 7 1976 61 41 43 43 82 7
1982 57 41 44 38 80 8 1982 59 43 47 37 81 7 1982 59 42 48 36 81 7 1982 60 40 50 36 81 6 1982 60 38 51 34 85 5
1983 58 39 42 39 82 7 1983 59 37 52 36 86 7 1983 60 36 51 35 88 6 1983 61 37 47 42 86 5 1983 59 34 61 23 90 3
1984 57 36 64 23 67 9 1984 60 43 58 25 73 9 1984 59 48 64 24 81 6 1984 60 46 66 26 80 7 1984 62 39 51 44 86 8
1985 54 31 44 34 72 8 1985 59 40 46 31 74 6 1985 59 40 45 33 79 6 1985 59 42 50 31 80 7 1985 60 43 46 34 84 7
1986 54 36 47 37 69 8 1986 59 45 49 36 74 8 1986 58 43 49 33 75 6 1986 58 41 53 30 78 5 1986 59 35 53 29 82 4
1987 54 30 43 42 67 9 1987 59 42 49 36 75 7 1987 59 37 54 34 79 6 1987 59 32 59 32 81 5 1987 58 36 63 28 82 4
1988 54 35 43 34 69 9 1988 59 47 44 35 74 6 1988 58 42 47 30 77 5 1988 58 38 47 29 77 5 1988 61 37 53 30 82 6
1989 55 38 50 33 68 7 1989 59 44 52 31 73 7 1989 58 42 55 29 73 6 1989 59 41 60 28 76 6 1989 60 40 61 27 78 5
1990 56 40 49 33 71 7 1990 59 47 52 34 73 7 1990 58 45 54 30 73 7 1990 59 48 59 27 75 7 1990 61 44 58 32 76 7
1991 55 37 42 35 67 8 1991 58 45 45 30 73 8 1991 58 43 47 30 72 6 1991 57 42 46 32 73 5 1991 57 40 48 29 79 5
1992 55 39 44 32 66 6 1992 58 44 46 32 68 6 1992 58 42 47 31 73 6 1992 59 41 49 31 75 6 1992 58 41 46 33 74 6
1993 55 43 47 33 68 8 1993 57 47 47 30 72 6 1993 56 44 46 31 73 6 1993 56 43 46 27 75 5 1993 59 38 51 31 74 6
1994 56 43 47 26 68 7 1994 57 46 50 28 69 6 1994 57 43 52 29 68 5 1994 56 42 45 30 70 5 1994 56 40 43 33 73 6
1995 57 44 49 30 69 7 1995 59 46 50 28 72 7 1995 58 46 48 27 76 7 1995 59 44 49 29 77 6 1995 59 42 49 28 78 6
1996 59 45 51 29 67 7 1996 58 44 52 29 69 6 1996 57 41 50 27 68 6 1996 60 40 48 29 75 6 1996 59 38 50 29 77 5
1997 59 47 46 31 68 7 1997 58 44 48 29 70 6 1997 57 43 48 28 70 5 1997 58 47 46 25 79 6 1997 62 40 54 32 78 7
1998 60 48 48 30 70 8 1998 59 44 49 27 69 7 1998 58 44 49 27 72 6 1998 58 42 48 28 72 7 1998 60 45 48 26 79 6
1999 59 50 46 33 69 8 1999 58 46 47 31 68 6 1999 57 45 50 24 69 5 1999 57 42 54 28 67 6 1999 56 38 54 29 68 5
2000 59 50 41 30 65 8 2000 59 44 40 23 67 5 2000 60 39 54 29 68 7 2000 59 41 56 26 71 6 2000 60 36 55 31 76 7
Notes: The Table reports the average age, the percent female, the fraction married (among females), the fraction widowed (among females), the fraction married (among males), 
the fraction widowed (among males) for each wealth fractile.
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
Top 0.1%
Table B4: Gender, Age, and Marital Status and by Fractiles of Total Wealth in the United States, 1916-2000 
Top 2% Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.25%Age Female Married Widows Married Widowers Age Female Married WidowsMarried Widowers Age Female Married Widows Married Widowers Age Female Married Widows Married Widowers
1916 25 1916 25 1916 1916
1917 30 1917 25 1917 1917
1918 26 1918 23 1918 1918
1919 55 26 1919 58 16 1919 1919 53 17
1920 57 24 1920 56 26 1920 1920 52 17
1921 57 25 1921 55 40 1921 1921 53 16
1922 56 23 1922 58 20 1922 1922 53 18
1923 57 29 1923 57 33 1923 1923 52 18
1924 57 28 1924 52 35 1924 1924 53 20
1925 58 28 41 42 70 11 1925 58 24 59 38 66 11 1925 1925 53 22 33 39 71 10
1926 59 22 45 45 74 10 1926 61 21 51 43 72 9 1926 1926 53 21 41 40 71 13
1927 57 26 51 35 74 12 1927 57 20 35 45 72 10 1927 1927
1928 56 21 40 48 76 9 1928 59 21 41 46 87 7 1928 1928
1929 56 25 42 46 75 12 1929 54 24 62 29 73 8 1929 1929
1930 57 25 48 41 81 8 1930 56 26 56 31 76 9 1930 1930
1931 59 30 35 46 75 11 1931 59 26 36 35 69 10 1931 1931
1932 57 31 35 48 74 9 1932 59 35 35 44 75 9 1932 1932
1933 58 28 35 47 70 12 1933 56 24 41 35 68 8 1933 1933
1934 60 35 40 45 73 11 1934 61 31 42 39 61 13 1934 1934
1935 59 32 38 48 73 12 1935 59 27 29 55 67 10 1935 1935
1936 56 34 44 41 74 11 1936 57 32 50 38 69 13 1936 1936 54 18 43 37 75 10
1937 58 35 34 47 71 10 1937 57 33 34 38 73 7 1937 1937 53 22 40 40 73 10
1938 58 35 42 39 64 10 1938 56 35 46 37 60 7 1938 1938 53 19 44 36 78 8
1939 58 35 34 43 70 12 1939 53 31 39 49 60 9 1939 1939 53 21 40 39 76 9
1940 59 40 40 41 77 11 1940 58 37 42 37 79 11 1940 1940 54 22 41 37 76 9
1941 59 37 41 45 75 12 1941 59 39 58 35 76 14 1941 1941 54 26 39 40 74 10
1942 57 41 43 40 67 11 1942 56 48 49 36 70 18 1942 1942 54 24 43 40 78 9
1943 56 38 41 41 69 8 1943 53 26 36 51 61 7 1943 1943 52 16 49 35 80 7
1944 57 33 37 44 71 10 1944 58 32 28 41 63 8 1944 54 15 59 29 85 4 1944 51 21 37 39 73 9
1945 56 37 53 31 78 8 1945 59 42 57 36 80 10 1945 50 13 43 38 78 7 1945 53 27 37 40 78 8
1946 1946 1946 1946
1947 1947 1947 1947
1948 57 30 1948 61 26 1948 54 34 1948 53 26
1949 58 30 1949 57 35 1949 55 32 1949 53 26
1950 58 29 1950 61 27 1950 55 33 1950 54 25
1953 57 35 1953 57 48 1953 55 32 1953 55 25
1954 1954 1954 1954
1956 1956 1956 1956
1958 58 38 1958 59 46 1958 55 29 1958 55 26
1960 1960 1960 1960
1962 60 43 50 38 82 7 1962 61 45 56 29 86 6 1962 58 40 43 40 83 7 1962 59 40 43 41 83 8
1965 45 1965 44 1965 40 1965 43
1969 60 47 49 34 83 10 1969 62 48 46 45 83 8 1969 59 43 35 39 80 8 1969 59 43 40 44 84 7
1972 55 48 35 43 79 8 1972 59 45 41 43 81 6 1972 59 44 41 46 78 9 1972 56 44 34 47 73 8
1976 62 40 44 45 83 6 1976 62 44 31 60 83 6 1976 59 40 34 46 84 5 1976 57 37 40 41 78 7
1982 60 38 52 28 87 6 1982 60 31 63 30 89 4 1982 56 38 42 40 79 9 1982 59 45 45 38 81 8
1983 60 30 62 19 86 3 1983 58 52 64 22 89 5 1983 57 40 32 43 78 8 1983 58 39 53 37 84 7
1984 61 30 37 57 78 13 1984 62 43 68 24 80 9 1984 54 29 70 21 62 8 1984 60 38 51 26 65 12
1985 60 35 38 38 85 4 1985 61 33 55 36 73 4 1985 49 21 42 37 69 10 1985 59 41 47 29 69 7
1986 59 34 60 27 82 4 1986 57 25 67 33 87 3 1986 50 26 45 37 64 9 1986 59 48 48 39 73 9
1987 59 40 65 24 85 4 1987 59 36 71 22 85 4 1987 49 19 37 47 58 10 1987 58 46 43 39 72 8
1988 61 38 55 30 85 7 1988 62 40 60 31 91 5 1988 50 23 42 33 64 11 1988 59 52 42 40 71 7
1989 60 41 60 28 78 5 1989 59 28 51 39 83 3 1989 52 33 48 36 64 8 1989 60 46 49 33 72 8
1990 62 39 52 39 78 6 1990 60 48 55 29 84 7 1990 53 33 47 32 69 7 1990 59 48 50 37 73 8
1991 59 36 52 32 83 3 1991 61 46 38 34 87 4 1991 52 30 39 40 61 9 1991 58 47 42 31 75 9
1992 57 37 45 34 71 5 1992 61 37 55 34 82 5 1992 53 34 42 32 64 7 1992 57 46 44 34 63 6
1993 62 33 47 39 78 5 1993 61 33 29 35 79 5 1993 54 39 48 37 64 9 1993 58 50 47 28 71 7
1994 62 38 48 37 81 6 1994 60 29 50 36 87 4 1994 55 40 44 24 67 8 1994 56 49 49 27 70 7
1995 57 45 51 24 79 5 1995 62 42 61 32 79 7 1995 55 42 48 32 67 8 1995 60 47 52 29 68 7
1996 62 38 59 31 78 5 1996 64 32 51 37 83 5 1996 59 47 50 29 65 8 1996 59 47 53 31 70 6
1997 62 37 56 31 81 5 1997 63 35 59 29 89 5 1997 60 49 43 33 66 9 1997 59 46 48 30 71 6
1998 61 46 57 26 78 6 1998 58 43 75 17 72 4 1998 61 52 46 32 71 9 1998 59 44 49 27 65 7
1999 58 40 56 27 78 6 1999 60 26 51 36 77 9 1999 60 53 45 36 70 9 1999 58 48 43 38 67 7
2000 60 36 62 27 82 6 2000 60 35 65 21 88 4 2000 59 56 41 37 64 10 2000 57 49 26 17 65 3
Notes: The Table reports (NOT YET WEIGHTED WITH MULTIPLIERS) the average age, the percent female, the fraction married (among females), the fraction widowed (among females), the fraction married (among males), 
the fraction widowed (among males) for each wealth fractile.
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
Top 1-0.5%
Table B4: Gender, Age, and Marital Status and by Fractiles of Total Wealth in the United States, 1916-2000 (continued)
Top 0.05% Top 0.01% Top 2-1%Age Female Married Widows Married Widowers Age Female Married Widows Married Widowers Age Female Married Widows Married Widowers Age Female Married Widows Married Widowers Age Female Married Widows Married Widowers
1916 25 1916 25 1916 25 1916 25 1916 25
1917 26 1917 28 1917 29 1917 32 1917 25
1918 26 1918 26 1918 29 1918 26 1918 23
1919 55 24 1919 56 25 1919 57 24 1919 55 28 1919 58 16
1920 55 23 1920 55 22 1920 55 25 1920 57 23 1920 56 26
1921 55 22 1921 56 25 1921 56 26 1921 57 21 1921 55 40
1922 55 27 1922 55 25 1922 56 25 1922 56 24 1922 58 20
1923 56 29 1923 56 26 1923 56 29 1923 57 28 1923 57 33
1924 56 26 1924 56 28 1924 55 26 1924 58 26 1924 52 35
1925 55 26 37 41 72 10 1925 56 24 37 42 75 10 1925 57 23 42 43 76 9 1925 58 29 36 43 71 11 1925 58 24 59 38 66 11
1926 55 28 38 39 72 12 1926 56 29 38 46 76 9 1926 57 28 45 37 75 10 1926 58 23 43 45 74 10 1926 61 21 51 43 72 9
1927 54 23 43 39 79 10 1927 55 27 43 41 77 9 1927 56 27 34 48 75 10 1927 57 27 55 33 74 12 1927 57 20 35 45 72 10
1928 54 21 40 39 78 9 1928 55 29 41 41 75 10 1928 56 25 39 50 77 11 1928 56 21 40 48 73 10 1928 59 21 41 46 87 7
1929 54 26 42 40 75 10 1929 55 30 36 43 78 8 1929 56 27 42 40 75 12 1929 57 26 37 50 75 13 1929 54 24 62 29 73 8
1930 53 21 38 38 79 8 1930 55 29 40 40 76 8 1930 57 33 47 37 80 9 1930 58 24 46 44 82 8 1930 56 26 56 31 76 9
1931 52 14 49 38 84 6 1931 57 32 35 41 77 10 1931 57 32 44 44 76 10 1931 58 31 35 49 77 11 1931 59 26 36 35 69 10
1932 56 28 43 40 73 11 1932 56 31 36 44 72 12 1932 57 34 44 39 78 11 1932 57 29 35 49 74 9 1932 59 35 35 44 75 9
1933 56 30 40 43 72 11 1933 57 34 37 46 76 12 1933 57 32 38 47 70 12 1933 58 30 33 50 71 13 1933 56 24 41 35 68 8
1934 56 32 40 43 73 11 1934 57 36 41 40 71 11 1934 57 34 39 42 69 11 1934 59 36 40 46 76 11 1934 61 31 42 39 61 13
1935 57 36 37 43 68 13 1935 56 39 39 40 70 11 1935 57 39 33 45 72 9 1935 59 33 40 46 75 13 1935 59 27 29 55 67 10
1936 57 35 32 46 71 11 1936 57 34 35 45 72 12 1936 59 34 41 42 74 12 1936 56 35 43 42 75 10 1936 57 32 50 38 69 13
1937 57 36 36 42 70 12 1937 58 38 38 42 76 11 1937 57 38 47 36 71 10 1937 59 35 34 49 70 11 1937 57 33 34 38 73 7
1938 57 35 36 42 71 11 1938 58 34 37 45 76 10 1938 58 35 33 42 71 12 1938 58 35 41 39 65 11 1938 56 35 46 37 60 7
1939 57 36 37 45 70 11 1939 58 36 38 46 71 10 1939 57 36 46 37 70 11 1939 60 36 33 42 73 13 1939 53 31 39 49 60 9
1940 57 35 37 42 72 11 1940 57 37 37 41 75 10 1940 58 36 34 42 75 9 1940 59 40 39 42 76 11 1940 58 37 42 37 79 11
1941 58 36 31 46 74 10 1941 57 37 40 43 74 9 1941 57 39 37 41 71 10 1941 59 36 37 47 75 11 1941 59 39 58 35 76 14
1942 57 37 37 42 73 10 1942 57 38 36 42 71 10 1942 58 34 31 50 75 8 1942 57 39 41 41 66 9 1942 56 48 49 36 70 18
1943 55 32 41 40 74 8 1943 57 34 35 41 77 9 1943 56 31 39 43 70 10 1943 56 41 42 38 71 8 1943 53 26 36 51 61 7
1944 54 28 40 42 73 8 1944 54 34 41 37 72 8 1944 54 32 44 39 75 7 1944 57 33 39 45 73 10 1944 58 32 28 41 63 8
1945 55 32 39 41 77 8 1945 55 30 38 42 75 7 1945 57 32 43 43 75 8 1945 56 35 52 30 78 8 1945 59 42 57 36 80 10
1946 1946 1946 1946 1946
1947 1947 1947 1947 1947
1948 54 46 1948 55 24 1948 56 27 1948 56 31 1948 61 26
1949 54 46 1949 56 22 1949 57 27 1949 58 29 1949 57 35
1950 55 45 1950 55 27 1950 56 28 1950 57 29 1950 61 27
1953 54 46 1953 55 26 1953 57 31 1953 56 32 1953 57 48
1954 1954 1954 1954 1954
1956 1956 1956 1956 1956
1958 55 45 1958 57 30 1958 57 32 1958 58 36 1958 59 46
1960 1960 1960 1960 1960
1962 59 39 41 42 82 7 1962 58 41 45 36 80 7 1962 59 45 56 32 85 6 1962 60 43 48 40 81 7 1962 61 45 56 29 86 6
1965 42 1965 0 42 0000 1965 42 1965 45 1965 44
1969 59 41 39 40 83 7 1969 60 39 49 38 81 7 1969 60 41 42 41 85 6 1969 59 47 50 31 83 10 1969 62 48 46 45 83 8
1972 59 43 40 42 79 8 1972 59 46 42 36 82 8 1972 58 45 40 32 83 6 1972 54 49 34 43 79 9 1972 59 45 41 43 81 6
1976 62 42 33 47 81 7 1976 60 42 38 44 83 7 1976 60 42 43 41 81 7 1976 62 40 47 41 83 6 1976 62 44 31 60 83 6
1982 58 44 47 35 80 7 1982 59 42 49 38 79 7 1982 60 38 50 40 83 5 1982 60 39 49 28 86 6 1982 60 31 63 30 89 4
1983 60 34 56 28 89 8 1983 61 39 38 54 84 6 1983 59 38 60 28 94 2 1983 60 24 62 18 85 3 1983 58 52 64 22 89 5
1984 58 51 62 22 81 5 1984 60 50 76 14 76 7 1984 63 48 65 32 94 2 1984 61 26 29 65 78 14 1984 62 43 68 24 80 9
1985 58 37 41 35 79 4 1985 59 42 53 29 77 7 1985 59 51 53 30 83 10 1985 60 36 34 39 88 4 1985 61 33 55 36 73 4
1986 58 44 45 37 72 7 1986 58 45 53 30 76 6 1986 60 37 46 31 81 5 1986 59 36 58 26 81 4 1986 57 25 67 33 87 3
1987 59 42 49 35 76 8 1987 60 30 56 34 80 5 1987 58 31 62 32 79 4 1987 59 41 63 25 85 4 1987 59 36 71 22 85 4
1988 59 47 46 31 77 6 1988 56 38 44 28 74 4 1988 60 37 50 30 78 5 1988 61 37 54 30 84 8 1988 62 40 60 31 91 5
1989 57 44 50 30 70 6 1989 59 41 60 28 75 6 1989 60 40 62 27 78 5 1989 60 44 62 25 77 5 1989 59 28 51 39 83 3
1990 57 42 49 34 71 6 1990 59 51 59 23 74 7 1990 59 48 65 26 73 7 1990 63 37 51 41 77 6 1990 60 48 55 29 84 7
1991 58 44 49 27 71 7 1991 57 43 45 34 69 6 1991 55 43 44 26 74 6 1991 58 34 55 31 82 3 1991 61 46 38 34 87 4
1992 58 43 45 31 71 5 1992 59 41 52 30 75 6 1992 59 45 46 33 77 6 1992 56 37 43 34 68 5 1992 61 37 55 34 82 5
1993 55 46 47 36 71 6 1993 54 46 42 24 75 5 1993 55 43 56 23 70 6 1993 63 33 51 40 78 5 1993 61 33 29 35 79 5
1994 58 43 58 28 66 5 1994 56 43 47 28 67 5 1994 51 41 37 30 66 5 1994 62 40 48 37 79 7 1994 60 29 50 36 87 4
1995 57 47 47 24 75 7 1995 59 46 49 30 77 7 1995 61 38 48 33 77 6 1995 56 46 48 22 79 5 1995 62 42 61 32 79 7
1996 53 42 53 24 60 6 1996 60 42 47 29 74 6 1996 57 38 42 27 75 5 1996 61 39 61 30 77 5 1996 64 32 51 37 83 5
1997 56 39 51 31 61 4 1997 55 51 41 21 79 6 1997 62 43 52 33 76 8 1997 62 37 55 31 79 5 1997 63 35 59 29 89 5
1998 58 46 50 26 73 6 1998 56 40 48 29 67 7 1998 58 44 39 27 79 7 1998 62 47 53 28 80 6 1998 58 43 75 17 72 4
1999 57 48 47 20 71 5 1999 58 44 53 28 67 6 1999 53 35 53 30 58 4 1999 58 44 57 25 78 5 1999 60 26 51 36 77 9
2000 61 37 53 32 65 9 2000 59 44 56 22 68 5 2000 59 35 49 36 69 8 2000 60 37 61 28 81 6 2000 60 35 65 21 88 4
Notes: The Table reports the average age, the percent female, the fraction married (among females), the fraction widowed (among females), the fraction married (among males), 
the fraction widowed (among males) for each wealth fractile.
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
Top 0.01%
Table B4: Gender, Age, and Marital Status and by Fractiles of Total Wealth in the United States, 1916-2000 (continued)
Top 0.5-0.25% Top 0.25-0.1% Top 0.1-0.05% Top 0.05-0.01%Author Kopczuk-Saez Lampman (1962) Smith (1984) Wolff-Marley (1989) Wolff (1995) Scholz (2003)
Unit Adults Adults Individuals Individuals Households Households
Data Estates Estates Estates Patched Estates Patched SCF-Estates SCF
Wealth Net Worth Net Worth Net Worth Total Assets Net Worth Net Worth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1922 36.02 31.6 34.0 36.7
1929 36.76 36.3 37.2 44.2
1933 30.31 28.3 31.3 33.3
1939 25.95 30.6 38.1 36.4
1945 24.65 23.3 28.9 29.8
1949 22.59 20.8 25.7 27.1
1953 23.77 24.3 28.1 31.2
1954 23.18 24.0
1956 24.75 26.0
1958 24.18 26.6 27.0
1962 24.39 28.2 30.1 31.8 31.6
1965 24.70 25.4 31.9 34.4
1969 22.86 27.4 29.0 31.1
1972 23.13 21.9 28.6 29.1
1976 19.32 19.2 18.9 19.9
1983 21.07 30.9 31.5
1986 22.66 31.9





Notes: Lampman (1962), Table 94, p. 204, estimates are based on all estate tax returns filers and Pareto interpolation to optain top 1% share. 
Smith (1984), Table 1, p. 422, ranks individuals by total assets (not net worth) and defines top 1% group relative to total population 
(not only adults), and reports share of net-worth for this group.
Wolff-Marley (1989), Table 6, p. 786, row W2, completed and corrected in Wolff (1995), Table A1, pp. 78-79, col. (1), "Wolff-Marley series".
Top 1% defined relative to total population (not only adults). Estimates based on previous estimates by Lampman (1962) and Smith (1984).
Wolff (1995), Table A1, pp. 78-79, col. (6) "New Household Series" based on previous "Wolff-Marley" series and SCF estimations. 
Scholz (2003) based on SCF data.
Table C1: Comparing Top 1% Wealth Share with Previous EstimatesVery Top Wealth Shares Ratio to Average Wealth Top Estate Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Forbes 400 Forbes 400 Top .0002% Top .00005% Top .0002-.00005% Top .0002% Top .00005% Top .0002-.00005% Top .01%
Total Wealth Average Wealth (top 404 (top 101 (rank 102 to 404 (top 404 (top 101 (rank 102 to 404 Share
(billions 2000 $)(millions 2000 $) in 2000) in 2000) in 2000) in 2000) in 2000) in 2000) (top 20,000 in 2000)
1982 164.2 411 0.984 0.521 0.510 4,922 10,414 3,400 2.525
1983 204.1 510 1.187 0.593 0.593 5,933 11,864 3,957 3.194
1984 207.3 518 1.165 0.595 0.570 5,826 11,909 3,799 3.514
1985 214.5 536 1.153 0.567 0.586 5,763 11,335 3,905 4.085
1986 245.1 613 1.217 0.628 0.589 6,084 12,560 3,926 3.913
1987 333.6 834 1.603 0.856 0.747 8,017 17,129 4,979 3.438
1988 320.4 801 1.486 0.797 0.689 7,430 15,946 4,592 3.596
1989 373.1 933 1.670 0.885 0.785 8,349 17,702 5,232 3.791
1990 359.5 899 1.635 0.868 0.767 8,173 17,360 5,110 3.631
1991 363.4 909 1.658 0.932 0.726 8,291 18,649 4,839 3.549
1992 369.3 923 1.655 0.946 0.709 8,277 18,930 4,726 3.715
1993 390.6 977 1.735 1.000 0.735 8,676 20,001 4,901 3.761
1994 405.2 1,013 1.799 1.049 0.750 8,994 20,976 5,001 3.857
1995 446.0 1,115 1.923 1.142 0.781 9,614 22,841 5,205 3.988
1996 514.0 1,285 2.089 1.221 0.868 10,444 24,424 5,785 3.836
1997 669.5 1,674 2.537 1.552 0.985 12,687 31,042 6,569 3.778
1998 779.3 1,948 2.715 1.751 0.965 13,577 35,017 6,431 3.987
1999 1033.0 2,582 3.286 2.268 1.018 16,429 45,355 6,787 3.910
2000 1200.1 3,000 3.743 2.510 1.233 18,715 50,202 8,219 3.896
2001 925.1 2,313 3.031 1.971 1.060 15,157 39,428 7,066
2002 860.0 2,150 2.958 1.909 1.049 14,791 38,184 6,993
Notes: Data source is the Forbes 400 Richest American list published annually in October by Forbes Magazine since 1982.
Columns (1) and (2) report the total wealth and average wealth of the Forbes 400 richest (in 2000 dollars, CPI from Table A)
Columns (3) to (5) report the share of total wealth (reported in Table A, col. (3)) for the top .0002%, the top .00005%, and the top .0002-.00005% estimated using the Forbes list.
The top .0002% corresponds to the top 404 richest americans in 2000. The top .00005% corresponds to the top 101 richest americans in 2000.
The top .0002-.00005% corresponds to the americans with wealth rank 102 to 404 in 2000.
Columns (6) to (8) report the ratio of the average wealth in the top .0002%, the top .00005%, and the top .0002-.00005% to the average wealth in the United States 
(from col. (4) in Table A).
Column (9) report the top .01% wealth share estimated from tax returns (from Table B1, col. (7)).
Table C2: Very Top Shares from Forbes 400 Richest AmericansGroups .01% .05-.01% .1-.05% .25-.1% .5-.25% 1-.5% 2-1% .01% .05-.01%.1-.05%.25-.1%.5-.25% 1-.5% 2-1% .01% .05-.01%.1-.05% .25-.1% .5-.25% 1-.5% 2-1%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1916 57 211 227 681 1,140 55 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 100% 93% 64% 44% 32% 42%
1917 196 673 753 2,211 3,797 661 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 90% 67% 46% 32% 33%
1918 177 602 794 2,192 3,726 2,297 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 93% 74% 48% 34% 34%
1919 160 596 708 2,006 3,298 4,366 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 98% 82% 52% 39% 34%
1920 161 625 715 2,110 3,383 5,506 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 98% 84% 53% 40% 34%
1921 175 606 727 2,117 3,253 4,801 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 15% 0% 0% 0% 0%
1922 172 618 758 2,137 3,486 5,258 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 22% 0% 0% 0% 0%
1923 180 671 775 2,353 3,907 5,020 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 23% 0% 0% 0% 0%
1924 155 724 736 2,390 3,839 5,463 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 26% 1% 0% 0% 0%
1925 188 726 852 2,343 3,923 5,746 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 32% 0% 0% 0% 0%
1926 227 804 927 2,585 2,256 937 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.81 6.51 100% 27% 1% 0% 0% 0%
1927 197 740 849 2,432 3,454 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 42% 1% 0% 0%
1928 215 752 916 2,681 3,754 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 100% 88% 61% 52%
1929 193 792 904 2,600 3,931 417 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 100% 91% 65% 50% 70%
1930 175 825 942 2,608 3,590 77 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 100% 100% 85% 59% 54% 75%
1931 229 840 1,000 2,852 2,291 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 23% 1% 0% 1%
1932 244 839 1,035 2,519 2,470 377 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.14 1.76 1.76 89% 2% 0% 0% 0% 1%
1933 210 899 992 3,033 4,541 907 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0%
1934 276 939 1,057 3,124 4,788 777 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 93% 3% 0% 0% 0% 1%
1935 260 957 1,127 3,153 4,567 992 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.16 2.97 100% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0%
1936 222 901 1,239 3,385 5,471 4,672 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 16% 0% 0% 0% 0%
1937 258 997 1,139 3,493 5,603 5,078 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 8% 0% 0% 0% 0%
1938 241 917 1,180 3,344 5,378 4,729 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 83% 49% 32% 23% 23%
1939 243 1,074 1,129 3,445 5,502 5,249 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 100% 78% 57% 41% 42%
1940 252 1,027 1,239 3,477 5,787 5,505 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 78% 47% 32% 21% 21%
1941 260 1,039 1,193 3,379 5,613 6,537 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 98% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0%
1942 224 927 1,208 3,201 5,113 5,001 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.25 100% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0%
1943 278 971 1,121 3,444 5,212 5,123 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 99% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0%
1944 252 966 998 3,000 4,920 7,240 332 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 89% 51% 33% 25% 20% 25%
1945 295 884 1,120 3,033 4,920 8,319 1,555 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 14% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
1962 321 1,290 1,531 4,228 7,001 13,717 25,448 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1965 352 1,356 1,539 4,778 8,000 8,971 8,148 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.76 3.77 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1969 401 1,373 1,636 4,554 6,345 4,430 7,218 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.10 1.25 3.48 4.13 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1972 367 1,352 1,702 5,305 8,116 7,197 6,763 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.20 4.72 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1976 428 1,715 1,893 5,517 4,824 3,498 5,623 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.97 4.65 5.84 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1982 345 1,317 1,678 4,634 3,153 4,801 5,601 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.09 2.57 3.39 4.48 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1983 328 438 21 132 128 289 504 1.07 4.04 60.76 45.24 56.13 61.63 56.54 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1984 377 550 62 124 182 367 661 1.05 2.54 32.42 38.90 46.32 60.48 40.08 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1985 407 732 65 241 371 647 613 1.03 2.62 20.92 19.58 24.49 28.94 10.74 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1986 363 1,209 958 2,630 3,888 2,699 2,071 1.00 1.21 2.01 1.99 2.38 6.89 4.54 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1987 421 1,084 184 484 671 967 636 1.00 1.32 10.46 12.89 14.19 19.51 9.15 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1988 435 1,248 200 451 790 1,185 956 1.01 1.35 9.12 11.66 12.60 16.58 8.44 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1989 405 1,464 930 2,545 4,027 5,000 3,785 1.00 1.05 2.09 2.16 2.24 3.98 3.81 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1990 397 1,456 265 579 877 1,109 1,438 1.00 1.27 7.08 9.47 10.71 16.55 13.69 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1991 445 858 552 1,317 1,054 1,445 1,605 1.00 1.66 3.38 4.16 9.55 13.71 11.73 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1992 431 1,625 794 1,918 1,725 2,502 3,132 1.00 1.00 2.58 3.13 5.60 8.12 6.49 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1993 463 1,031 587 1,643 1,189 1,844 2,304 1.00 1.92 3.32 3.43 8.46 11.56 11.98 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1994 443 1,036 546 1,739 1,279 1,681 2,398 1.00 1.87 3.24 3.47 8.25 11.63 12.81 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1995 501 1,615 1,192 2,227 1,885 2,981 3,932 1.00 1.01 1.96 2.92 5.53 7.53 8.51 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1996 544 1,139 754 1,906 1,371 2,206 2,957 1.00 1.61 2.92 3.55 6.67 10.20 14.16 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1997 534 1,358 869 1,699 1,959 2,257 3,044 1.00 1.51 2.80 3.48 5.47 10.13 15.83 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1998 419 2,048 2,086 2,198 2,887 3,615 4,623 1.00 1.01 1.10 2.98 3.73 6.37 10.71 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1999 473 1,446 668 1,455 1,773 1,605 2,659 1.00 1.17 3.13 4.90 5.54 13.65 18.33 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
2000 458 1,530 600 900 942 998 1,678 1.00 1.20 3.87 7.22 13.72 21.65 29.26 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Notes: Computations by authors based on estate tax return micro-dataset. See Appendix Section B for details.
The weight numbers represent the inverse of the sampling probability. Complete edit data provides detailed information on estate composition.
Table D: Sample size, weights, asset details information
Fraction  subject to a complete edit Sample size Average WeightFIGURE 1
Average Real Wealth and Consumer Price Index in the United States, 1916-2002


















































































































































) Average Wealth Corporate Equity
Wealth less corp. equity Consumer Price IndexFIGURE 2
The Top 1% Wealth Share in the United States, 1916-2000



























































































Average Real Wealth of bottom 99% and top 1% in the United States, 1916-2000
Source: Table B2, columns Top 1%, Bottom 99% computed from Average Wealth (Table A, Col. (4)) 











































































































































Top 1% average wealth
Bottom 99% average wealthFIGURE 4
The Wealth Shares of Top 2-1%, 1-0.5%, and 0.5-0.1%, 1916-2000
Source: Table B1, columns Top 2-1%, 1-0.5%, and 0.5-0.1%. 

























































































Top 2-1% Top 1-0.5% Top 0.5-0.1%FIGURE 5
The Shares of the Top Wealth Groups in the United States, 1916-2000
Source: Table B1, Columns 0.1%, and 0.01%. 























































































































































Wealth Composition of Top Groups within the Top 0.5% in 1929
Source: Table B3, row 1929.















































Real Estate Bonds and Cash Stock OtherFIGURE 7
Fraction of Corporate Stock within the Top .5% and total net-worth, 1916-2000




























































































Fraction Stock in top .5% Fraction Stock in total net-worthFIGURE 8
Average Age and Fraction Female in Top 0.5%, 1916-2000






































































































Average Age Percent FemaleFIGURE 9
The Top 0.01% Income Share and Composition, 1916-2000
The Figure displays the top 0.01% income share (top curve). Estimates are based on families
 and not individuals.
Taxpayers are ranked by income excluding capital gains but capital gains included in the share.
Interest, Rents, Trusts, etc.),
The Figure displays the composition of those top incomes into Capital Income (Dividends, 
Realized Capital Gains, Business Income (Sole Proprietorships, Partnerships, S-Corporations), 
and Salaries (Wages and Salaries, Pensions).















































































Capital Income Capital Gains Business Income SalariesFIGURE 10
Marginal Tax Rate and Wealth Share for the Top 0.1%, 1916-2000
Notes: Marginal Tax Rate computations are made assuming no deductions beyond the basic exemption.
Effective marginal tax rates are lower due to additional deductions (funeral expenses, spousal bequest 




























































































































Top 0.1% Marginal Tax Rate Top marginal tax rate
Top 0.1% ShareFIGURE 11








































































































Very Top Shares from Forbes 400 Richest Americans, 1983-2002
Source: Table C2, col. (3), (4), (5), and (9). 













































































































Top .0002% (top 400 in 2000)
Top .00005% (top 100 in 2000)
Top .0002-.00005% (101 to 400 in 2000)FIGURE 13
The Top 1% Wealth Share in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France
Sources: United States, Table B1, column Top 1%
United Kingdom: 1913-1972, Atkinson and Harrison (1978), p. 159, Column Top 1%, England and Wales. 
1976-2000: Inland Revenue Personal Wealth (Top 1% Marketable net worth series for adult population, 
Table 13.5) http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/stats/personal_wealth/dopw_t05_1.htm
Series 1913-1989 reproduced in Lindert (2000), Table 2, pp. 181-182.
France: Piketty, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal (2003), Table 4, Top 1% estate share 



































































































United States United Kingdom FranceFigure A1
Ratio of the average mortality to the mortality of the wealthy





















































Male 25K-50K Female 25K-50K
Male 50K+ Female 50K+
Note: The graph is based on tables 1 and 7 in Rogot et al. (1992) and shows the ratios of death rates for white 
individuals with family incomes above 25,000 and 50,000 of 1980 dollars to the corresponding death rates for the 
whole population (Table 1).  The annualized death rates for income-age categories are computed by multiplying the
annualized mortality rate for the age category by the ratio of actual and expected numbers of deaths in the income 
categories (all of these numbers are reported in Table 7).  Deaths in Rogot et al. (1992) are tabulated for age 
categories of: 0-14, 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, 75-84, 85+ and the corresponding values of age used
on the graph are 7, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 and 90. The number of individuals and deaths in the $50,000+ 
categories is relatively small and the resulting age-pattern is considerably noisier.Figure A2
over time, based on Buck tables










































































































Average females Average malesFigure A3
over time, based on annuity data



























































































































































































































Note: the socioeconomic mortality differentials are based on estimates from Brown, Liebman and Pollet (2002) for 
the  college-educated  population.  Values greater than 100% were set to 100%. See the discussion in Appendix B.Figure A5
The Top 1% Wealth Share: The Impact of Life Insurance
Note: The Series No Life Insurance excludes completely life insurance payments from the numerator. The series 
Cash Surrender Value only includes only the cash surrender value of life insurance (as in all our series reported in 
Table B1). The series Full Payout includes the full value of life insurance reported on estate tax returns. For all three 












































































Cash Surrender Value only
Full Payout Included
` `Figure A6
Marital status of top wealth-holders located
in the community property states
(Upper panel: top .05%. Lower panel: top .25-.05%)
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